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INTRODUCTION 
New law students often experience a kind of culture shock.  A bit of this 
shock comes from the flurry of unfamiliar words and phrases that students 
confront in most every class—assumpsit, bill of attainder, demurrer, 
easement, ex post facto law, seisin, trover.  Another share comes from 
seeing more familiar words used in new ways—bond, consideration, 
covenant, release, servitude.  Law professors tell students, especially in 
those rocky first few weeks of first year classes, to “look it up!”  Look it up 
in Black’s Law Dictionary, or Bouvier’s Law Dictionary . . . just look it 
up.1 
Law professors thus follow the tradition of teachers generally, who help 
students fully join a language community by urging them to consult an 
exhaustively researched, carefully constructed repository of the range of 
ordinary meanings of words in that community—in other words, a 
dictionary.  And in this exchange both teachers and students reflect and 
reinforce the “reverence for dictionaries” that is “deeply embedded in our 
                                                          
 1. For an engaging account of Bouvier’s decline and Black’s ubiquity, see Mary 
Whisner, Bouvier’s, Black’s, and Tinkerbell, 92 LAW LIBR. J. 99 (2000). 
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culture.”2  Indeed, dictionaries can be powerful symbols of cultural 
accomplishment and belonging.  Consider, for example, the ad copy that 
accompanied the 1961 launch of Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, still one of the leading unabridged dictionaries of the English 
language:  “Hold the English language in your two hands,” embodied by a 
copy of Webster’s Third, “and you possess the proven key to knowledge, 
enjoyment, and success!”3 
If judicial behavior is any indication, dictionary formulations of ordinary 
meanings not only mark common ground in a language community, they 
also play a prominent role in officially stated justifications for legal 
judgments.  The U.S. Supreme Court, setting the tone for the national 
judiciary, continues to quote extensively from both law dictionaries and 
general purpose English language dictionaries in its opinions.  In the 
October 2003 Term, for example, seven majority opinions (9.6%) from 
among the Court’s seventy-three cases with full opinions4 use one or more 
dictionaries to justify the chosen construction of a disputed statute,5 
constitutional provision,6 or other binding legal text.7  Nor is the October 
                                                          
 2. Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH 50, 50 (1993).  
Professor Solan, a law professor with a Ph.D. in linguistics and the author of The Language 
of Judges (1993), is currently the Director of the Center for the Study of Law, Language and 
Cognition at Brooklyn Law School.  See also SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES:  THE ART & 
CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 6 (2d ed. 2001).  “Dictionary is a powerful word.  Authors and 
publishers have found that if they call a reference book a dictionary it tends to sell better 
than it would if called by another name because the word suggests authority, scholarship, 
and precision.”  Id. 
 3. HERBERT C. MORTON, THE STORY OF WEBSTER’S THIRD:  PHILIP GOVE’S 
CONTROVERSIAL DICTIONARY AND ITS CRITICS 215 (1994) (facing page).  The ad itself is 
reproduced infra in App. A. 
 4. Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 
5, 2004, at A1 (“The court decided 73 cases with full opinions during the term.”). 
 5. See Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 n.3 (2004) (citing BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) in support of its construction of the term “assessment” in the 
Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341); Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124 S. Ct. 
1836, 1845 & nn.15-16 (2004) (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000), 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968), and OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) 
in support of its construction of “arising under” in the federal catchall statute of limitations, 
28 U.S.C. § 1658); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 
1756, 1761 (2004) (citing WEBSTER’S SECOND NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1945) in 
support of its construction of the term “standard” in the Clean Air Act’s pre-emption 
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)); United States v. Galletti, 124 S. Ct. 1548, 1553 (2004) 
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) in support of its construction of the term 
“assessment” in § 6502 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6502). 
 6. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004) (citing NOAH WEBSTER, 
AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828), in support of its construction 
of “witnesses” in the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. VI). 
 7. See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 124 S. Ct. 1221, 1226 & n.6 (2004) (citing 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 
1990), and WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1999) in support of its 
construction of “accident” in the Warsaw Convention on injuries sustained during 
international air travel); Virginia v. Maryland, 124 S. Ct. 598, 603 & n.2 (2003) (using 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) to define “low-water mark” in applying an 1877 
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2003 Term unusual on this score.  Over the past twenty years, the Supreme 
Court has increasingly relied on dictionaries to explain its constructions of 
legal text.8  The federal judiciary, as a whole, has also cited both general 
purpose and law dictionaries more frequently in recent years.9 
It should come as little surprise, then, that the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”), which hears all appeals arising 
under the U.S. patent laws,10 has also turned increasingly to dictionaries 
when explaining its constructions of disputed terms in patent claims.  Court 
reliance on dictionaries to construe disputed patent claim terms is, to be 
sure, nothing new.  The regional circuit courts of appeal heard patent 
                                                          
arbitrators’ decision to a present-day riparian rights dispute between Virginia and 
Maryland). 
 8. The first two empirical studies of the phenomenon are Solan, supra note 2, at 51 
(reporting data on Supreme Court citations to dictionaries from 1986 to 1991), and Note, 
Looking It Up:  Dictionaries in Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438-40 
(1994) (reporting data on Supreme Court citations to dictionaries from 1958 to 1992).  The 
most comprehensive study of the Supreme Court’s reliance on dictionaries, which covers 
the entire body of the Court’s opinions through the 1997-98 term, is the magisterial Samuel 
A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress:  The United 
States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999) [hereinafter 
Lexicon Fortress].  In this study, Thumma & Kirchmeier observed that, “at the Court’s 
present rate, the decade of the 1990s will give rise to nearly half of all the opinions in the 
Court’s two-century history where a Justice has relied on a dictionary.”  Id. at 260 
(emphasis in original).  In an update to their study, they report that their “predictions [in 
1999] were correct:  the 1990s alone accounted for nearly half of all the opinions in 
Supreme Court history in which the Court relied on a dictionary.”  Samuel A. Thumma & 
Jeffrey Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Remains a Fortress: An Update, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 51, 52 
(2001) (emphasis in original). 
 9. For example, using the search term (dictionary /6 (“webster’s” or “american 
heritage” or “random house” or college or collegiate or concise or unabridged or oxford)) in 
Westlaw’s allfeds database, one observes the following total number of “hits” annually over 
the last decade (reflecting a 37.2% increase from 1994 to 2003): 
 
YEAR NUMBER OF “HITS” YEAR NUMBER OF “HITS” 
1994 537 1999 638 
1995 519 2000 610 
1996 565 2001 662 
1997 636 2002 718 
1998 628 2003 737 
 
In addition, using the search term (“black’s law dictionary” or “bouvier’s law dictionary” 
or “ballentine’s law dictionary”) in Westlaw’s allfeds database, one observes the following 
total number of “hits” annually over the last decade (reflecting a 32.2% increase from 1994 
to 2003): 
 
YEAR NUMBER OF “HITS” YEAR NUMBER OF “HITS” 
1994 515 1999 603 
1995 559 2000 643 
1996 517 2001 694 
1997 602 2002 691 
1998 549 2003 681 
 
 10. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2002). 
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infringement appeals until the Federal Circuit’s creation in 1982.11  The 
Court of Customs & Patent Appeals heard appeals from Patent Office12 
proceedings on patent applications until the Federal Circuit’s creation in 
1982.13  These courts, from time to time, expressly used dictionaries and 
similar reference sources to construe disputed claim terms.14  And the 
Federal Circuit itself, before a key turning point in 1995, expressly relied 
                                                          
 11. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(1982) (codified as amended in Title 28, U.S.C.) (establishing a United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit).  For a definitive study of the Federal Circuit’s early years, 
see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:  A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
 12. The agency is formally called the “United States Patent and Trademark Office.”  35 
U.S.C. § 1(a) (2002).  This Article focuses on patent law questions and thus, as is common 
in the literature, refers to the agency simply as the “Patent Office.”  See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, 
Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 765 & 
n.1 (2002) (using the term “Patent Office” instead of other acronyms to refer to patent 
activities of the United States Patent and Trademark Office); Robert P. Merges, One 
Hundred Years of Solicitude:  Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 
2216-17 (2000) (describing the rise of Patent Office operations in the twentieth century). 
 13. See Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 3-5 & n.9 (commentating on the creation of the 
Federal Circuit to allow for specialization and to reduce incoherence and differentiation 
between the circuits). 
 14. We found twelve such regional circuit cases spanning the period from 1900 to 
1982:  Saunders v. Air-Flo Co., 646 F.2d 1201, 1206, 1209, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 337, 341, 
344, (7th Cir. 1981); Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294, 1297, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
138, 141 (6th Cir. 1975); Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 F.2d 
1105, 1110, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 98, 101 (6th Cir. 1973); Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons 
Prods. Co., 413 F.2d 89, 92, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 449, 451 (8th Cir. 1969); Schmidinger v. 
Welsh, 383 F.2d 455, 463, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289, 296 (3d Cir. 1967); Gomez v. Granat 
Bros., 177 F.2d 266, 268, 83 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 197, 198 (9th Cir. 1949); Universal Oil Prods. 
v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 137 F.2d 3, 6, 58 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1943); Cabot 
v. J.M. Huber Corp., 127 F.2d 805, 807, 53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 442, 443 (5th Cir. 1942); 
Dernell Potato Prods. v. Snelling, 38 F.2d 788, 789, 4 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 194 (2d Cir. 
1930); I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Panther Rubber Mfg. Co., 260 F. 934, 938, 171 C.C.A. 576 (1st 
Cir. 1919); Frey v. Marvel Auto Supply Co., 236 F. 916, 920, 150 C.C.A. 178 (6th Cir. 
1916); Am. Can Co. v. Hickmott Asparagus Canning Co., 142 F. 141, 145, 73 C.C.A. 359 
(9th Cir. 1905). 
We found eleven such cases from the Court of Customs & Patent Appeals before 1982.  
See In re Gaubert, 524 F.2d 1222, 1226, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 664, 667 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In 
re Skoll, 523 F.2d 1392, 1395-96, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 483 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re 
Altenpohl, 500 F.2d 1151, 1157 & n.7, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 38, 45 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re 
McCue, 475 F.2d 1200, 1203, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 393, 395 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re 
Wakefield, 422 F.2d 897, 902-03, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 636, 640 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re 
Markert, 396 F.2d 477, 480, 158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 39, 41-42 (C.C.P.A. 1968); Liebscher v. 
Boothroyd, 258 F.2d 948, 951 & n.2, 119 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 133, 136 & n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1958); 
In re Gabrielsen, 213 F.2d 545, 546, 102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 121 (C.C.P.A. 1954); In re 
Tamarin, 187 F.2d 160, 162, 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 490, 492 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Ripper, 
171 F.2d 297, 299, 80 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 96, 98 (C.C.P.A. 1948); In re Curley, 158 F.2d 300, 
304, 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 116, 118-19 (C.C.P.A. 1946).  In addition, we found two such 
cases in appeals from Patent Office proceedings that were taken to what is now the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  See Chapman v. Beede, 296 F. 956, 959-60 (D.C. 
Cir. 1924); Swain v. Booth, 295 F. 236, 237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1924). 
To put in context the total number of such pre-Federal Circuit cases that we have found—
twenty-five, or about one every three and one quarter years—consider that the Federal 
Circuit has issued twenty-three or more such opinions every year since 2000.  See infra Tbl. 
4. 
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on dictionaries in explaining some of its claim construction rulings.15  As 
the data presented in this study show, however, the last nine years have 
seen more than a ten-fold increase in the number of times per year that the 
Federal Circuit, in its majority opinions, expressly relies on publicly 
available reference sources such as dictionaries, encyclopedias, and learned 
treatises16—compressed, for the remainder of this Article, to the more 
handy tag “dictionaries.”  The Federal Circuit, recognizing some of the 
questions raised by its increasing reliance on dictionaries, granted en banc 
review in a claim construction case in late July 2004.17  The court requested 
briefing on, among other things, the question whether “the public notice 
function of patent claims [is] better served by refer[r]ing primarily to 
technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a 
claim term,” or rather “by looking primarily to the patentee’s use of the 
term in the specification” of the patent.18 
The Federal Circuit’s turn to dictionaries is a key part of the court’s 
ongoing effort to set out a predictable method for establishing the scope of 
a patent owner’s right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or 
importing the invention established in the patent—the right that is the heart 
of every patent.19  This effort began in 1995 with the court’s decision in 
Markman v. Westview Instruments,20 where the court, en banc, held that it 
is for judges—not juries—to construe disputed terms in patents and thereby 
define patent rights.21  Because claim construction disputes frame nearly 
                                                          
 15. See, e.g., Nike Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 43 F.3d 644, 647, 33 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t. Stores Co., 46 
F.3d 1556, 1561 & n.2, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1227 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Lantech, 
Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32 F.3d 542, 547 & n.5, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666, 1670 & n.5 
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., 9 F.3d 948, 951 & n.8, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1936, 1938 & n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562 & n.6, 27 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1510, 1513 & n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 
997 F.2d 870, 876, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Charles Greiner & 
Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1035, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 
1992); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1571, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
1137, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 16. See infra Tbl. 4. 
 17. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (en banc order). 
 18. Id. at 1383, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.  The court posed a total of seven 
questions, many of them compound, for additional briefing.  Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1766. 
 19. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2002) (providing that one who “without authority makes, 
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into 
the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes 
the patent”); 35 U.S.C. § 281 (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for 
infringement of his patent.”).  As Chief Justice Taney long ago observed, “The franchise 
which the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, 
using, or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee.  This is all that 
he obtains by the patent.”  Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852). 
 20. 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 21. Id. at 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.  A year later, the Supreme Court affirmed 
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every issue in a patent infringement dispute, from the question whether the 
accused infringer has practiced the claimed invention to whether the patent 
was validly issued to begin with,22 most post-Markman Federal Circuit 
opinions in patent cases contribute to the court’s claim construction 
jurisprudence.  Systematic empirical study of the substance of this 
jurisprudence—of the public explanations that the Federal Circuit provides 
for the claim construction decisions it makes—is necessary to understand 
fully the scope, and thus the value, that patents generally possess.  There is, 
however, almost no such systematic empirical study of the Federal 
Circuit’s substantive claim construction case law.23 
This Article helps to close that gap, presenting the first systematic 
empirical study of the Federal Circuit’s use of dictionaries to help construe 
the scope of disputed patent rights.  Specifically, we present both (a) top-
level counts of yearly total dictionary citations in Federal Circuit and 
district court patent cases for the last decade, and (b) detailed data from a 
review of all Federal Circuit opinions, precedential and nonprecedential, 
from April 5, 1995 (the date of the court’s Markman decision) to June 30, 
2004, in which the majority opinion for the court expressly relied on one or 
more dictionaries to help construe a word in a disputed patent claim.  The 
dataset from this detailed review, a copy of which we provide as Appendix 
C to this Article, identifies all the cases reporting such dictionary use, the 
specific sources the court used, the words it defined, and the judges who 
authored each of the opinions in the study. 
This Article also takes the next step that the data suggest, presenting the 
normative case for integrating the choice of preferred reference sources 
into the patent application and examination process at the Patent Office.  
Starting from the Federal Circuit’s stated reasons for relying on 
                                                          
the Federal Circuit’s allocation of claim construction authority to judges.  Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (“We hold that the construction of a 
patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the 
court.”). 
 22. See Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1362, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1027, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The first step in any invalidity or infringement 
analysis is claim construction.”).  As Professor Wagner and Mr. Petherbridge note in their 
recent empirical study of Federal Circuit claim construction methodology, “Though the 
precise magnitude of its role is a matter of considerable debate, it is clear that claim 
construction plays a major—and perhaps the major—role in patent infringement litigation.”  
R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical 
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1119 (2004) (footnote 
omitted); see also JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 8 (2003) (“The 
interpretation and scope of the claims will be the focal point of any litigation involving the 
patent.  The language of the claims is scrutinized intensely in analyzing both the validity of 
the patent and whether it has been infringed.”).  
 23. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 22, at 1110-11 & n.16, 1127 & n.83 (discussing 
the outcome-based methodology used in nearly all empirical studies of the Federal Circuit).  
Indeed, the Wagner & Petherbridge study is the first systematic empirical study of the 
substance of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction methodology.  See id. at 1110-11. 
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dictionaries, which focus on the need for neutral reference materials that 
can ground predictable claim scope analysis, we show that the court’s 
desiderata cannot likely be achieved so long as courts remain effectively 
free, as they are now, to choose whatever dictionaries they favor after 
litigation has already begun.24  We further show that the Patent Office can 
and should use its power to regulate patent examination proceedings25 to 
mandate that all patent applicants identify the general purpose and 
technical dictionaries to which parties should refer when construing the 
words in their patent claims, and that the dictionaries so identified be listed 
on the face of any resulting issued patent.  Indeed, only the Patent Office, a 
key player in the multi-institutional framework that is our patent system,26 
is well-placed to bring about the predictable and neutral deployment of 
dictionaries that the Federal Circuit envisions. 
Part I begins with the top-level data about the rate at which the Federal 
Circuit and the district courts cite dictionaries when construing patent claim 
terms.  Then, as a bridge to the data resulting from detailed case review, 
Part I examines the Federal Circuit’s evolving rationale for using 
dictionaries in the claim construction process—a rationale reflected in a 
small number of milestone decisions in the post-Markman era.  In these 
cases, the Federal Circuit moves from a largely expertise-based rationale 
for dictionaries (according to which one might predict more frequent 
reliance on technical or specialized sources than on general purpose 
English language dictionaries) to a neutrality-based rationale (according to 
which one might predict no greater reliance on specialized than on general 
purpose sources).  Finally, Part I provides a detailed assessment of every 
                                                          
 24. Our normative goal is not to show that the Federal Circuit’s reliance on dictionaries 
to establish ordinary meaning is sound, but is rather to show how, given the commitment to 
rely on dictionaries for this purpose, one can make the use of dictionaries more neutral and 
predictable for all parties.  The existing literature on the deeper normative question—is it 
sound to use dictionaries to help establish a word’s ordinary meaning?—is substantial.  The 
interested reader should consult, in addition to the works cited already, supra note 8, the 
following sources:  Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word:  Dictionary Shopping in the 
Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998); Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning 
and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561 (1994); Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First:  
Curbing the Urge to Resort to the Dictionary When Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 401 (2002-2003); Gary L. McDowell, The Politics of Meaning:  Law 
Dictionaries and the Liberal Tradition of Interpretation, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257 (2000); 
Aaron J. Rynd, Dictionaries and the Interpretation of Words:  A Summary of Difficulties, 29 
ALBERTA L. REV. 712 (1991); and Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits:  The Decline 
of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235. 
 25. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2002) (giving the Patent Office the power to “establish 
regulations, not inconsistent with law, which . . . shall govern the conduct of proceedings in 
the Office”). 
 26. See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy:  A Multi-Institutional 
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1036-40 (2003) (discussing 
the need for patent reforms that consider all patent system actors, including the Federal 
Circuit, the Patent Office, the federal trial courts, and the Supreme Court). 
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occasion, from its April 1995 decision in Markman to the end of June 2004, 
that the Federal Circuit has reported relying on a dictionary or similar 
source to construe the meaning of a word in a patent claim.  The data show, 
among other things, that the neutrality-based rationale more accurately 
reflects the court’s actual dictionary citation behavior. 
Part II explores existing constraints on a court’s choice of dictionary for 
use in claim construction.  At present, the constraints are minimal.  Indeed, 
in the milestone Telegenix case, the Federal Circuit emphasizes the absence 
of such constraints as an apparent boon for the courts.27  Our discussion 
reveals, however, that the courts’ unfettered discretion to choose whatever 
dictionaries they may favor during the litigation process threatens to 
undermine the Federal Circuit’s professed goals of greater neutrality and 
predictability in claim construction.  Part II closes with a demonstration 
that this unfettered discretion presents a real jurisprudential and 
institutional problem.  It analyzes three recent cases where dictionary 
selection had a palpable effect on the claim construction outcome. 
Part III proposes a new approach to choosing dictionaries for claim 
construction—an approach that preserves the neutrality of these sources by 
eliminating the apparent arbitrariness that now attends their selection by the 
courts.  The key to this approach is to place dictionary selection squarely in 
the patent applicant’s hands and push it back in time to the patent’s 
examination phase at the Patent Office, i.e., before a concrete infringement 
dispute skews one’s preferred construction.  Indeed, it is precisely when a 
would-be patentee files for patent protection that the applicant can most 
readily match the background reference sources for claim word meaning—
whether ordinary or specialized—to the intended scope of the claim.  
Thereafter, third parties and the courts would know which reference 
sources to consult when construing words in the resulting patent, whether 
for licensing, design-around, or litigation purposes.  The enhanced 
predictability and reduced cost of assessing the scope of the resulting 
patent, which would benefit every member of the interested public for the 
entire multi-year term of the patent, should more than offset the increased 
cost to the applicant of determining which dictionaries he prefers. 
                                                          
 27. See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-04, 64 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 1818-20 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“As resources and references to inform 
and aid courts and judges in the understanding of technology and terminology, it is entirely 
appropriate for both trial and appellate judges to consult these materials at any stage of a 
litigation, regardless of whether they have been offered by a party in evidence or not.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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I. THE RISE AND RISE OF DICTIONARIES AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT  
Before discussing our empirical results, it is useful to review briefly the 
basic way that patent claims define patent rights, as well as some of the 
fixed stars that guide patent claim construction. 
Every utility patent—the most common kind of patent,28 and the subject 
of this study—ends with one or more separately numbered paragraphs, 
known as “claims.”29  The Patent Act expressly requires the patentee to 
provide these numbered claim paragraphs, the prescribed function of which 
is to “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which 
the applicant regards as his invention.”30  Each of the claims gives the 
patentee a separate right to exclude others,31 the scope of which is 
                                                          
 28. U.S. law provides for three separate types of patents:  utility patents, design patents, 
and plant patents.  See MUELLER, supra note 22, at 169 & n.1, 194-96.  Utility patents cover 
useful, new, and nonobvious products and processes.  35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.  This is the 
sort of patent most people think of as, simply, a patent.  Design patents cover new, original, 
and ornamental designs for “article[s] of manufacture.” 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173.  Plant patents 
cover distinct and new varieties of plants that are asexually reproduced.  35 U.S.C. §§ 161-
164.  The Patent Office grants many more utility patents than design or plant patents.  For 
example, during the eight years from 1994 to 2001 inclusive, the Patent Office granted 
1,049,260 utility patents (or about 131,158 per year); 109,414 design patents (or about 
13,677 per year); and 3,755 plant patents (or about 470 per year).  See U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR YEARS 1963-2001 (2004) 
(reporting annual grant totals), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf. 
 29. As Professor Mueller puts it, “A patent claim is a precision-drafted, single-sentence 
definition of the patent owner’s right to exclude others.”  MUELLER, supra note 22, at 37.  
For example, U.S. Patent No. 6,263,732 (issued July 24, 2001), entitled “Measuring Cup,” 
has a single claim.  One of us used this patent as the basis for a semester-long writing 
project in his basic Patent Law class.  The sole claim of the patent provides as follows: 
1.  A measuring device, comprising: 
a bottom wall and a generally vertical and encircling side wall having a lower 
edge and an upper edge, said sidewall defining an upwardly opening cup with 
an upper end; 
a spout attached integrally to said side wall; and 
a pair of continuously sloping ramps formed integrally with and radially 
inward in relief from said sidewall, said ramps extending from about said 
bottom wall generally opposite said spout toward said open upper end 
generally adjacent said spout, wherein said ramp is coextensive with said 
spout, said ramp having an upwardly directed surface and indicia located on 
said upwardly directed surface being at least one of standard and metric units 
of measurement providing a readily observable indication of the volume of the 
contents contained within said cup. 
Id. at col. 4, l. 59—col. 6, l. 3.  As Figures 4 through 6 in the ‘732 patent suggest, and the 
matching patent number molded into its plastic bottom confirms, the OXO-brand “Angled 
Measuring Cup” (a picture of which you can call up in the Kitchen & Housewares section of 
http://www.amazon.com) embodies the invention in this claim. 
 30. 35 U.S.C. § 112.  The Patent Act has contained this claiming requirement since 
1870.  See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870); see also William R. 
Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 757-60 
(1948) (tracing the history of the modern patent claim in U.S. patent law). 
 31. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (providing that “[e]ach claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed 
valid independently of the validity of other claims”); Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking 
Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 301, 319 (1909) (discussing the legal separateness and viability of 
MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:27 PM 
2005] PROVEN KEY 839 
determined by the words in that claim.  As the Federal Circuit put it in a 
recent case, “the claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim 
construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the actual 
words of the claims.”32 
Patents are, of course, legal instruments.  The rights they create, 
however, involve varied, and sometimes quite complex, technologies.  Of 
necessity, then, patent claims often use a range of specialized technical 
terms.33  When a generalist federal judge34 confronts a claim construction 
dispute, she must both preserve the specialized meaning of claim terms and 
ensure that her chosen construction preserves the patent’s internal 
coherence as a legal instrument.  The Supreme Court, in fact, emphasized 
the need to ensure a patent’s integrity as a legal instrument when it 
affirmed the Federal Circuit’s allocation of claim construction authority to 
the judiciary.35 
                                                          
individual patent claims); MUELLER, supra note 22, at 37-39. 
 32. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Par Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248, 48 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 
F.3d 1019, 1023, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“the language of the 
claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim interpretation,” and “throughout the 
interpretation process, the focus remains on the meaning of claim language”).  In this 
respect, the Federal Circuit is simply following a path cleared more than a century ago by 
the Supreme Court.  See also Yale Lock Mfg. v. Greenleaf, 117 U.S. 554, 559 (1886) (“The 
scope of letters patent must be limited to the invention covered by the claim, and while the 
claim may be illustrated it cannot be enlarged by language used in other parts of the 
specification.”); Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877) (“When 
the terms of a claim in a patent are clear and distinct (as they always should be), the 
patentee, in a suit brought upon the patent, is bound by it.”). 
 33. For example, contrast the largely familiar terminology from the ‘732 patent, supra 
note 29, with the more specialized terminology from claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 
(issued Apr. 12, 1988), entitled “Transgenic Non-Human Mammals”: 
1.  A transgenic non-human mammal all of whose germ cells and somatic cells 
contain a recombinant activated oncogene sequence introduced into said mammal, 
or an ancestor of said mammal, at an embryonic stage. 
Id. at col. 9, l. 35—col. 10, l. 2.  This patent is better known as the (in)famous Harvard 
oncomouse patent.  See Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”:  Rethinking the 
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 & nn.58-59 (2001) (discussing the importance of the oncomouse patent 
in the context of patent-protected biomedical research tools); Dashka Slater, huMouseTM, 
LEGAL AFFS., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 20, 25 (discussing the oncomouse patent in the context of 
debates over the patentability of living, genetically modified organisms); The Harvard 
Mouse:  A Short History, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 2003, at 30 (recounting Harvard’s 
efforts to patent the oncomouse). 
 34. See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Taming Patent:  Six Steps for Surviving Scary Patent 
Cases, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1413, 1417 (2003) ( 
There are no science prerequisites in Article III.  Nothing in the process of 
selecting federal judges screens for technologists.  We therefore may fairly picture 
the average district judge as a smart, accomplished, and legally sophisticated 
person who is technologically ignorant:  an able and successful lawyer before 
appointment, but a person who might have been a history or English major and 
who may never have taken a course in calculus or in any basic science at all. 
). 
 35. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1996) (“In the 
main . . . any credibility determinations [regarding expert witnesses] will be subsumed 
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How, then, do courts structure the claim construction inquiry to best 
ensure both technological fidelity and documentary coherence?  Two 
overarching principles frame the claim construction process.  First, a court 
must construe claim terms as would a person of ordinary skill in the field of 
art to which the patent pertains.  As the Federal Circuit recently 
summarized it, 
It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention through 
whose eyes the claims are construed.  Such person is deemed to read the 
words used in the patent documents with an understanding of their 
meaning in the field, and to have knowledge of any special meaning and 
usage in the field.36 
Taking on this perspective requires a judge to dip into the substance of the 
pertinent art; litigation parties must thus find ways to deliver this substance 
effectively.37 
Second, a court must start with a baseline, a default meaning for the 
words in a patent claim; the party who contends the default meaning is 
inappropriate must carry the burden of proving that contention.  The default 
rule is, according to the Federal Circuit, a word’s “ordinary meaning”:  “As 
a starting point, we give claim terms their ordinary and accustomed 
meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.”38  This “ordinary 
                                                          
within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole [patent] document, required by the 
standard construction rule that a term can be defined only in a way that comports with the 
instrument as a whole. . . .  The decisionmaker [now] vested with the task of construing the 
patent [i.e., the judge(s)] is in the better position to ascertain whether an expert’s proposed 
definition fully comports with the specification and claims and so will preserve the patent’s 
internal coherence.”) (citations omitted). 
 36. Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 
1362, 1365, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[C]laim construction is 
firmly anchored in reality by the understanding of those of ordinary skill in the art.”); Cole 
v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (“The district court correctly recognized that words in a patent claim are construed as 
they would be understood by a reader skilled in the relevant art unless it appears that the 
inventor used the words differently.”). 
There are, as experienced patent practitioners know, some words that have become terms 
of patent law art.  The court construes these not as a technically trained person would but 
rather as a trained patent lawyer would.  Thus, for example, the court construes the 
transition word “comprising” to mean “including, but not limited to” and construes the 
transition phrase “consisting of” to mean “including only.”  See, e.g., Medichem, S.A. v. 
Rolabo, S.L., 353 F.3d 928, 933, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2003); PPG 
Indus. v. Guardian Indus., 156 F.3d 1351, 1354-55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1351, 1353-54 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 37. See Wiley, Jr., supra note 34, at 1420 (“If judges do not begin with specialized 
knowledge but must make difficult scientific and technical decisions, what is to be done?  
Plainly they must gain a scientific and technical education if they are to perform their work 
with competence.”). 
 38. Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 
1258, 1267, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also ResQNet.com, Inc. 
v. Lansa, Inc., 346 F.3d 1374, 1378, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  “A 
fundamental principle for discerning the usage of claim language is the ordinary and 
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meaning” default for patent claim terms is a longstanding one:  it originates 
in regional circuit law,39 and the Federal Circuit has long observed it.40 
In recent years, however, the Federal Circuit has strengthened this 
principle by underscoring the way that it structures the process of proving 
the meaning of a disputed claim term.  Specifically, beginning in 1999 with 
Johnson Worldwide Associates v. Zebco Corp.,41 the court has linked the 
“ordinary meaning” default to that familiar proof-structuring device, the 
presumption:42 
The general rule is, of course, that terms in the claim are to be given their 
ordinary and accustomed meaning.  General descriptive terms will 
ordinarily be given their full meaning; modifiers will not be added to 
broad terms standing alone.  In short, a court must presume that the 
terms in the claim mean what they say, and, unless otherwise compelled, 
give full effect to the ordinary and accustomed meaning of claim terms. 
In order to overcome this heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary 
meaning of claim language, it is clear that “a party wishing to use 
statements in the written description to confine or otherwise affect a 
patent’s scope must, at the very least, point to a term or terms in the 
                                                          
accustomed meaning of the words amongst artisans of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the 
time of invention.”  ResQNet.com, 346 F.3d at 1378, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622. 
 39. See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 137 F.2d 3, 6, 58 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1943) (“[W]ords will be given their ordinary and accustomed 
meaning unless it appears that the inventor used them differently.”). 
 40. See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249-50, 48 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117, 1121-22 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 
F.3d 1420, 1427, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Bell Communications 
Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1816, 1819-20 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Nike Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 43 F.3d 644, 646, 33 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., 
15 F.3d 1573, 1577, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Intellicall, Inc. v. 
Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 
1992); Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473, 
477 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 40. Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 41. Id. at 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610. 
 42. See Ronald J. Allen, The Explanatory Value of Analyzing Codifications by 
Reference to Organizing Principles Other Than Those Employed in the Codification, 79 
NW. U. L. REV. 1080, 1090 (1984-1985) (“Once the label is pierced, it becomes obvious that 
the word ‘presumption’ is the label applied to the various methods of structuring the 
process-of-proof at trial, in particular (but not limited to) allocations of burdens of 
production and persuasion and judicial summary and comment on the evidence.”).  It may 
seem strange, in the context of a discussion about how one establishes a proposition of law 
(i.e., the meaning of a disputed claim term), to invoke constructs familiar from the process 
of proving facts.  Standards of proof and presumptions, however, are just as useful—indeed, 
necessary—in adjudicating law disputes as they are in adjudicating fact disputes.  See 
generally Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (1992) (discussing the 
need for an appropriate standard of proof in legal interpretive theory).  See also James R. 
Barney, In Search of “Ordinary Meaning”, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 101, 109 
(2003) (“By imposing a ‘heavy presumption’ . . .  courts essentially impose a burden of 
proof on whichever party opposes th[e] ordinary and accustomed meaning.”). 
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claim with which to draw in those statements.”43 
The Johnson Worldwide shift to a “heavy presumption” has stuck.  
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has invoked this “heavy presumption” in at least 
twenty-two of its precedential claim construction decisions in the past two 
and one-half years.44 
The heavy presumption of ordinary meaning for patent claim terms puts 
a premium on identifying that ordinary meaning.  How is a court to do so?  
One key way appears to be by looking up the disputed claim word in a 
dictionary:  “Standard dictionary definitions indicate ordinary meaning.”45  
In fact, it is hardly surprising that, in the midst of a decade of Supreme 
Court statutory interpretation cases equating ordinary meaning with the 
content of general purpose English language and law dictionaries,46 the 
                                                          
 43. Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610 (citations 
omitted) (quoting Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1248, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121). 
 44. See Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc., 373 F.3d 1158, 1164, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255, 
1259 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 
1354, 1360, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2004); W.E. Hall Co. v. Atlanta 
Corrugating, LLC, 370 F.3d 1343, 1350, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1135, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
Housey Pharms., Inc. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1352, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1641, 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1334, 70 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Golight, Inc. v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 355 
F.3d 1327, 1332, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 2004); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. 
Lansa, Inc., 346 F.3d 1374, 1378, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 
Genzyme Corp. v. Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 346 F.3d 1094, 1098, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1596, 1599 (Fed. Cir. 2003); E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 
1368, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947, 1950 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. v. 
SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1302, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 
Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytech Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computers, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1371, 66 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Northrup Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp., 
325 F.3d 1346, 1355, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Riverwood Int’l 
Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346, 1357, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1331, 1339 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003); Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1865, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 318 F.3d 1143, 
1148, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1818, 1821 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1327, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Tex. 
Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 
1817-18 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 
308 F.3d 1167, 1177, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Teleflex, Inc. v. 
Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2002); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg., 285 F.3d 1353, 
1357, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 45. MSM Invs. Co. v. Carolwood Corp., 259 F.3d 1335, 1339 n.*, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1856, 1859 & n.* (Fed. Cir. 2001) (relying on Webster’s II New Riverside University 
Dictionary for ordinary meaning of “feed”); see also Apex, 325 F.3d at 1371, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1449 (“[D]ictionary definitions may be consulted in establishing a claim term’s 
ordinary meaning.”); CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 
(“Sensibly enough, our precedents show that dictionary definitions may establish a claim 
term’s ordinary meaning.”). 
 46. The Supreme Court used one or more dictionaries to provide an “ordinary meaning” 
for a disputed statutory term at least thirteen times between 1991 and June 2004.  See 
Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761 (2004); 
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 & n.5 (2002); Williams v. Taylor, 
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Federal Circuit would turn to dictionaries to establish the ordinary 
meanings of disputed claim terms.  So comfortable is it with equating 
ordinary meaning to dictionary content that the Federal Circuit, in its 
milestone Telegenix case endorsing dictionaries as claim construction tools, 
slips in the space of two pages from a “heavy presumption” of “ordinary 
meaning”47 to “the presumption in favor of a dictionary definition.”48  
Telegenix also expressly supports the use of dictionaries to provide the 
ordinary meanings of claim terms by analogizing such use to reliance on 
dictionaries for ordinary meanings in statutory construction cases.49  
Importantly, as Telegenix itself takes pains to emphasize, consulting a 
dictionary is simply the first step in a properly conducted claim 
construction analysis, and it can never be the last step.50 
                                                          
529 U.S. 420, 431-32 (2000); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757-58 (1997); 
Ingalls Shipbuilding Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 519 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1997); 
Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207-08 (1997); Bailey v. United States, 
516 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1995); Asgrow Seed v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995); 
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357-58 (1994); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 
U.S. 471, 476 (1994); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1993); Pioneer Inv. 
Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993); Chapman v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 453, 461-62 (1991). 
The Federal Circuit, for its part, has used the same ordinary meaning/dictionary 
methodology in many of its statutory interpretation decisions since 1985.  See Bayer AG v. 
Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1371, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Alloy 
Piping Prods., Inc. v. Kanzen Tetsu Sdn. Bhd., 334 F.3d 1284, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Info. 
Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 
Liesegang v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 312 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Mudge v. 
United States, 308 F.3d 1220, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Am. Express Co. v. United States, 
262 F.3d 1376, 1381 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2001); AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 226 F.3d 
1361, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 201 F.3d 1367, 1372 
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Aimcor v. United States, 141 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1998); NSK Ltd. 
v. United States, 115 F.3d 965, 975 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Cook v. Brown, 68 F.3d 447, 451 
(Fed. Cir. 1995); Jones v. Brown, 41 F.3d 634, 638 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd. 
v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1571 & n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Sharp v. United States, 14 F.3d 
583, 587-88 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Best Power Tech. Sales Corp. v. Austin, 984 F.2d 1172, 1177 
(Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Canadian Pac. Ltd., 754 F.2d 992, 994, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 971, 
973 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 47. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 48. Id. at 1204, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819. 
 49. See id. at 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (providing examples of courts using 
dictionaries to “aid in the interpretation of statutes and regulations” in cases involving tariff 
terms and Internal Revenue Service regulations). 
 50. See id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1819 (stressing that “[b]ecause words often have multiple 
dictionary definitions, some having no relation to the claimed invention, the intrinsic record 
must always be consulted to identify which of the different possible dictionary meanings of 
the claim terms in issue is most consistent with the use of the words by the inventor”); id. at 
1204, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1819 (insisting that “the intrinsic record also must be examined in 
every case to determine whether the presumption of ordinary and customary meaning is 
rebutted”).  In one post-Telegenix case, the Federal Circuit further emphasized this 
fundamental point: 
While dictionaries and treatises are useful resources in determining the ordinary 
and customary meaning or meanings of disputed claim terms, the correct meaning 
of a word or phrase is informed only by considering the surrounding text.  This is 
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With this backdrop in mind, we are well-placed to appreciate the 
stunning rise in the Federal Circuit’s reliance on dictionaries and similar 
sources as claim construction tools.  We begin with data that give a bird’s 
eye view. 
A. The Top-Level View of Dictionary Citation Rates in Patent Cases 
It is not difficult, when surveying the post-Markman claim construction 
case law, to sense the growing centrality of dictionaries as a claim 
construction resource.  At the same time, one might wonder whether the 
apparent increase in courts’ reliance on dictionaries is simply an artifact of 
an increase in the overall number of patent decisions or the overall number 
of claim construction decisions.  It is possible, by casting a broad net with 
text-based searches in electronic case law databases, to approximate some 
rough—but nevertheless informative—answers to these questions. 
We used both broad and a narrow Boolean search strings in Westlaw’s 
district court (dct) and Federal Circuit court (ctaf) databases to flag both 
precedential and non-precedential opinions wherein the court likely used a 
dictionary or similar source to construe a claim term, whether for an 
infringement or a validity analysis.  The search strings are as follows: 
Narrow Search—patent! /s claim! /s (constru! or interpret!) /s (dictionar! 
or encyclopedia! or treatise! or handbook!) and date([re-strictor]) 
Broad Search—patent! /p claim! /p (constru! or interpret!) /p (dictionar! 
or encyclopedia! or treatise! or handbook!) and date([re-strictor]) 
The Narrow Search string looks for key words that occur within a 
sentence and the Broad Search string looks for the same key words that 
occur within a paragraph.  We also used an even broader Baseline Search 
string in the same two databases to flag both precedential and non-
precedential opinions where the court likely decided a claim construction 
question.  That search string is thus: 
Baseline Search—patent! /p claim! /p (constru! or interpret!) and 
date([restrictor]) 
In each of these searches, we adjusted the date restrictor term to reflect 
                                                          
why consulting dictionary definitions is simply a first step in the claim construction 
analysis and is another reason why resort must always be made to the surrounding 
text of the claims in question, the other claims, the written description, and the 
prosecution history.  Our precedent referencing the use of dictionaries should not 
be read to suggest that abstract dictionary definitions are alone determinative.  In 
construing claim terms, the general meanings gleaned from reference sources, such 
as dictionaries, must always be compared against the use of the terms in context, 
and the intrinsic record must always be consulted to identify which of the different 
possible dictionary meanings is most consistent with the use of the words by the 
inventor. 
Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 326 F.3d 1215, 1221-22, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). 
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the time period of interest, whether a given year or a larger interval. 
1. Comparing the pre- and post-Markman eras 
Before the Federal Circuit’s Markman decision, parties could opt to give 
claim construction questions to the jury. Both district courts and the 
Federal Circuit could review the resulting jury verdicts without elaborate 
analysis.  After Markman, detailed opinions on claim construction 
questions cannot be avoided, except in the case of summary affirmances on 
appeal.51 
Our counts of the baseline number of apparent claim construction 
opinions issuing from the U.S. district courts (considered as a group) and 
the Federal Circuit show a sharp increase in claim construction opinions in 
the nine years since the April 5, 1995 Markman decision, when compared 
to the number of such opinions issued from 1983 (the first full year of the 
Federal Circuit’s operation) to the day before Markman came down.  This 
increase is all the more notable when one considers that the pre-Markman 
interval is twenty-five percent larger, measured in months, than the post-
Markman interval.  Table 1 presents the claim construction opinion counts. 
TABLE 1 
Number of opinions flagged by the Baseline Search 
 
 1983 TO Markman Markman TO 2003 
DISTRICT COURTS 1,284 2,478 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 541 1,032 
 
Our counts also show an increase in the share of all claim construction 
opinions that likely involved use of a dictionary or similar source to 
construe a claim term.  Table 2 presents the counts of district court 
opinions using both the Narrow Search and Broad Search, expressed both 
in absolute numbers and as proportions of the Baseline Search results for 
the same time interval.  The proportional data effectively allow 
comparisons that control for the increase in the overall number of claim 
construction opinions.  Additionally, they show a greater rate of dictionary 
citation in the post-Markman period.  Specifically, the (Narrow 
Search/Baseline Search) proportion increased more than 27-fold from the 
pre- to the post-Markman period.  The (Broad Search/Baseline Search) 
proportion increased more than six-fold. 
                                                          
 51. See Fed. R. App. P. 36 (mandating that the court must provide a copy of its opinion 
to all parties to the litigation or a copy of the judgment where no such opinion was written). 
MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:27 PM 
846 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:829 
TABLE 2 
Number of district court opinions flagged by the Narrow and Broad 
searches in total and as a percentage of Baseline Search cases 
 
 1983 TO Markman (%) Markman TO 2003 (%) 
NARROW 
SEARCH 
4  (0.3%) 206  (8.3%) 
BROAD SEARCH 43  (3.3%) 492  (19.9%) 
 
Table 3 presents analogous counts of Federal Circuit opinions, again 
expressed in absolute numbers and as proportions of the Baseline Search 
results.  As was true for the district court opinions, the Federal Circuit 
opinions show a greater rate of dictionary citations in the post-Markman 
period.  Specifically, the (Narrow Search/Baseline Search) proportion 
increased more than five-fold from the pre- to the post-Markman period.  
The (Broad Search/Baseline Search) proportion increased more than three-
fold. 
TABLE 3 
Number of Federal Circuit opinions flagged by the Narrow and Broad 
searches in total and as a percentage of Baseline Search cases 
 
 1983 TO Markman (%) Markman TO 2003 (%) 
NARROW 
SEARCH 
4  (0.7%) 39  (3.8%) 
BROAD  
SEARCH 
18  (3.3%) 130  (12.6%) 
 
In sum, to the extent that our chosen search strings do a good job of 
capturing actual claim construction output and actual dictionary use within 
claim construction opinions, the first nine years after Markman (Apr. 1995-
Dec. 2003) have witnessed a marked increase in the rate at which the U.S. 
district courts and the Federal Circuit use dictionaries as claim construction 
tools. 
2. Annual dictionary citation rates from 1993 to 2003 
We augmented the aggregated pre- and post-Markman data with annual 
counts for the U.S. district courts (again considered as a group) and the 
Federal Circuit using the same three search strings—Baseline Search, 
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Baseline Count of Claim Construction Opinions
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Narrow Search, and Broad Search—for each year from 1993 to 2003, 
inclusive. 
Figure 1 presents the results of the Baseline Search for both the district 
courts and the Federal Circuit.  From 1993 to 2003, annual Federal Circuit 
claim construction opinion output tripled from 49 to 151 cases, while 
district court opinion output more than tripled from 125 to 406 cases.  Not 
surprisingly, the raw number of opinions from the district courts was 
greater than the raw number of opinions from the Federal Circuit 
throughout this period. 
FIGURE 1 
Annual number of opinions flagged by the                                          
Baseline Search from 1993 to 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 focuses on the results of the Narrow and Broad searches in the 
district court opinion database.  The datapoints in this figure reflect the 
proportions (Narrow Search/Baseline Search) and (Broad Search/Baseline 
Search) for each year in the decade.  As with the aggregated data discussed 
above, the use of proportions effectively allows us to control for the rise in 
dictionary use that is attributable simply to the general rise in claim 
construction opinion output.  Figure 2 shows that the rate of dictionary 
citation in claim construction opinions in the district courts increased 
markedly from 1995 to 1999, in both the Narrow Search (from 0.8% to 
11.3%) and Broad Search (from 4.8% to 25.3%) categories.  After dips in 
2000 and 2001, the 2002 and 2003 levels for both the Narrow Search 
(10.4%, 9.1%) and Broad Search (22.6%, 23.2%) categories are close to 
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the 1999 level. 
FIGURE 2 
Annual number of district court opinions flagged by the Narrow and Broad 
searches, expressed as percentages of Baseline Search cases 
Figure 3, like Figure 2, focuses on annual proportions, but this time in 
the Federal Circuit.  Specifically, Figure 3 shows the dictionary citation 
rates reflected by the Narrow Search and Broad Search.  The Narrow 
Search proportions show a nearly steady rise, from zero percent in 1993 to 
9.3% in 2003.  In addition, the rise in citation rates from 2.6% in 2000 to 
9.3% in 2003 represents an increase of over 350%.  The Broad Search 
proportions show two periods of marked increase, the first from 3.3% in 
1995 to 11.3% in 1998 and the second from 8.7% in 2000 to 26.5% in 
2003.  The second burst in citation rates is especially sharp, with a one-year 
jump from 14.6% in 2002 to 26.5% in 2003.  It is interesting to note, in 
connection with this tripling in annual dictionary citation rates from 2000 
to 2003 in the Broad Search and the more-than-tripling in the Narrow 
Search, that two of the six most active claim construction dictionary citers 
on the Federal Circuit revealed by our data, Judges Dyk and Linn, began 
their active service on the court in the first half of 2000.52 
                                                          
 52. Infra Tbl. 7, App. B.  Judge Linn began active service on January 1, 2000 and Judge 
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FIGURE 3 
Annual number of Federal Circuit opinions flagged by the Narrow and 
Broad searches, expressed as a percentage of Baseline Search cases 
In sum, to the extent that our chosen search strings provide good 
measures of claim construction and dictionary reliance activity (an 
important qualification on the data presented in this section of the paper), 
the period from 1993 to 2003 witnessed marked increases in the annual 
rates at which the U.S. district courts and the Federal Circuit used 
dictionaries as claim construction tools.  Indeed, at the Federal Circuit, the 
2000 to 2003 time period saw a dramatic increase in dictionary citation 
rates, tripling from 8.7% to 26.5% in the (Broad Search/Baseline Search) 
proportions and more than tripling from 2.6% to 9.3% in the (Narrow 
Search/Baseline Search) proportions.  The impression of more frequent 
reliance on dictionaries in claim construction opinions should not be 
dismissed as an artifact of the general increase in claim construction 
opinions. 
To achieve a deeper understanding of dictionary citation rate growth, one 
must examine in detail the Federal Circuit cases wherein the court used one 
                                                          
Dyk began active service on June 9, 2000.  U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT, JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHIES, at www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last modified Jan. 25, 
2005) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
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or more dictionaries to help determine the meaning of a word in a contested 
patent claim.  After touching briefly on three milestones in the Federal 
Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence—Markman, Vitronics, and 
Telegenix—we present data from just such a detailed examination. 
B. “Unbiased Reflections of Common Understanding” 
We know that one factor driving the Federal Circuit to use dictionaries in 
claim construction more often is the heavy presumption in favor of giving a 
claim term its ordinary meaning to those of skill in the pertinent art, 
combined with the identification of ordinary meaning with dictionary 
content.53  As an additional backdrop against which to assess the data from 
our detailed review of all dictionary-citing Federal Circuit cases from April 
1995 to June 2004, it is helpful to explore the Federal Circuit’s avowed 
rationale for relying on dictionaries.  The rationale has evolved, shifting 
from a stance rooted in the need generalist judges have to learn background 
information about the disputed technology, to one rooted in the greater 
neutrality of publicly available reference sources that predate a given 
dispute.  The shifts in rationale are readily apparent upon close review of a 
small number of milestone claim construction cases, beginning with the 
Markman case. 
1. Markman v. Westview Instruments 
The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc.54 is best known for its holding that “the court”—that is, 
the judge, not the jury—“has the power and obligation to construe as a 
matter of law the meaning of language used in the patent claim.”55  
However, just as important as this bare holding is the Federal Circuit’s 
assessment in that case of the sources on which judges should rely when 
construing disputed patent claim terms. 
In keeping with many of its prior cases, the court began with a focus on 
sources internal to the patent document itself, including the claims in the 
patent, the specification that supports those claims (also called the written 
description of the patent), and the patent’s prosecution history before the 
Patent Office.56  The court then discussed sources aimed specially at 
helping a generalist judge learn enough about the pertinent technological 
                                                          
 53. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text. 
 54. 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 
370 (1996). 
 55. Id. at 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 56. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
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field to construe the disputed claim language properly, grouping the 
materials under the rubric “extrinsic evidence.”57  According to the court, 
[e]xtrinsic evidence consists of all evidence external to the patent and 
prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, 
dictionaries, and learned treatises.  This evidence may be helpful to 
explain scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and terms of 
art that appear in the patent and prosecution history.  Extrinsic evidence 
may demonstrate the state of the prior art at the time of the invention.  It 
is useful to show what was then old, to distinguish what was new, and to 
aid the court in the construction of the patent.58 
The court thus approved extrinsic evidence, including dictionaries and 
treatises, as claim construction resources while at the same time tethering 
use of such materials to the need for specialized technological information. 
Time has weakened this link between reliance on dictionaries and the 
need for specialized information.  The next case was the first step in the 
attenuation process. 
2. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc. 
A little over a year after its own Markman decision, and shortly after the 
Supreme Court’s affirmance of Markman, the Federal Circuit handed down 
an opinion that drew special attention to the utility of dictionaries in claim 
construction.  The case is Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,59 and it 
“place[s] technical treatises and dictionaries near the top of the extrinsic 
evidence hierarchy.”60 
In Vitronics, the Federal Circuit reversed a trial court’s erroneous 
construction of the phrase “solder reflow temperature” in a patent claim 
directed to a method for mounting chips on circuit boards.61  The 
undermining vice in the trial court’s approach to claim construction was 
undue reliance on the testimony of the accused infringers’ expert witness.62  
In explaining the trial court’s error, the Federal Circuit rehearsed the list of 
permissible extrinsic sources—“expert testimony, inventor testimony, 
                                                          
 57. Id. at 979-81, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329-31. 
 58. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
 59. 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 60. Ben Hattenbach, Chickens, Eggs and Other Impediments to Escalating Reliance on 
Dictionaries in Patent Claim Construction, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 181, 183 
(2003); see also Edward G. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 27 
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 29 (1999) (opining that “Vitronics established a hierarchy for types of 
extrinsic evidence”). 
 61. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1578-79, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573-74. 
 62. See id. at 1581, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575 (describing testimony from defense 
expert, Dr. Rothe); id. at 1585, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578 (“Unfortunately, here the trial 
judge did use the extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the manifest meaning of the 
claims.”). 
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dictionaries, and technical treatises and articles.”63  It then passed beyond 
mere rehearsal in a footnote—footnote 6—that has changed the face of 
claim construction:64 
Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of 
extrinsic evidence, as they do not form a part of an integrated patent 
document, they are worthy of special note.  Judges are free to consult 
such resources at any time in order to better understand the underlying 
technology and may also rely on dictionary definitions when construing 
claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any 
definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.65 
Two important things happened here.  First, the court directly encouraged 
judges to consult dictionaries and similar sources to learn about the 
technology at issue in a dispute, stating they are available “at any time.”66  
Second, and quite apart from the ‘technology backgrounder’ point, the 
court approved “rel[iance] on dictionary definitions when construing claim 
terms,”67 foreshadowing the identification of dictionary definition with 
ordinary meaning that has since become so pronounced in the court’s 
cases.68 
Why this special solicitude for dictionaries in Vitronics?  The court 
highlighted the utility of such sources by contrasting them with the partisan 
slant that expert witnesses provide—and remember, the root of the trial 
court’s error in this case was over-reliance on inapposite expert 
testimony.69  Specifically, after distinguishing “expert testimony . . . on the 
proper construction of a disputed claim term” from background “testimony 
on the technology,”70 the court urged that 
                                                          
 63. Id. at 1584, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578. 
 64. The Federal Circuit, in the time between the Vitronics case and the Telegenix case 
(the next milestone case in this line of development), has at least nine times squarely relied 
on footnote 6 in Vitronics to support its use of dictionaries as claim construction tools, 
including in Telegenix itself.  See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 
1193, 1202, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Union Carbide Chems. & 
Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 1177 & n.4, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1545, 1552 n.4  (Fed. Cir. 2002); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 
1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. 
Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 
1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., Ltd., 257 F.3d 1364, 1373, 
59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 
208 F.3d 1324, 1334-35, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Cybor Corp. v. 
FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1459, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(en banc); Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King Indus., Inc., 21 Fed. Appx. 894, 898 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 
2001); Rival Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., Nos. 98-1198, 98-1199, 1999 WL 96416, at *5 (Fed. 
Cir. Feb. 23, 1999). 
 65. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578 n.6 (emphasis added). 
 66. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) at 1578. 
 67. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) at 1578. 
 68. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. 
 69. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1581, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575. 
 70. Id. at 1585, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.  The court continues to approve the use 
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prior art documents and dictionaries, although to a lesser extent, are 
more objective and reliable guides [than expert testimony].  Unlike 
expert testimony, these sources are accessible to the public in advance of 
litigation.  They are to be preferred over opinion testimony, whether by 
an attorney or artisan in the field of technology to which the patent is 
directed.  Indeed, opinion testimony on claim construction should be 
treated with the utmost caution, for it is no better than opinion testimony 
on the meaning of statutory terms.71 
Opinion testimony on the meaning of a disputed claim term is thus 
inherently disfavored, relative to publicly available “objective” documents, 
such as prior art references and dictionaries that predate the litigation.  It 
warrants a judge’s “utmost caution.”72  The court’s central message here, in 
combination with footnote 6, is unmistakable:  dictionaries are better than 
expert testimony. 
Vitronics, like Markman, links the use of dictionaries to the need for 
specialized technological information.  Unlike Markman, however, 
Vitronics also approves the use of dictionaries to define claim terms, 
praising these sources as superior to expert witnesses because they are 
“more objective and reliable guides.”  This theme—that dictionaries are 
preferred because they are not avowedly partisan in content—took center 
stage in the next milestone case. 
                                                          
of expert testimony to teach trial judges background information about the pertinent 
technology.  See, e.g., Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716, 48 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911, 1917 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that “trial courts generally can hear 
expert testimony for background and education on the technology implicated by the 
presented claim construction issues, and trial courts have broad discretion in this regard”).  
The court also approved a district court’s decision, in a case involving highly complex 
microprocessor technology, to appoint a “technical advisor” to help the court better cope 
with the scientific and technical information in the case.  TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 
286 F.3d 1360, 1377-79, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1460-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 71. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (emphasis added). 
 72. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.  The court has recently commented on this need 
for objectivity in claim construction: 
The inquiry into the meaning that claim terms would have to a person of skill in the 
art at the time of the invention is an objective one.  This being the case, a court 
looks to those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the 
art would have understood disputed claim language to mean.  Those sources 
include the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the 
prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific 
principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art. 
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116, 72 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see also Bell & Howell 
Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 
1038 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Once a dispute over claim construction arises, ‘experts’ should also 
not be heard to inject a new meaning into terms that is inconsistent with what the inventor 
set forth in his or her patent and communicated, first to the patent examiner and ultimately 
to the public. Patents should be interpreted on the basis of their intrinsic record, not on the 
testimony of such after-the-fact ‘experts’ that played no part in the creation and prosecution 
of the patent.”). 
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3. Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc. 
A little over six years after Vitronics, the Federal Circuit handed down 
its decision in Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,73 which 
reframed its rationale for using dictionaries in claim construction.  The 
court had, of course, continued to use dictionaries after Vitronics to help 
construe claims.74  In Telegenix, however, the court discussed the benefits 
of recourse to dictionaries more elaborately than in any other case.  One 
commentator has called it “a momentary high water mark” in the line of 
dictionary cases.75 
Before plunging into detailed analyses of the eleven separate claim 
construction disputes requiring resolution,76 of which only three used a 
dictionary to help construe the term,77 the Telegenix court provided a 
spirited encomium to dictionary use.78  Specifically, and with greater 
emphasis than Vitronics, the court identified the benefit of dictionaries with 
their freedom from the taint of litigation advocacy masquerading as 
expertise.  According to the court, 
[d]ictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises, publicly available at the time 
the patent is issued, are objective resources that serve as reliable sources 
of information on the established meanings that would have been 
attributed to the terms of the claims by those of skill in the art.  Such 
references are unbiased reflections of common understanding not 
influenced by expert testimony or events subsequent to the fixing of the 
                                                          
 73. 308 F.3d 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 74. In two cases that Hattenbach highlights, see supra note 60, at 186, the Federal 
Circuit emphasized the vital role dictionaries can play in providing evidence of a word’s 
ordinary meaning.  See Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp., 308 F.3d 1167, 1177 
n.4, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1552 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Although technically a form of 
extrinsic evidence, dictionaries hold a special place in claim construction, and judges 
‘may . . . rely on dictionary definitions when construing claim terms, so long as the 
dictionary definition does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained by the 
reading of the patent document.’.”) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d  
1576, 1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 
1373, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]echnical terms often have an 
‘ordinary meaning’ as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, although these same 
terms may not be readily familiar to a judge, or may be familiar only in a different context. 
Thus, in determining the ordinary meaning of a technical term, courts are free to consult 
scientific dictionaries and technical treatises at any time.”). 
 75. Hattenbach, supra note 60, at 181. 
 76. See Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1205-16, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820-29 (setting out 
the eleven disputed claim terms, including “repeatedly substantially simultaneously 
activating,” “selectively controlling the durations of the time intervals of activation,” “color 
control means,” “display areas” and “background areas,” “display areas arranged in a 
pattern,” “means for selectively activating said display light sources,” “converter means,” 
and “control means for selectively coupling said light sources”). 
 77. See id. at 1206, 1209, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821, 1823 (construing claim 
limitation “repeatedly substantially simultaneously activating” with the aid of MODERN 
DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS (6th ed. 1984) and “display area” and “background area” with 
the aid of ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS (3d ed. 1985)). 
 78. Id. at 1202-05, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818-20. 
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intrinsic record by the grant of the patent, not colored by the motives of 
the parties, and not inspired by litigation.  Indeed, these materials may 
be the most meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better 
understanding both the technology and the terminology used by those 
skilled in the art to describe the technology.79 
And gone is the careful parsing of extrinsic from intrinsic evidence.  The 
court rejected categorizing dictionaries as “extrinsic evidence” or even a 
“special form of extrinsic evidence.”80  After Telegenix, dictionaries are, 
quite literally, in a category by themselves. 
The court also quite openly equates a word’s ordinary meaning with its 
dictionary definition, moving from mention of “a ‘heavy presumption’ 
                                                          
 79. Id. at 1202-03, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (emphasis added).  If one were to take 
“unbiased” in this passage to refer to the complete absence of prejudice or personal interest, 
the Federal Circuit has stumbled badly here.  Dictionary-writing is a decidedly human 
enterprise; the people who write dictionaries, like the rest of us, bring their individual 
judgments and points of view to their work.  As Sidney Landau, an eminent lexicographer 
with over forty years’ experience, has stated, “[e]very established dictionary reflects, 
however it may strive to be impartial, the prevailing biases of its times, because the biases 
often inhere in the very manner of expression used in its definitions.”  LANDAU, supra note 
2, at 421. Landau argues that “[d]ictionaries act as a conservative force on the language 
because they tend to overrepresent the volume of conservative speech and writing, which is 
that of the educated classes, and underrepresent the volume of speech and writing by and for 
people who are relatively uneducated.”  Id. at 207.  For example, Landau discusses the 
range of approaches, across books and over time, to the inclusion of sexual and scatological 
taboo words in dictionaries.  Id. at 228-31; see also HENRI BÉJOINT, MODERN 
LEXICOGRAPHY:  AN INTRODUCTION 124-36 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the range of ways in 
which dictionaries reflect the ideology of the dominant culture); Anne Curzan, The Compass 
of the Vocabulary, in LEXICOGRAPHY AND THE OED:  PIONEERS IN THE UNTRODDEN FOREST 
96, 96 (Lynda Mugglestone ed., 2000) (commenting that “[t]he apparent objectivity of 
dictionaries rests on a series of subjective judgments” because “dictionaries and dictionary 
makers define what constitutes ‘the language’ as much as they do any individual word in the 
lexicon”).  In a similar vein, David Foster Wallace, a successful novelist and astute observer 
of literary culture, recently observed that “claims to objectivity in language study are now 
the stuff of jokes and shudders.”  David Foster Wallace, Tense Present:  Democracy, 
English, and the Wars Over Usage, HARPER’S MAG., Apr. 1, 2001, at 39, 46.  He continues 
that “[t]o presume that dictionary-making can somehow avoid or transcend ideology is 
simply to subscribe to a particular ideology, one that might aptly be called Unbelievably 
Naïve Positivism.”  Id. 
If, however, one takes “unbiased” in the narrower sense of “disinterested” that the 
passage as a whole suggests—namely, not reflecting any stake in the outcome of the case at 
hand—then the Federal Circuit is on solid ground.  An expert witness, retained by a party in 
a particular dispute, surely has a stake in the success with which she persuades the 
decisionmaker in the case and crafts her testimony accordingly; hence the common knock 
on expert witnesses is that too often they are biased mouthpieces for the parties who hire 
them.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Control Over Expert Testimony:  Of Deference 
and Education, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1156, 1162-65 (1993).  By contrast, a team of 
professional dictionary writers, who toiled at their work before the patent in dispute (much 
less the lawsuit about it) ever existed, almost certainly cannot have had any stake in the 
scope of a later-issued patent or the outcome of a later-filed infringement case as they wrote 
the definitions that a dictionary contains.  Dictionaries are, for the most part, published in 
the hopes of turning a profit, and they cannot do so unless they attract as wide a range of 
consumers as possible; writing skewed definitions to curry favor with a single individual or 
firm would, in these circumstances, be self-defeating. 
 80. Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819. 
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that” claim words “have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to 
those words by persons skilled in the relevant art,”81 at the outset of the 
discussion, to “the presumption in favor of a dictionary definition”82 toward 
the close of the discussion.  It is thus not surprising that, at the conclusion 
of its general discussion of dictionary use, the court suggests a standard 
claim construction procedure in which using relevant dictionaries to obtain 
possible meanings that would have been attributed to the words of the 
claims by those skilled in the art is effectively a universal first step.83  
Markman’s more narrowly drawn link between resort to dictionaries and 
the occasional need for specialized technological information has far 
receded. 
The road from Markman to Telegenix, then, is one from the occasional 
reference to a specialized dictionary of technological arcana to routine 
reliance upon numerous definitions from neutral reference sources.  
Dictionaries admittedly have not assumed this central role without some 
controversy.84  The court’s decision in Telegenix, however, hails 
dictionaries as the primary tools for identifying ordinary meanings of 
disputed claim terms as they would be understood by those skilled in the 
art—a step that must be taken to resolve any claim construction dispute, 
                                                          
 81. Id. at 1202, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817. 
 82. Id. at 1204, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819. 
 83. Id. at 1205, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820.  However valuable a first step in claim 
construction, consulting a dictionary can never be the final step.  See supra note 50 and 
accompanying text. 
 84. For example, the court occasionally expresses some skepticism about reliance on 
dictionaries.  See Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1365, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1300, 1304-05 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J.) (indicating that a court should not rely 
on a dictionary to provide the meaning of a common word where the working definition of 
that word within a patent document is peculiar to the context of that document); AFG 
Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 239 F.3d 1239, 1248, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1776, 1783 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (Michel, J.) (emphasizing that courts should turn to dictionaries only when 
patent documents fail to define terms of art, particularly since standard dictionaries can fail 
to distinguish two words treated as distinct within the patent documents); Toro Co. v. White 
Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299-1300, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1067-68 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (Newman, J.) (suggesting that the general nature of dictionary definitions renders 
dictionaries unable to settle disputes over the specific scientific meanings of words in patent 
documents); Anderson v. Int’l Eng’g & Mfg., Inc., 160 F.3d 1345, 1348-49, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1631, 1633-34 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J.) (noting that where dictionaries provide 
more than one meaning for the same word, the technical meaning of the word must be taken 
from the context of the patent documents at issue); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, 
Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J.) 
(cautioning courts against using dictionaries to provide “legal, not linguistic, significance” 
to patent document terms); see also Housey Pharms., Inc. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 
1348, 1356-60, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1647-50 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing both the heavy presumption in favor of ordinary meaning and the use 
of dictionaries as claim construction tools).  Judge Newman authored all but one of the 
court’s opinions expressing skepticism about dictionary use, and, as our detailed data show, 
Judge Newman used dictionaries as claim construction tools only twice from April 1995 to 
June 2004.  See infra Tbl. 7, App. B.  Among the judges still in active service on the court, 
only Chief Judge Mayer used dictionaries on fewer occasions.  Id. 
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given the heavy presumption in favor of ordinary meaning for the words in 
a claim. 
The change in rhetoric from dictionary as occasional reference 
(Markman) to basic tool (Telegenix) accompanies a correlative change in 
the court’s avowed rationale for using dictionaries, from one rooted in the 
need to educate the court about technology to one rooted in the need to 
establish a word’s ordinary meaning with a neutral resource.  Which 
rationale, one might query, better comports with the Federal Circuit’s 
actual use of dictionaries?  Does the court, as the Markman rationale might 
lead one to predict, use specialized dictionaries more often than general 
purpose English language sources?  Or rather does the court, as the 
Telegenix rationale might lead one to predict, use general purpose English 
language sources just as often—or perhaps even more often than—
specialized sources, for the simple reason that the quality that makes 
reference sources attractive is their neutrality rather than any specialized 
content?  Only detailed data on the Federal Circuit’s actual use of 
dictionaries can answer these questions. 
C. The Federal Circuit’s Use of Dictionaries for Claim Construction 
Our top-level data show that, while the number of written Federal Circuit 
claim construction decisions roughly tripled from 1993 to 2003, the rate at 
which the Federal Circuit appeared to cite dictionaries in aid of its claim 
construction analysis increased about nine-fold in the same period.85  And a 
close reading of the Federal Circuit’s post-Markman caselaw shows that 
the court’s rationale for using reference sources such as dictionaries shifted 
from a focus on gaining helpful background information about disputed 
technology (in Markman and, to a lesser extent, in Vitronics), to a focus on 
the greater neutrality offered by such reference works (in Telegenix).86  
Which rationale, then, better comports with the Federal Circuit’s use of 
dictionaries?  Our data show that the Telegenix rationale explains the 
court’s actual use of dictionaries far better than does the Markman 
rationale. 
1. Methodology 
We created a dataset describing all occasions from April 5, 1995 to June 
30, 2004, where the Federal Circuit used one or more dictionaries or 
similar sources to help define a word or phrase in a contested patent 
                                                          
 85. See supra Figure 1 (showing a three-fold increase in claim construction decisions), 
Figure 3 and accompanying text (showing that Broad Search proportion increased from 
3.3% in 1993 to 26.5% in 2003). 
 86. See supra Part I.B. 
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claim.87  The unit of analysis in this dataset is not an individual case; rather, 
it is the use of a reference source to define a word or phrase in a claim.  
Thus, for example, the case captioned Yamaha Corp. v. ESS Technology, 
Inc.,88 involving a dispute over the claim limitation “a stored waveshape 
table,” yielded three entries for our dataset—one for each word that the 
court defined with the aid of a dictionary (i.e., “stored,” “waveshape,” and 
“table”).89  Similarly, the case captioned Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp.,90 
involving a dispute over the claim limitation “coherence length of the 
beam,” yielded one entry for our dataset—an entry reflecting the phrase 
that the court defined by consulting a reference source (i.e., “coherence 
length”).91  It is also important to note that we counted only majority 
opinions for the court; individual judges’ citations to dictionaries in 
concurring or dissenting opinions are not counted here. 
To create this dataset, we first used broad searches to flag all arguable 
candidates in Westlaw’s database of Federal Circuit opinions (ctaf).92  With 
the help of research assistants, we read the cases to winnow the group to 
those that arguably involved use of at least one dictionary or similar source 
to help define a word in a disputed patent claim.  At that stage, we read the 
smaller group of cases in close detail, collecting the relevant information 
about each occasion where the Federal Circuit did, in fact, use a dictionary 
to help define a contested claim term.  The dataset in Appendix C describes 
each of these occasions.  We identified only four cases (two precedential 
and two nonprecedential) in which the Federal Circuit first identified 
dictionary definitions for claim words with specificity and then expressly 
rejected any reliance on the dictionaries.93  We excluded these cases from 
our dataset.  We also identified, and excluded from the dataset, ten cases in 
which the Federal Circuit used a dictionary to define a word from the 
written description portion of the patent, rather than from a claim.94 
                                                          
 87. See infra App. C (providing the dataset). 
 88. No. 95-1362, 1996 WL 146499 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1996). 
 89. See infra App. C, at rows 12-14. 
 90. 79 F.3d 1563, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 91. Id. at 1565 & n.1, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282 & n.1; see infra App. C, at row 17. 
 92. We used search terms such as (patent! and (infringe! or valid!) and (dictionar! or 
treatise! or encyclopedia! or handbook!)) and (patent! and claim! and dictionar!).  Because 
we are analyzing the reasons the court provides in its written decisions, our data do not 
include—and we know nothing about the role of dictionaries in—cases in which the Federal 
Circuit summarily affirmed the trial court’s claim construction without writing its own 
opinion. 
 93. See Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351 F.3d 1364, 1367-68, 1372 & nn.3-5, 69 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220, 1222-23, 1226 & nn.3-5 (Fed. Cir. 2003); AFG Indus., Inc. v. 
Cardinal IG Co., 239 F.3d 1239, 1247-49, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1776, 1782-84 (Fed. Cir. 
2001), vacated by 375 F.3d 1367, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ultratech 
Stepper, Inc. v. ASM Lithography, Inc., 97 Fed. Appx. 914, 919-20 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 35 Fed. Appx. 918, 924 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 94. See Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 375 F.3d 1328, 1335-36, 71 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650, 1656-57 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery 
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2. Results 
From April 5, 1995 to June 30, 2004, the Federal Circuit used one or 
more dictionaries to help construe a disputed claim term 209 times.95  Table 
4 presents annual totals, separating precedential from nonprecedential 
decisions.  Annual dictionary use increased by a factor of fourteen from 
1995 to 2003. 
TABLE 4 
Number of times the Federal Circuit relied on at least one dictionary 
definition of a patent claim word to help construe an element of that claim 
 
YEAR Published 
Decision 
Unpublished 
Decision 
TOTAL 
1995* 2 1 3 
1996 9 5 14 
1997 8 6 14 
1998 4 5 9 
1999 4 6 10 
2000 13 10 23 
2001 19 9 28 
2002 22 10 32 
2003 34 8 42 
2004* 25 9 34 
TOTAL 139 69 209 
* Partial year 
 
In using dictionaries to help construe claim words 209 times, the Federal 
Circuit used 268 individually identified sources, i.e., 1.28 sources per 
term.96  Specifically, the Federal Circuit relied on one, and only one, source 
                                                          
Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1371, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050, 1054-55 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); Genzyme Corp. v. Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 346 F.3d 1094, 1099, 68 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1600 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, 
Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1345, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1408-09 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Electro 
Scientific Indus., Inc. v. Dynamic Details, Inc., 307 F.3d 1343, 1350, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1781, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1382, 60 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1124, 1126-27 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Baker Hughes Inc., 215 F.3d 1297, 
1303, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Lizardtech, 35 Fed. Appx. at 924; 
G&S Metal Prods. Co. v. Ekco Housewares, Inc., 152 F.3d 944, Nos. 97-1188, 97-1210, 
1998 WL 121472, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 17, 1998); Storz Instrument Co. v. Alcon Labs., 
Inc., 135 F.3d 777, No. 97-1149, 1998 WL 50947, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1998).  The 
Novartis case, decided in July 2004, is also outside the temporal scope of this study. 
 95. See infra App. C. 
 96. See infra App. C. 
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167 times (79.9%), on two sources thirty-three times (15.8%), on three 
sources four times (1.9%), on four sources three times (1.4%), and on five 
sources and six sources one time each (0.5%). 
General purpose English language sources dominate the dataset.97  
Specifically, out of the 268 sources used, the court used 189 (70.5%) 
general purpose English language sources and seventy-nine (29.5%) 
specialized sources.  Tables 5 and 6, contained in Appendix B, list all the 
general purpose English language sources cited and all the specialized 
sources cited, respectively, including the number of times the court cited 
each source.  Of the six most-often cited sources,98 the top five are general 
purpose sources. 
Several facts stand out immediately upon review of Tables 5 and 6.  
First, citations to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Webster’s 
Third) dominate the dataset.  The court cited various printings of Webster’s 
Third sixty-eight times;99 Webster’s Third was originally published in 1961 
and is still Merriam-Webster’s flagship dictionary.  This represents 25.4% 
of all citations to any source (general or specialized), and 36.0% of all 
citations to a general purpose English language source.  The Federal Circuit 
is, in this respect, like the Supreme Court, where Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary and its predecessor, Webster’s New International 
Dictionary, Second Edition, are the two most frequently cited 
dictionaries.100 
Second, the Merriam-Webster family of dictionaries—comprising 
Webster’s Third, its two immediate predecessors, and four different 
editions of its New Collegiate series (all of which share a common editorial 
core with the New International series)101—accounts for 38.4% of the 
                                                          
 97. See infra Tbls. 5-6, App. B. 
 98. These are Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (cited sixty-eight times); 
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (cited eighteen times); Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (cited fifteen times); American Heritage Dictionary (cited twelve times); 
Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary (cited ten times); McGraw-Hill 
Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms (cited nine times).  See infra Tbls. 5-6, App. B. 
 99. See infra App. C. 
 100. Lexicon Fortress, supra note 8, at 262-63 (reporting statistics); id. at 533-55 (listing 
cases); Lexicon Remains, supra note 8, at 52 (summarizing results); id. at 66-68 (listing 
cases). 
 101. See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6 (1985) (describing itself as 
“the latest in the Collegiate line of Merriam-Webster dictionaries which began in 1898”); 
WEBSTER’S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 4a (1972) (“For many years Merriam-
Webster dictionaries have formed a series in which the unabridged dictionary is the parent 
work and the Collegiate Dictionary the largest abridgment.  From each successive revision 
of the unabridged work new abridged books have sprung. . . . The definitions [herein] are 
for the most part based on the most recent available information contained in the parent 
work, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, with such modifications or 
adaptations as are required by the smaller scope of the Collegiate.”); WEBSTER’S NEW 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY  iv (6th ed., 1949) (providing the language quoted in the 1972 
publication of Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, citing the “parent work,” 
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citations to any source, and 54.5% of the citations to any general purpose 
source.  Considering families of editorially related dictionaries, Houghton 
Mifflin’s American Heritage Dictionary family takes second place with 
twenty four citations (9.0% of all citations).102  Oxford University Press’s 
family of dictionaries, which includes both the Oxford English Dictionary 
and the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, comes in third with eighteen 
citations (6.7% of all citations).  Random House’s family of dictionaries, 
the last identifiable family among the general purpose sources, takes fourth 
place with eleven citations (4.1% of all citations). 
Third, citations to specialized sources are considerably more spread out 
among different titles than citations to general purpose sources.  For 
example, thirty-three of the forty-four specialized titles (74.4%) are cited 
once and only once during the period of the study, and only three of them 
(6.7%) are cited more than five times.  By contrast, sixteen of the twenty-
six general purpose titles (61.5%) are cited more than once, and eight of 
them (30.8%) are cited more than five times. 
We also observed an interesting phenomenon not easily captured in any 
of the data tables.  Specifically, in six different cases during the period of 
the study, all of them precedential, the Federal Circuit both used a 
dictionary to define a word from a disputed claim and then used a 
dictionary to define a word from the dictionary definition it had just 
quoted.103  Four of these six cases were issued in just the last two and one-
                                                          
however, as “Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition”); see also 
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, FIFTH EDITION (1936) (“The publication in 1934 of 
Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition, another complete revision of the 
unabridged dictionary, inaugurated a new Merriam-Webster series to which this present 
work belongs.”). 
 102. See infra Tbl. 5, App. B. The American Heritage family remains in second place, 
with thirty-five (13.1%) of the citations to any source, even if one extends it to include two 
other Houghton Mifflin dictionaries—Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary and 
its successor title Webster’s II New College Dictionary. 
The American Heritage college dictionaries, like the Merriam-Webster college 
dictionaries, share a common editorial core with the much larger American Heritage 
Dictionary.  See AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY vii (3d ed. 1997) (calling 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed.) “[t]he immediate predecessor of the College 
Dictionary,” and asserting that the College Dictionary “displays the[] same virtues and 
assets [as its parent] in a more compact form”); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, SECOND 
COLLEGE EDITION 6 (1985) (describing itself as “the first complete revision of the American 
Heritage Dictionary”). 
 103. See Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 363 F.3d 1306, 1308-10, 70 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1440-41 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (tracing a long series of dictionary 
definitions of words in other dictionary definitions); Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 
361 F.3d 1363, 1372-74, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209, 1215-17 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (defining 
“annular,” then “ring,” then “band”; and defining “adjoining,” then “adjacent”); Union 
Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 1177, 64 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1551-52 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (defining “characterizable,” then 
“characterize”); Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 723-24, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1031, 1033-34 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (defining “groove,” then “channel”); Moore U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1114, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1241 (Fed. 
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half years.  Interestingly, the second-order dictionary is not always the 
same as, or even the same type as, the first-order dictionary.  Perhaps the 
most vivid instance of the phenomenon is the Novartis case, where the 
court forged a five-step chain of dictionary definitions of words appearing 
in other dictionary definitions:  “hydrosol” (the claim term), to “sol,” to 
“solution,” to “medicinal,” to “medicine,” to “preparation.”104  The first 
four words were defined using two different general purpose dictionaries, 
and the last word was defined using three different specialized medical 
dictionaries.105 
Who on the Federal Circuit has cited dictionaries when authoring claim 
construction opinions for the court?  Table 7, contained in Appendix B, 
provides comprehensive data on this question.  The Federal Circuit has 
twelve judges in regular active service and a number of senior judges.  
During the period studied here, from April 1995 to June 2004, sixteen 
judges were in regular active service on the Federal Circuit for at least 
some months; Table 7 notes the different periods of service for each of 
these sixteen judges.  Every one of the judges authored at least one 
majority opinion for the court in which the court used at least one 
dictionary to help construe a disputed claim term.106  Six of the sixteen 
judges (37.5%) each account for 10% or more of the 209 occasions on 
which the Federal Circuit has used one or more dictionaries to help 
construe a claim term.  They are, in descending order of frequency of 
contribution, as follows: 
 Judge Linn, with 27 of 209 (12.9%) 
 Judge Rader, with 26 of 209 (12.4%) 
                                                          
Cir. 2000) (defining “along,” then “by”); Great N. Corp. v. Henry Molded Prods., Inc., 94 
F.3d 1569, 1574, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1997, 2001 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (defining “flexural,” 
then “flexure”). 
 104. Novartis, 363 F.3d at 1308-09, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440-41. 
 105. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440-41.  The dissenting judge in Novartis, with some 
justification, calls the majority’s reasoning a “chase through the dictionary.”  Id. at 1315 n.7, 
70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444 n.1 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).  Indeed, one could well call it 
a chase through five dictionaries. 
 106. Another indication of the pervasiveness of dictionary use is that, from August 1, 
2003 to June 30, 2004, all twelve judges in active service on the court joined at least one 
panel opinion in which the court used one or more dictionaries to help construe a disputed 
claim term.  See Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc., 373 F.3d 1158, 1165-66, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1255, 1260-61 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Schall, Gajarsa, & Prost, JJ.); Housey Pharms., Inc. 
v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1353, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)) (Mayer & Clevenger, JJ.); Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 
362 F.3d 1367, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, Dyk, & Archer, JJ.); 
Int’l Rectifier, 361 F.3d at 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1209 (Newman, Linn, & Prost, 
JJ.); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1996 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, Bryson, & Prost, JJ.); Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., 
Inc., 357 F.3d 1340 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1815 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Lourie & Bryson, JJ.); 
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d 1343, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (Mayer, Michel, & Dyk, JJ.). 
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 Judge Clevenger, with 24 of 209 (11.5%) 
 Judge Lourie, with 23 of 209 (11.0%) 
 Judge Dyk, with 22 of 209 (10.5%) 
 Judge Gajarsa, with 21 of 209 (10.0%) 
Together, they account for 68.4% of the entries in the dataset.  And of 
the six, three—Judges Dyk, Gajarsa, and Linn—joined the court after both 
Markman and Vitronics had already been decided. 
It also appears from our data that, during the period of the study, the 
Federal Circuit judges who had patent law or technical backgrounds before 
joining the court cited a greater proportion of specialized reference sources 
than did the judges who did not have such backgrounds.  The data are in 
Table 8.  Using information from the judges’ biographies,107 we separated 
all the judges who were in active service on the court from April 1995 to 
June 2004 into two groups:  the judges who had a patent law or technical 
background,108 and the judges who did not.109  Using the opinion authorship 
data in Appendix C, we also counted the number of occasions a given 
judge cited one or more general purpose sources to help define a claim 
term, and the number of occasions a given judge cited one or more 
specialized sources to do so.  When a given judge cited one or more general 
sources and one or more specialized sources to help define the same term, 
we counted the event in both columns of our table.110  As Table 8 shows, 
the judges with a patent law or technical background cited specialized 
sources 36.1% of the time, whereas the judges without a patent law or 
technical background did so 21.7% of the time.  The difference in citation 
rate to specialized sources is statistically significant using the conventional 
test for whether two variables are independent.111 
TABLE 8 
Number of citations to one or more general or specialized references, 
grouped by Federal Circuit judge background 
 
 GENERAL SPECIALIZED 
                                                          
 107. See U.S. COURT FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, JUDICIAL 
BIOGRAPHIES (reporting biographical information for active and senior judges), at 
http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last revised Jan. 25, 2005) (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 108. Six judges have a patent law or technical background:  Judges Gajarsa, Linn, 
Lourie, Newman, Nies, and Rich. 
 109. Ten judges do not have a patent law or technical background:  Judges Archer, 
Bryson, Clevenger, Dyk, Mayer, Michel, Plager, Prost, Rader, and Schall. 
 110. There were ten such instances in the full dataset. 
 111. Specifically, the likelihood that this different rate is due to chance alone, as 
measured by the χ2 statistic, is 0.02. 
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SOURCES SOURCES 
JUDGES WITH PATENT LAW OR 
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
63.9%  
(53/83) 36.1%  (30/83) 
JUDGES WITHOUT PATENT LAW 
OR TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
78.3%  
(101/129) 21.7%  (28/129) 
 
In sum, the data from our detailed review of individual cases show that 
(a) the Federal Circuit uses dictionaries to construe words in claims more 
often with each passing year; (b) it most often identifies only one reference 
source per word; (c) it uses general purpose English language dictionaries 
more than twice as often as specialized sources, consistent with the “neutral 
sources”-based Telegenix rationale (and not the “specialized knowledge”-
based Markman rationale) for dictionary use; (d) it uses Webster’s Third 
most of all; (e) just over a third of the judges who have served on the 
Federal Circuit since the Markman decision account for more than two 
thirds of the occasions where the court has used dictionaries to construe 
disputed claim terms; and (f) judges with a patent law or technical 
background cite specialized reference sources at a greater rate than those 
without such a background.  Both general purpose and specialized 
dictionaries and similar reference sources have become central to the 
Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence. 
II. BIAS THROUGH THE BACK DOOR?  DICTIONARY                         
SELECTION AT COURT 
The Federal Circuit’s cases firmly establish both that one should begin 
the claim construction process by presuming that a term has its ordinary 
meaning to a person of skill in the art, and that one can use a dictionary or 
similar objective reference source to help establish this ordinary meaning.  
The Federal Circuit’s actual dictionary citation behavior over the last nine 
years just as firmly shows that, when the court uses a dictionary to establish 
the ordinary meaning of a disputed claim term, it most often does so by 
reference to a single general purpose English language dictionary.  And 
although a full theoretical critique of judicial use of dictionaries to help 
establish ordinary meaning is beyond the scope of this Article,112 common 
experience suggests both that one interprets a new document by using one’s 
prior understandings of word meanings, and that it is entirely wholesome to 
augment one’s untutored understanding of a word’s meaning by consulting 
a dictionary, professionally prepared at great effort, to remind oneself of 
                                                          
 112. See supra note 24 (distinguishing the question whether the Federal Circuit should 
use dictionaries from the question of how the Federal Circuit can best use dictionaries, 
having chosen to do so). 
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the full range of ordinary meanings that a given word possesses.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court highlighted this very use of dictionaries in the context 
of legal disputes over a century ago.113 
It is not enough, however, simply to note that dictionaries can be helpful.  
There is an important middle step between the act of writing a definition 
for a word (back in the publishing house’s lexicography shop) and the act 
of quoting a definition (in a judicial opinion or a lawyer’s brief)—namely, 
choosing which dictionary (or dictionaries) to use from among the 
available candidates.  The court often uses Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary, but not always.  The Federal Circuit’s increasing 
reliance on dictionaries thus raises an important question:  how does the 
court select the dictionary it uses in any given case?114 
The selection question is a critical one because the court now justifies its 
use of dictionaries primarily by reference to the neutrality with which 
professional lexicographers write dictionary definitions.115  This neutrality-
based justification for favoring dictionaries rings quite hollow, of course, if 
the way the court picks the dictionary it uses in a given case is not itself 
neutral.  Put another way, to achieve the full measure of neutrality, and thus 
predictability, that the Federal Circuit has set as its claim construction goal, 
one should be able to state in advance some rule or principle that guides 
dictionary selection without regard to the merits of the case in which the 
dictionary will be used.  Sadly, the cases suggest a large share of judicial 
caprice in dictionary selection.  One cannot, moreover, dismiss the 
arbitrariness in dictionary selection as inconsequential.  We consider, in 
turn, both the lack of formal constraints on court choice of dictionaries in 
claim construction, and the demonstrable difference in case outcome that 
the choice among dictionaries can make. 
A. Dictionary Choice Unchained—The Dark Side of Telegenix 
A court confronting a claim construction dispute today can, after the 
dispute is well under way and the parties’ general positions on the merits 
are clear, effectively pick whatever dictionary it prefers to help construe the 
                                                          
 113. See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1893) (categorizing tomatoes as 
“vegetables,” rather than as “fruit,” for purposes of a tariff schedule). “Of that [ordinary] 
meaning the [C]ourt is bound to take judicial notice, as it does in regard to all words in our 
own tongue; and upon such a question dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as 
aids to the memory and understanding of the [C]ourt.”  Id. 
 114. As one commentator has observed, “[t]he first step toward claim interpretation 
using a dictionary should be selecting an appropriate dictionary, a step that was not 
addressed by the Telegenix court and which is neither straightforward nor inconsequential.”  
Hattenbach, supra note 60, at 187. 
 115. See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (praising dictionaries because they are “not influenced 
by expert testimony or events subsequent to the fixing of the intrinsic record by the grant of 
the patent, not colored by the motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation”). 
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words in the claim.  The only apparent constraint is a temporal one:  the 
reference source should have been publicly available as of the filing date of 
the application that matured into the patent in suit.116  Importantly, a court 
is not bound by the parties’ evidentiary submissions in the litigation.  The 
Federal Circuit took pains to emphasize the point in the Telegenix case: 
As resources and references to inform and aid courts and judges in the 
understanding of technology and terminology, it is entirely proper for 
both trial and appellate judges to consult these materials [i.e., 
dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises] at any stage of a litigation, 
regardless of whether they have been offered by a party in evidence or 
not.117 
To the extent one views a publicly available reference work’s content as an 
adjudicative fact, Telegenix is consistent with the Federal Rules of 
Evidence governing judicial notice of such facts,118 which empower courts 
to take notice on their own initiative119 both at trial and on appeal.120  
                                                          
 116. See Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1124, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen a claim term understood to have a narrow 
meaning when the application is filed later acquires a broader definition, the literal scope of 
the term is limited to what it was understood to mean at the time of filing.”); Schering Corp. 
v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(“Rather, the [claim] term ‘IFN-α’ in the patent has a specialized meaning limited to the 
particular leukocyte interferon that Dr. Weissman supported in his original application.  In 
sum, this court must determine what the term meant at the time the patentee filed the ‘901 
application.”).  The principle that a claim term forever has the same meaning it had on the 
date the application was filed is a longstanding one.  See Universal Oil Prods. v. Globe Oil 
& Ref. Co., 137 F.2d 3, 6, 58 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 504, 504 (7th Cir. 1943) (“Moreover, the 
meaning which the inventor gives to his words can not be made to depend upon subsequent 
events, but should appear when the application is filed.”). 
The Federal Circuit has, in some recent cases, sown needless confusion on this point.  The 
cases just cited establish that, as a doctrinal matter, the key date for fixing the meaning of a 
claim term is the application’s filing date.  Even if this were not already a matter of settled 
doctrine, the filing date is the only date that makes any sense in view of patent law 
requirements regarding a given written disclosure’s ability to properly support a given set of 
claims.  See infra Part III.B.  It is thus quite strange that in the Telegenix case the court 
speaks of reference sources that are “publicly available at the time the patent is issued.”  
Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (emphasis added).  After 
Telegenix, the Federal Circuit has twice stated that its “decisions have not always been 
consistent as to whether the pertinent date is the filing date of the application or the issue 
date of the patent.”  Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. Princeton Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d 
1365, 1370 n.1, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926, 1930 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Inverness Med. 
Switz. GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1378 n.2, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1933, 1936 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  There is no cause for the court to be coy:  the filing date is 
the one that matters, and the Telegenix court erred on this point. 
 117. Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819 (emphasis added). 
 118. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(a)-(b).  See generally CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. 
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 2.7, at 80-81 & n.9 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing judicial notice of 
such “verifiable facts” as “language or word usage”). 
 119. Fed. R. Evid. 201(c) (“A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.”). 
 120. Fed. R. Evid. 201(f) (“Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding.”); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 118, § 2.10, at 90.  The Federal Circuit 
has taken judicial notice of facts in reliable documents in a number of cases.  See 
Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 497 n.1, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1608, 1609 
n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., 9 F.3d 948, 954 n.27, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 
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Historically, judicial notice has been the ground on which the Supreme 
Court based its own use of dictionaries.121  To the extent one views 
dictionary content as a legislative rather than an adjudicative fact,122 the 
Federal Rules of Evidence do not regulate the situation at all.123 
The lack of formal constraints does not, of course, mandate that a judge 
simply indulge her personal preference when choosing a dictionary to help 
define a word in a patent claim.  The Federal Circuit, however, has not 
stated any rules or principles for how a judge should choose a dictionary in 
this context—not how to decide between using a general purpose or a 
specialized reference source, or how to decide precisely which (or how 
many) reference source(s) to use from among several candidates, or how to 
distill some core ordinary meaning from multiple definitions in multiple 
sources.124  Judges, both trial and appellate, are thus left with little more to 
guide them than personal preference—preference for one dictionary over 
another, or preference for one internal, unstated guideline over another. 
For example, one judge might opt to rely on the dictionary cited by the 
party he finds more persuasive on other grounds, converting dictionaries 
from useful tools for reaching sound conclusions into post hoc 
rationalizations.  Another judge might opt consistently for unabridged over 
collegiate dictionaries.  Yet another judge might opt to stick with the 
dictionary she has at hand in her chambers, or in the courthouse library, 
                                                          
(BNA) 1936, 1941 n.27 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., 
Inc., 897 F.2d 511, 514 n.3, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2029, 2031 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 121. See Lexicon Fortress, supra note 8, at 246-48. 
 122. On the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts, see BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 610-11 (7th ed. 1999) and MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 118, §§ 2.2-
2.3, at 65-72. 
 123. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 118, § 2.3, at 66 (“The Federal Rules of 
Evidence do not regulate the process of noticing legislative facts.”). 
 124. The Federal Circuit, tacitly acknowledging its failure thus far to provide any 
guidance on these critical questions, requests, in its en banc order in Phillips, see supra 
notes 17-18 and accompanying text, additional briefing on, among others, the following two 
questions:  “What use should be made of general as opposed to technical dictionaries?  How 
does the concept of ordinary meaning apply if there are multiple dictionary definitions of the 
same term?”  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765, 
1766 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Question #2). 
In fairness to the Federal Circuit, the court is hardly alone in failing to give meaningful 
guidance on dictionary selection.  The Supreme Court, too, has failed to state any rules or 
principles governing how courts should choose dictionaries when construing statutes and the 
like, and scholars have criticized the Court accordingly.  See Lexicon Fortress, supra note 8, 
at 264-76 (providing extended critique of the “confusion” resulting from the fact that, 
“[a]lthough the Court has relied on dictionaries for nearly 170 years, there are few 
articulated principles to provide guidance to the Court’s use of dictionaries”); Rickie 
Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2197-2201 
(2003) (reviewing critiques of the Supreme Court’s unpredictable dictionary selection 
practices); Looking It Up, supra note 8, at 1447-48 (“Yet there has been no apparent pattern 
to (or discussion of) the Justices’ choices of [dictionary] volume or vintage. . . .  If the Court 
is serious about its quest for ordinary meaning, it should not continue to employ dictionaries 
in such a chaotic fashion.”). 
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when it is time to make a decision.  Indeed, given the lack of guidance from 
the Federal Circuit, one cannot be surprised at the following exchange, 
involving an experienced federal trial judge, at a three-day patent law 
conference in September 2003: 
Returning to the notion that claim construction should begin with the 
dictionary meaning of the disputed term, a conference participant 
suggested that different dictionaries may provide inconsistent 
definitions, leaving a judge with the need to decide which dictionary to 
rely upon.  [U.S. District] Judge [T.S.] Ellis [E.D. Va.] shot back, “I use 
the dictionary in my library.”125 
Such an approach to dictionary choice is neither neutral nor predictable.  
Indeed, to the degree that cases are assigned to judges at random, the “it’s 
in my library” method amounts to random dictionary selection.  This state 
of affairs is, from a systemic perspective, highly undesirable. 
Dictionary selection by judicial caprice is not merely the stuff of 
anecdote.  Our detailed review of dictionary-citing cases from April 1995 
to June 2004 reveals two troubling phenomena that underscore the chaotic 
way in which the Federal Circuit itself appears to choose dictionaries for 
claim construction.  First, we identified four cases in which the Federal 
Circuit used a dictionary different from the dictionary it reported the trial 
court had used in the same case.126  In none of these four cases does the 
Federal Circuit explain, in any way, why it chose a dictionary different 
from the one the trial court used.  The dictionary switches in these cases are 
made all the more puzzling by the fact that the Federal Circuit has, in other 
cases, used all the dictionaries it rebuffs from the trial judges in these four 
cases.  Why the inter-court switch?  A Federal Circuit preference for 
unabridged over college dictionaries (which could explain three of the four 
cases)?  The chosen book’s ready availability in a chambers or court 
                                                          
 125. Judge Lourie Defends CAFC Reversals, PTO Chief Rogan Promises Patent Quality, 
66 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 580, 581 (Sept. 26, 2003), available at 
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/PTC.NSF.  It is not clear from the report whether Judge Ellis 
was referring to a library in his chambers or instead to a general library at the courthouse 
where he works. 
 126. Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1324, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1065, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J.) (shifting from Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary to help define a 
claim term); Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1370-74, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1209, 1214-17 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J.) (shifting from Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary to help define three 
separate claim terms); Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 
1378, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933, 1936 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Dyk, J.) (shifting from Merriam-
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary to both Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
and Shorter Oxford English Dictionary to help define two separate claim terms); Johnstown 
Am. Corp. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., Nos. 97-1070, 97-1071, 1997 WL 291956, at *1-3 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997) (Archer, J.) (shifting from American Heritage Dictionary to Dictionary of 
Architecture & Construction to help define a claim term). 
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library?  The personal preference of an opinion’s authoring judge?  Some 
other reason?  The court does not say. 
Second, we identified four cases (separate from those just discussed) in 
which the Federal Circuit uses different dictionaries to define two different 
words from the very same disputed phrase in the claim.127  In the most 
recent of the cases, for example, the court construes the claim phrase 
“opening for connecting” by, among other things, looking up the definition 
of “opening” in the Oxford English Dictionary and the definition of 
“connect” in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.128  In none of 
these four cases does the Federal Circuit explain, in any way, why the 
dictionary used to define one word in the phrase is inadequate or 
inappropriate when defining the other word in the very same phrase.  Why 
the mid-phrase switch?  Did the parties themselves cite the dictionaries in 
this pattern?  If so, what about this citation pattern was persuasive?  Was 
one dictionary more comprehensive on the desired term than the other?  
Some other reason?  Again, the court does not say. 
It thus appears to the outside observer that the Federal Circuit effectively 
chooses dictionaries at random.  To be sure, both the sweeping mandate of 
Telegenix (licensing any dictionary at any time) and the freewheeling 
approach to dictionary selection that its own cases reveal maximize the 
Federal Circuit’s freedom to obtain the objective reference(s) that it finds 
most helpful—whatever that means—at a given moment.  When a court 
chooses a dictionary according to this approach, it knows, of course, its 
own dictionary predilections, the bottom-line positions of each party 
offering any other dictionary, and the final conclusion it favors based on 
the other materials in the case.129  This approach, which replaces judicial 
                                                          
 127. TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 1138, 
71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1328, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J.) (using two different general 
purpose dictionaries for two different words); Housey Pharms., Inc. v. AstraZeneca UK 
Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1353, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Clevenger, 
J.) (using two different specialized dictionaries for two different words); Anchor Wall Sys. 
v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 1311, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 
1869-70 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Gajarsa, J.) (using two different general purpose dictionaries for 
two different words); Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971, 50 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (using a general purpose dictionary for one 
word and a specialized dictionary for another). 
 128. TI Group, 375 F.3d at 1138, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337. 
 129. In a thoughtful discussion of the Federal Circuit’s “ordinary meaning” cases, 
Barney posits that judicial selection of a dictionary is preferable to litigant selection of a 
dictionary.  See Barney, supra note 42, at 126.  Specifically, Barney argues, “unlike [with] 
other sources of extrinsic evidence, a judge can pull a dictionary from his or her own shelf 
and find a definition of a disputed term free from any influence by the litigants.”  Id. 
(emphasis in original).  First, we disagree that a judge who has heard the parties’ arguments 
on claim construction is “free from any influence by the litigants.”  Second, even if Barney 
is right about the absence of litigant influence, a “let the judge choose” strategy provides no 
guidance to parties who are attempting in good faith to avoid litigation in the first place, 
either by licensing the patent or designing around the claimed invention.  Surely our goal 
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caprice for party bias, is thus quite at odds with the neutrality that 
Telegenix praises as the reason to prefer dictionaries over resources such as 
expert testimony.130  The price of the courts’ freedom is the costly 
uncertainty the court imposes on all other actors in the patent system—
patentees, potential licensees, accused infringers, the Patent Office—who 
are simply left to guess, for good or ill, what dictionary a trial court may 
choose when litigation arises and what dictionary (perhaps a different one) 
the Federal Circuit may choose on appeal.  Nor is the guessing game mere 
sport.  The dictionary that a court chooses to help define a claim term can 
have a demonstrable effect on the case’s outcome. 
B. The Difference a Different Dictionary Can Make 
One might posit, in response to the apparent caprice in dictionary 
selection just discussed, that there is no harm in such caprice because 
dictionaries do not differ enough in content for the choice among them to 
materially affect a case’s outcome.  There is doubtless some common sense 
appeal to this notion.  After all, professional lexicographers, whether 
writing a general purpose English language dictionary or a specialized 
dictionary, strive to define the words in a common lexicon, e.g., standard 
American English, or standard medical terminology.  All dictionary writers 
are under enormous pressure to be concise,131 and concision leaves less 
room for differing creative expressions.  All reputable dictionary writers 
use extensive evidence of common usage132 and, in the case of specialized 
terms, copious input from accomplished experts in the relevant field.133  
                                                          
should be to develop a claim construction methodology that helps opposing interests 
accurately assess their respective likelihoods of success were litigation to occur and thus 
dispense with the need actually to litigate at all. 
 130. See Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (dictionaries are helpful because they are “not influenced by 
expert testimony or events subsequent to the fixing of the intrinsic record by the grant of the 
patent, not colored by the motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation”). 
 131. See LANDAU, supra note 2, at 173 (“Almost every defining characteristic common 
to dictionaries can be traced to the need to conserve space.”). 
 132. The “chief sources of definitions” for modern dictionaries are “the citation file and 
the electronic corpus.” Id. at 189.  According to Landau, a “citation file is a selection of 
potential lexical units in the context of actual usage, drawn from a variety of written sources 
and often some spoken sources, chiefly because the context illuminates an aspect of 
meaning.”  Id. at 190 (emphasis in original).  And a “corpus . . . is a collection of different 
texts or of recorded speech, nowadays stored electronically on a computer and indexed so 
that any particular word can be found quickly in the context in which it has been used.”  Id.; 
see also id. at 192-93 (contrasting electronic corpora from citation files).  Landau provides 
both exemplar citation slips and sample corpus printouts.  See id. at 196-99 (citation slips in 
Figs. 8-13); id. at 194 (corpus printout in Fig. 7); see also BÉJOINT, supra note 79, at 97-99 
(discussing usage-based evidence for definitions).  All lawyers are, of course, familiar with 
the corpora known as Westlaw and LexisNexis. 
 133. See LANDAU, supra note 2, at 168 (“Although usage in scientific terminology is 
given much weight when it is available, in general imposed definitions are determined by a 
consensus of experts.”); id. at 191 (noting that general purpose dictionaries “rely on 
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Finally, competing lexicographers have, since the birth of the English 
language dictionary, aggressively monitored (and sometimes avidly 
borrowed from) one another’s published definitions.134  The hunch that 
different dictionaries often converge in their definitions is thus consistent 
with actual lexicography practice. 
At the same time, important differences among competing dictionaries 
exist alongside convergence in some definitions.  First, different 
dictionaries approach crafting the body of a definition differently.  
Consider the flagship dictionaries of the two groups that the Federal Circuit 
cites most often, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary and 
American Heritage Dictionary.  A definition in Webster’s Third, for 
example, is consciously designed to be “a single coherent and clearly 
expressed phrase that need[s] no punctuation except where commas [are] 
essential to separate words or groups of words in a series.”135  In addition, 
                                                          
specialists to define the large percentage of scientific and technical terms.”); id. at 213 
(“Most scientific and technical terms must be defined by specialists on the basis of their 
judgments about preferred scientific usage.”).  Consulting experts (or, at least, claiming to) 
is as old as Edward Phillips’ The New World of English Words (1658), in which the author 
vouched “for the accuracy of his definitions by naming specialist sources of information, for 
example ‘Dr Sparks’ for ‘physicks’, ‘Mr Molins’ for ‘botanicks’, and ‘Dr Wybard’ for 
geometry.”  Michael Rand Hoare & Vivian Salmon, The Vocabulary of Science in the OED, 
in LEXICOGRAPHY AND THE OED:  PIONEERS IN THE UNTRODDEN FOREST 156, 156, 171 
(Lynda Mugglestone ed., 2000). 
 134. As Landau succinctly states, “[m]odern lexicographers look very carefully at each 
other’s work.”  Id. at 43.  The practice is dictated, in part, by the profit motive:  “Few 
modern commercial publishers have an instinct for scholarship so pure that they will spend 
millions of dollars to redo what other, better scholars have done before them.”  Id. at 44.  As 
a result, when a new dictionary project begins, one scrutinizes existing sources.  According 
to Landau, 
Dictionary makers acquire every significant new dictionary as soon as it is 
published.  One’s direct competitors’ works are examined with due care to see what 
new terms they have included—or failed to include. . . .  Another dictionary’s 
definition must be considered along with other citations for the word being 
defined. . . .  [C]ommercial dictionaries are now loath to admit having relied on a 
competitor.  For marketing reasons, every dictionary is represented as being 
unaffected by every other.  Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Id. at 214.  Even so, not all dictionaries are equal:  “the Merriam-Webster dictionaries in 
America and the Oxford dictionaries in the UK are less influenced by other dictionaries than 
other dictionaries are by them.”  Id. at 402.  For an engaging discussion of detailed 
examples of verbatim definition borrowing, in dictionaries both modern and antique, see 
Robert Burchfield, The Genealogy of Dictionaries, in UNLOCKING THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
147 (1989). 
Borrowing a competitor’s handiwork verbatim is as old as English lexicography.  Robert 
Cawdrey’s A Table Alphabeticall (1604), “most often accepted as the first [English 
monolingual] dictionary,” copied liberally from two Latin-English works.  LANDAU, supra 
note 2, at 46, 48.  Cawdrey’s work was in turn copied liberally by “[t]he next English 
dictionary,” John Bullokar’s An English Expositor (1616).  Id. at 48.  In short, “[t]he earliest 
English lexicographers by and large copied the definitions of their predecessors.”  Id. at 190. 
 135. MORTON, supra note 3, at 87.  This defining style, pioneered by Philip Babcock 
Gove, the Editor-in-Chief of Webster’s Third, was “Gove’s most distinctive innovation” in 
the work.  Id.  The style produced some clunkers and thus had its critics.  Id.  For example, 
Webster’s Third broadly defines the noun “door” as follows: 
1 a:  a movable piece of firm material or a structure supported usu. along one side 
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the definitions in Webster’s Third carry only minimal status and usage 
labeling.136  A definition in American Heritage, by contrast, is not confined 
to the single-statement defining style of Webster’s Third,137 and American 
Heritage provides both copious status labeling and usage advice from a 
200-member “usage panel.”138  These differences are, in fact, rooted in the 
great controversy that erupted with the publication of Webster’s Third in 
1961:  both the American Heritage Dictionary, first published in 1969, and 
the “usage panel” device it inaugurated, were direct responses to what its 
publisher viewed as the radical descriptivism of Webster’s Third.139 
Second, when defining a word with multiple senses, different 
dictionaries order the several senses differently.  There are two 
conventional approaches to ordering these senses:  chronologically (or 
historically), ranging from earliest to most recent sense; and logically, 
ranging from more to less important or frequent sense.  A given dictionary 
                                                          
and swinging on pivots or hinges, sliding along a groove, rolling up and down, 
revolving as one of four leaves, or folding like an accordion by means of which an 
opening may be closed or kept open for passage into or out of a building, room, or 
other covered enclosure or a car, airplane, elevator, or other vehicle—see kalamein 
door, panel door 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 674 (2002). 
 136. MORTON, supra note 3, at 135 (“The most striking of Gove’s policies on usage was 
his decision to cut back on the use of the slang label, eliminate the label colloquial entirely, 
and put greater reliance on illustrative quotations and usage notes to indicate the status of 
words that were on the borderline of standard English.”).  As Morton recounts in 
comprehensive detail, Gove’s choice to minimize status and usage labeling in Webster’s 
Third was savaged by many reviewers and hailed by others in the two years following the 
book’s first publication.  Id. at 153-214.  See also Robert Burchfield, Words and Meanings 
in the Twentieth Century, in UNLOCKING THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 61, 76 (1989) (“The 
publication of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary in 1961 was greeted with 
immense pleasure by most academic reviewers and with implacable hostility by nearly 
every journalist who reviewed it.  University teachers loved its inclusiveness and its up-to-
dateness.  Journalists spoke of ‘sabotage at Springfield’:  they judged it to be a work of 
deplorable linguistic permissiveness.”). 
So spirited were the so-called “prescriptivist/descriptivist” debates attending the 
publication of Webster’s Third, the controversy yielded an anthology of detractors’ and 
supporters’ reviews.  See DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY:  A CASEBOOK ON THE AIMS 
OF LEXICOGRAPHERS AND THE TARGETS OF REVIEWERS 50-250 (James Sledd & Wilma R. 
Ebbitt eds., 1962).  Gove later defended his policy on status and usage labels.  See also 
Philip B. Gove, Usage in the Dictionary, in THE ROLE OF THE DICTIONARY 51 (Philip B. 
Gove ed., 1967). 
 137. For example, American Heritage broadly defines the noun “door” as “[a] movable 
structure used to close off an entrance, typically consisting of a panel that swings on hinges 
or that slides or rotates.”  AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 536 (4th ed. 2000). 
 138. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY viii (4th ed. 2000) (“The Usage Notes are 
based on periodic surveys of the Usage Panel, a group of some 200 distinguished writers, 
scholars, scientists, and other respected users and students of the English language.”); id. at 
xiii-xv (listing members of the usage panel); see also LANDAU, supra note 2, at 93 (“The 
one extraordinary feature of the American Heritage dictionaries apart from their [graphic 
and color illustration] design has been the introduction of a usage panel of putative ‘good 
writers’ whose judgments about disputed usages are supposed to provide guidance for the 
rest of the benighted English-speaking world.”). 
 139. See LANDAU, supra note 2, at 93-94 (discussing the early history of the American 
Heritage Dictionary); MORTON, supra note 3, at 223-25, 228-32 (same). 
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usually states its approach to ordering senses in its “front matter,” which 
most users rarely, if ever, consult.140  Funk & Wagnalls pioneered ordering 
senses by frequency of usage in its Standard Dictionary (1893) and New 
Standard Dictionary (1913),141 and logical ordering is now the more 
common way to organize senses.142  Both Merriam-Webster and Oxford 
University dictionaries order senses chronologically.143  Both American 
Heritage and Random House dictionaries, by contrast, order senses from 
more to less central usage.144 
These important differences among different dictionaries can, in turn, 
generate different claim construction analyses.  First, when a court uses 
only one dictionary in aid of its claim construction, the dictionary’s content 
may differ from others in a way that hits hard at the patentee’s core 
disagreement with the accused infringer.  Second, these content-based 
effects may be compounded by the fact that, when a court uses multiple 
dictionaries to derive a unified ordinary meaning for a disputed word, it can 
select from among varied approaches to forging one definition from many 
sources.  A brief review of three Federal Circuit cases from the last year 
amply demonstrates the substantive difference that selecting different 
dictionaries can make. 
1. The usage note case 
In International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp.,145 the Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 140. See LANDAU, supra note 2, at 148 (“The trend in recent years has been to cut back 
on front matter because it is widely believed among lexicographers that no one reads it.”). 
 141. See id. at 86. 
 142. See BÉJOINT, supra note 79, at 50. 
 143. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 17a, ¶ 12.5 (2002) (“The 
order of senses is historical:  the one known to have been first used in English is entered 
first.”); 1 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY xvii-xviii, ¶ 4.10 (5th ed. 2002) 
(explaining chronological ordering of senses); 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY xxix (2d ed. 
1989) (“[T]hat sense is placed first which was actually the earliest in the language:  the 
others follow in the order in which they appear to have arisen.”); WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 19 (1985) (“The order of senses within an entry is historical:  the 
sense known to have been first used in English is entered first. . . .  When a numbered sense 
is further subdivided into lettered subsenses . . . their order is likewise historical:  subsense 
1a is earlier than 1b, 1b is earlier than 1c, and so forth.”).  For a lucid and detailed account 
of the way in which James A.H. Murray and his assistants crafted definitions for the first 
edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, see Penny Silva, Time and Meaning:  Sense and 
Definition in the OED, in LEXICOGRAPHY AND THE OED:  PIONEERS IN THE UNTRODDEN 
FOREST 77 (Lynda Muggleston ed., 2000). 
 144. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY xxxiv (4th ed. 2000) (“Entries containing 
more than one sense are arranged for the convenience of contemporary dictionary users with 
the central and often the most commonly sought meaning first.  Senses and subsenses are 
grouped to show their relationships with each other.”); AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY xxv (3d ed. 1997) (same); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE xxxii (2d ed. 1987) (“In each part of speech group, the most frequently 
encountered meanings generally come before less common ones.”); RANDOM HOUSE 
WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY xviii (2d ed. 1997) (same). 
 145. 361 F.3d 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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confronted a claim construction dispute involving a patented 
semiconductor chip structure.  The claimed structure included both a 
“wafer of semiconductor material having a relatively lightly doped major 
body portion” and “a further region of opposite conductivity type adjoining 
[the] lightly doped major body portion.”146  The accused infringer’s liability 
for infringement of the claims using the word “adjoining” turned entirely 
on whether or not “adjoining” requires that the major body portion and the 
further region touch each other.147 
The district court, quoting defining language from Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary, concluded that “two objects need not be in physical 
contact to be ‘adjoining.’”148  IXYS, the accused infringer, conceded that it 
could not avoid infringement of the claims under the district court’s 
construction of “adjoining.”149 
What does this dictionary actually say?  The Ninth New Collegiate 
defines “adjoin” as “to lie next to or in contact with” and “to be close to or 
in contact with one another,” and defines “adjoining” as “touching or 
bounding at a point or line.”150  The definition of “adjoining” also directs 
the reader to the definition of “adjacent,” which it labels a synonym.151  The 
Ninth New Collegiate defines “adjacent” as “not distant,” “having a 
common endpoint or border,” and “immediately preceding or following.”152  
All these definitions suggest that one can, consistent with ordinary usage, 
use both adjoining and adjacent to describe two items that are close to each 
other but not touching.  Most importantly for our discussion here, the 
definition of “adjacent” in the Ninth New Collegiate further includes a 
usage note contrasting adjoining and adjacent, a note to which the district 
court made no apparent reference: 
ADJACENT, ADJOINING, CONTIGUOUS, JUXTAPOSED mean 
being in close proximity.  ADJACENT may or may not imply contact 
but always implies absence of anything of the same kind in between; 
ADJOINING definitely implies meeting and touching at some point or 
line; CONTIGUOUS implies having contact on all or most of one side; 
JUXTAPOSED means placed side by side esp. so as to permit 
comparison and contrast.153 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s construction 
of “adjoining,” holding that this word in the claims requires physical 
                                                          
 146. Id. at 1367, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212 (quoting claim 19 of U.S. Patent No. 
4,959,699 (issued Sept. 25, 1990)). 
 147. Id. at 1375, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218. 
 148. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218. 
 149. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218. 
 150. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 56 (1985). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:27 PM 
2005] PROVEN KEY 875 
contact between the major body portion and the further region.154  It also 
held that, as a matter of law, IXYS could not have infringed the claims 
containing the “adjoining” requirement.155  First, and without explaining 
why, the Federal Circuit switched from the Ninth New Collegiate to the 
1966 printing of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.156  Second, 
after quoting the definitions of “adjoining” and “adjacent” from Webster’s 
Third, the court focused on the Webster’s Third version of the usage note 
(appended to the definition of “adjacent”) that contrasts these two 
synonyms.157 
The usage note in Webster’s Third is quite a bit longer than the 
corresponding note in the Ninth New Collegiate.  It states, in relevant part, 
as follows: 
ADJACENT is sometimes merely a synonym for near or close to.  
Applied to things of the same type, it indicates either side-by-side 
proximity or lack of anything of the same nature intervening.  
ADJOINING is quite similar to ADJACENT in meaning and suggestion 
but may more strongly indicate existence of common bounding lines or 
lines or points of junction.158 
The Federal Circuit, after quoting this usage note, concludes that the 
district court erred by ignoring its teaching.  According to the Federal 
Circuit, 
[T]he district court was not free to disregard this usage note. . . .   [T]he 
district court’s adoption of a definition [for “adjoining”] attributed to 
“adjacent,” a synonym of the claim term, disregards entirely the 
distinction between the two terms set forth in the usage note.  Had the 
inventor meant “adjacent,” he could have used that word.159 
The court betrays no hint of irony at faulting the district court for 
“disregarding” a usage note in a dictionary that the district court never 
consulted. 
Putting the unexplained dictionary switch to one side, it seems sensible 
at first blush to conclude that, having decided to consult a dictionary, one 
                                                          
 154. Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1375, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1209, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 155. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218. 
 156. Id. at 1374, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217. 
 157. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217. 
 158. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 26 (1966) (illustrative 
quotations omitted).  The 2002 printing of Webster’s Third contains the very same 
definitions and usage note.  See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 26-27 
(2002).  In addition, the Addenda Section of the 2002 printing, id. at 55a-144a, which 
contains new words and new senses of words that have entered the lexicon since 1961, does 
not provide any additional information for “adjacent” or “adjoining.”  See id. at 55a.  We 
suspect that many who use post-1961 printings of Webster’s Third do not know about the 
existence of, much less the importance of consulting, the Addenda Section.  The Federal 
Circuit appears never to have cited it. 
 159. Int’l Rectifier, 361 F.3d at 1374, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217. 
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must take all that one finds there—both the bitter and the sweet, as it were.  
And the Ninth New Collegiate, like Webster’s Third, includes a usage note 
for “adjacent” that tilts decidedly in favor of the Federal Circuit’s 
construction of “adjoining.”  Then one wonders, do other dictionaries draw 
precisely the same distinctions between “adjoining” and “adjacent” that the 
Merriam-Webster sources do?  If not, perhaps more weight has been put on 
these usage notes than they can bear. 
As it turns out, the American Heritage dictionaries—which as a group 
take second place among the Federal Circuit’s most commonly cited 
general purpose dictionaries—distinguish “adjoining” from “adjacent” far 
less tidily than do the Merriam-Webster sources.  The entire definitions of 
“adjoining” and “adjacent” from the three American Heritage sources are 
as follows: 
 
 “ADJOINING” “ADJACENT” 
American 
Heritage   
Dictionary 21 (4th 
ed. 2000) 
Neighboring; 
contiguous. 
1. Close to; lying near; 
adjacent cities.  2. Next to; 
adjoining:  adjacent garden 
plots. 
American 
Heritage   College 
Dictionary 16 (3d 
ed. 1997) 
Neighboring; 
contiguous. 
1. Close to; lying near; 
adjacent cities.  2. Next to; 
adjoining:  adjacent garden 
plots. 
American 
Heritage   
Dictionary 79 (2d    
college ed. 1985) 
Neighboring; 
contiguous; 
next to. 
1. Close to; lying near.   
2. Next to; adjoining. 
 
None of these three dictionaries has any usage note for either word.  Nor 
do any of them even point from the word “adjoining” to the word 
“adjacent.”  The definition of “adjacent” merely uses the word “adjoining.” 
It thus appears that, had the Federal Circuit switched to an American 
Heritage dictionary rather than switching to Webster’s Third, it might well 
have affirmed the district court’s construction of “adjoining” and the 
concomitant infringement liability judgment.  Instead, it reversed the claim 
construction and the liability judgment.  Dictionary selection seems to have 
made the difference between liability and no liability. 
2. The high frequency and wood board cases:  Making one from many 
Two recent cases expose an important methodological choice that arises 
when one tries to use definitions from multiple dictionaries to create a 
single statement of a word’s ordinary meaning.  One option is to take as the 
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word’s ordinary meaning only the select material that is common to all the 
definitions; another option is take as the word’s ordinary meaning the 
totality of the material from all the definitions.160  The first approach, which 
extracts material common to all the definitions, has the virtue of identifying 
the meaning of the target word that is most widely and well-established in 
the relevant language community.  And it is the settled nature of ordinary 
meaning that makes ordinary meaning—and the use of a dictionary to 
identify it—attractive as a default rule for claim construction.161  The 
second approach, which embraces all material found in any definition, has 
the virtue of identifying the broadest possible range of ordinary meaning 
for the target word.  And it is the promise of a comprehensive reminder 
which augments one’s untutored understanding that makes consulting a 
dictionary a helpful exercise.162  Both methods, then, are consonant with 
some of the policy bases for relying on dictionaries.  Choosing between the 
methods, one must note, also interacts with one’s choice of dictionaries, 
given that dictionaries vary in content.  Which method should a court use 
when creating one definition of a disputed claim term from many 
dictionaries?  Interestingly, each of the two Federal Circuit cases to which 
we now turn uses a different one of these two methodologies. 
In Intellectual Property Development, Inc. v. UA-Columbia Cablebvision 
of Westchester, Inc.,163 the Federal Circuit construed the phrase “high 
                                                          
 160. We owe this point to John Duffy. 
 161. Thus, for example, the Federal Circuit recently rejected the efforts of both a 
patentee and an accused infringer to rely on reference sources that reflected changing, rather 
than settled, meanings of the claim term under dispute.  In the case, captioned ACTV, Inc. v. 
Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the parties 
disputed the scope of the claim term “uniform resource locator.”  Each party urged the court 
to rely on one of two dueling reference documents, called Requests for Comments or RFCs, 
from the internet standard setting body known as the World Wide Web Consortium.  Id. at 
1088-89, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520-21.  The Federal Circuit rejected both reference 
documents on the ground that they did not reflect a settled meaning for the target term: 
The purpose of the RFCs is . . . to collect commentary and to select language to 
facilitate a common understanding, or to select a standard, from a variety of 
competing technologies and vocabularies and from a variety of potentially 
competing interests. . . .  This purpose is in sharp contrast to the role of dictionaries 
and treatises, which aim not to select or give meaning to a word or phrase, but to 
report the meaning already established and commonly understood by those skilled 
in the art. . . .  Because the RFCs were not designed to reflect common usage, but 
rather to assign language to facilitate further conversation, and because of the 
seeming contradictions between RFC 1738 and RFC 1808, we conclude that both 
documents are extrinsic evidence . . . [and] we decline to rely on them in our claim 
construction analysis. 
Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
The reader interested in learning more about the role of RFCs in developing internet 
standards should consult Scott Bradner, The Internet Engineering Task Force, in OPEN 
SOURCES:  VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 47, 50 (Chris DeBona et al. eds., 
1999). 
 162. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 163. 336 F.3d 1308, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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frequency carrier” in a patent claim covering a wired broadcasting 
system.164  The district court, relying on both the McGraw-Hill Dictionary 
of Scientific and Technical Terms and Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate 
Dictionary, construed “high frequency” to mean between three and thirty 
MHz.165  The Federal Circuit, for its part, affirmed this construction of 
“high frequency,” relying on the same dictionaries as the district court.166 
In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit rejected the patentee’s 
contention that it was improper to define “high frequency” so narrowly 
given the existence of dictionaries that define the phrase more broadly.  
Specifically, the patentee presented broader definitions from both the 
Oxford English Dictionary and the Dictionary of Electronics.167  The 
Federal Circuit resolved the apparent problem with the broader definitions 
by pointing out, with the help of extended quotations from them, that they 
also included the narrower equation of “high frequency” with “3 to 30 
megahertz.”168  In other words, without expressly stating it, the court used 
the first of the two methodologies described above:  take as the ordinary 
meaning only that which is common to multiple dictionary definitions.  The 
narrower construction of “high frequency” precluded infringement 
liability.169  Less than a year later the court shifted ground to the other 
methodology. 
In Nystrom v. TREX Co.,170 the Federal Circuit construed the noun 
“board” in a patent claim covering a flooring board with a top surface 
designed to slope gradually off to either side of the center.171  The patentee 
contended that the word “board” covered both wood boards and synthetic 
boards; the accused infringer, who made synthetic boards that otherwise 
fell within the scope of the patent claims, contended that “board” covered 
only wood boards.172  The district court, agreeing with the accused 
infringer, construed “board” to mean “a piece of elongated construction 
material made from wood cut from a log.”173  The Federal Circuit reversed 
this construction, defining “board” as “an elongated, flat piece of wood or 
other rigid material.”174 
                                                          
 164. Id. at 1310-12, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 165. Id. at 1314-15, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
 166. Id. at 1315-16, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389-90. 
 167. Id. at 1315, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390. 
 168. Id. at 1316 n.7, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390 (quoting from Oxford English 
Dictionary and Dictionary of Electronics). 
 169. Id. at 1317, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 
 170. 374 F.3d 1105, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 171. Id. at 1107-08, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243. 
 172. Id. at 1110-11, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245. 
 173. Id. at 1110, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245. 
 174. Id. at 1113, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247. 
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Just as in UA-Columbia, the Federal Circuit confronted multiple, 
differing dictionary definitions of the critical term.  Specifically, Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary and American Heritage Dictionary 
define “board” differently, and the difference is precisely the ‘wood only v. 
wood and synthetic’ distinction.  Webster’s Third defines “board,” in 
relevant part, as “a piece of sawed lumber of little thickness but 
considerable surface area usu. being rectangular and of a length greatly 
exceeding its width.”175  American Heritage, by contrast, defines “board,” 
in relevant part, as both “[a] long flat slab of sawed lumber; a plank” and 
“[a] flat piece of wood or similarly rigid material adapted for a special 
use.”176  The court quoted both definitions, noting that “[w]hile some 
dictionaries define ‘board’ solely in reference to its material composition, 
not all dictionaries are so constrained.”177 
Had the Nystrom panel followed the same methodology as the UA-
Columbia panel, the court would have distilled from these disparate 
definitions that which is common to both and thus defined “board” to mean 
“a slab of sawed lumber.”178  Under that construction, it would have 
affirmed the district court’s judgment of no liability.  Instead, the court 
adopted the opposite methodology—combining material mentioned in any 
definition, rather than extracting material mentioned in all definitions.  
According to the Federal Circuit, the differing Webster’s Third and 
American Heritage definitions “show that the ordinary meaning of the 
word ‘board’ encompasses both a piece of cut wood or sawn timber and a 
similarly-shaped item made of rigid material.”179  The court did not cite, 
much less discuss, the UA-Columbia case. 
In the foregoing cases, the court’s dictionary selections and methods for 
using dictionaries directly affected the liability outcome.  It is, of course, 
possible that in most other instances in which the Federal Circuit used one 
or more dictionaries to help construe a claim term, the court would have 
reached the very same outcome no matter what dictionary it used.  But it is 
not likely.  Dictionary choice matters.  And thus the need remains for a 
principled, predictable dictionary selection method that shares the 
neutrality of dictionary writing, i.e., that helps one get dictionary content 
that is free from the biasing influence of the parties’ position-dictated views 
                                                          
 175. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 243 (2002) (sense 3a).  The 
Addenda Section defines additional senses for the noun “board,” id. at 65a, but none of them 
is relevant here.  It is interesting to note that, had the Federal Circuit used one dictionary 
alone (which is the more common technique), and that dictionary had been Webster’s Third 
(which it cites most often, see Apps. B & C), the case could well have come out the opposite 
way. 
 176. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 203 (4th ed. 2000). 
 177. Nystrom, 374 F.3d at 1111-12, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246. 
 178. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246. 
 179. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246. 
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or the judge’s purely personal preferences.  The method we propose 
achieves this predictability and neutrality by mandating that dictionary 
selections be made before the parties to a dispute can know which 
reference sources best favor the outcomes they desire—indeed, before the 
patent, at the heart of a later dispute, even exists. 
III. MOVING DICTIONARY CHOICE TO THE PATENT OFFICE 
The presumption of ordinary meaning has great merit.  A person of 
ordinary skill in the art to which a patent pertains is knowledgeable about 
both the art itself and the ways that people in the art talk and write about 
their work.  As a result, when a person of ordinary skill in the art reads a 
patent, she looks at the words that the patentee has used in light of the 
ordinary meaning that those words have to people skilled in the art.  
Patentees surely know this about their readers.  Only nonce words—words 
that are coined for a single occasion180—often lack an ordinary meaning 
outside the context of the patent.  Patentees know this, too.  It is thus quite 
sensible to assume that, unless there is good evidence to the contrary, the 
patentee has chosen the words in the written description and the claims of 
the patent according to their ordinary meaning.  The Federal Circuit’s 
heavy presumption of ordinary meaning builds this insight into the claim 
construction process.181 
Consulting dictionaries and similar usage-based sources to determine 
ordinary meaning also has great merit.  Of course, even our most 
comprehensive dictionaries cannot map all the linguistic terrain.  As Robert 
Burchfield, editor of the four-volume Supplement to the Oxford English 
                                                          
 180. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1535 (2002) (defining 
adjective “nonce” as “occurring, used, or made only once or for a special occasion”).  The 
highfalutin term is hapax legomenon.  Id. at 1030.  Nonce words can have an ordinary 
meaning upon being coined if they are constructed using other well known words.  For 
example, no one who lived through or knew about the Nixon resignation had any trouble 
understanding on first reading the popular press terms “travelgate” (the dustup over firings 
at the White House Travel Office early in President Clinton’s first term), “nannygate” (the 
sinking of President Clinton’s first nominee to be Attorney General, Zoë Baird, over her 
having employed two illegal immigrants to work as nannies) or “zippergate” (a colorful 
term for the Lewinsky scandal)—all of which are derived analogically from the Watergate 
break-in scandal that destroyed the Nixon presidency.  See generally Dieter Kastovsky, 
Words and Word-Formation:  Morphology in OED, in LEXICOGRAPHY AND THE OED:  
PIONEERS IN THE UNTRODDEN FOREST 110, 113 (Lynda Mugglestone ed., 2000) (discussing 
the ways in which “a nonce-formation can usually be satisfactorily interpreted by the 
listener when he or she hears it for the first time”). 
James A.H. Murray, the editor of the first edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, 
coined the phrase “nonce word” to describe items that appeared in only one source.  See 1 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY xxvii (2d ed. 1989) (“Words apparently employed only for 
the nonce, are, when inserted in the Dictionary, marked nonce-wd.”); see also 10 OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 487 (2d ed. 1989) (definition 1, sense 4, of “nonce”). 
 181. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text. 
MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:27 PM 
2005] PROVEN KEY 881 
Dictionary from 1957 to 1986,182 put it, there is a “never-ending 
raggedness, stretching away into the darkness, of our language at the 
perimeter of what we can manage to put in our largest dictionaries.”183  All 
the same, it is better to aid subjective memory with objective resources than 
to rely on subjective memory alone.  The Federal Circuit’s turn to 
dictionaries as helpful reminders about the full range of a word’s ordinary 
meaning to a person of ordinary skill follows, in this respect, a well-worn 
judicial path.184  The empirical evidence discussed above, which shows that 
all current members of the Federal Circuit have relied on dictionaries in 
claim construction to at least a degree,185 strongly suggests that the court 
will not stop using dictionaries altogether as a claim construction tool.186  
The court’s dictionary selections in individual cases, however, remain 
troublingly chaotic. 
The Federal Circuit, having chosen to presume that patentees select 
words for a claim according to their ordinary meaning, is right to seek out 
this meaning in “unbiased reflections of common understanding” that are 
“not colored by the motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation.”187 
The court cannot reach this goal, however, without identifying some 
predictable basis upon which to deploy objective reference sources that 
were publicly available to the patentee and others in the art at the time the 
patent application was filed. 
One might be tempted to conclude that the Federal Circuit can bring 
about this predictability entirely on its own.  We conclude otherwise.  To 
appreciate why, consider the following thought experiment:  Imagine that 
the court declares that, so far as it is concerned, (a) the definitive general 
purpose English language dictionary is Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, (b) it will consult one and only one general purpose English 
                                                          
 182. See Robert Burchfield, Linguistic Milestones, in UNLOCKING THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 3, 3 (1989). 
 183. Id. at 19 (quoting a letter he wrote to Anthony Burgess, novelist and literary critic, 
in 1986).  One of the Federal Circuit’s predecessor courts made a similar point in discussing 
the freedom the law gives every patentee to coin new words in a patent: 
Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it.  The dictionary 
does not always keep abreast of the inventor.  It cannot.  Things are not made for 
the sake of words, but words for things.  To overcome this lag, patent law allows 
the inventor to be his own lexicographer. 
Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 502 (Ct. Cl. 
1967).   
 184. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 185. See infra Tbl. 7, App. B. 
 186. We concede that, as a formal matter, the en banc order in the Phillips case puts a 
“no more dictionaries” option in play.  See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.  As a 
practical matter, however, we do not think it is likely that the court will choose the “no more 
dictionaries” option. 
 187. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203, 64 US.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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language dictionary, Webster’s Third, when determining a contested 
claim’s ordinary meaning, and (c) it will consult the printing of Webster’s 
Third that most closely precedes the disputed patent’s filing date.  This 
framework, which has the virtue of maximizing predictability (at least in 
the short run), is far too brittle to survive.  Its largest defect, apart from 
grossly violating existing patentees’ settled expectations about the 
acceptability of numerous dictionaries,188 is the failure to take any account 
of the court’s preference, about thirty percent of the time, for specialized 
reference sources.189 
Imagine, then, that the court modifies the simple framework above to 
include specialized reference sources.  The court cannot limit itself to a 
single specialized source because it reviews cases from numerous 
technological domains.  As the court tries to answer questions that 
necessarily arise when it uses multiple sources, predictability quickly 
begins to collapse.  When should one use a specialized source rather than a 
general purpose source?  Should one use a single specialized source, or 
multiple sources?  Which source(s)?190  If one uses multiple sources, how 
does one forge a single meaning from what they say as a group?  Most of 
these questions likely cannot be answered in a way that applies robustly 
across a large number of patents, even within a single field of art.  
Moreover, if the court somehow managed to provide answers that had 
some staying power, the prior decision to permit use of only one general 
purpose source (Webster’s Third in our hypothetical) would doubtless 
come under relentless pressure from parties who stood to gain, in their 
respective cases, from the use of a different general purpose dictionary 
(e.g., American Heritage Dictionary).  The task of drafting what amount to 
complex dictionary citation regulations, in the guise of deciding cases, 
would thus begin anew with the general purpose sources.191 
                                                          
 188. This is not a small problem.  The Supreme Court has cautioned the Federal Circuit 
against violating patentees’ settled expectations with jarring retroactive changes to the rules 
of the patent game.  See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 
722, 739 (2002) (“[C]ourts must be cautious before adopting changes [to patent law] that 
disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community.”). 
 189. See supra Tbl. 8. 
 190. This question is probably the toughest for the court to answer.  First, a single case is 
simply not a good vehicle for issuing what amount to prospective regulations about 
acceptable reference books.  Second, even if it wanted to try to identify mandated reference 
books case by case, the court does not have the institutional resources to determine, for any 
given field at a given time, which specific reference books were the highest quality for claim 
construction purposes.  For example, which specialized reference is best for pharmaceutical 
inventions made in the late 1980s?  For computer software inventions made in the early 
1990s?  For semiconductor chip inventions made in 2000?  Nor does the problem stand still.  
As time rolls forward, the court would have to keep identifying the best reference sources 
over and over again. 
 191. At least one commentator has concluded that choosing dictionaries for use in 
statutory interpretation cases is better resolved by legislative than by judicial action.  See 
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
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This brief thought experiment should be enough to show that the Federal 
Circuit, if forced to undertake the task alone, is ill suited to make dictionary 
selection substantially more predictable.  All the court alone can do, at least 
at this time, is mandate a closed list of the reference sources it will consult.  
Happily, the Federal Circuit is not alone. 
The Patent Office, another key player in our patent system,192 is well 
suited to deploy its power over patent examination procedure to render 
dictionary selection far more predictable.  And it can do so without relying 
on closed source lists.193  Specifically, as we describe in detail below, the 
Patent Office can and should require all patent applicants to state their 
dictionary preferences, both general purpose and specialized, on the face of 
their patent applications at the time of filing.194  In any subsequent claim 
construction process, whether for licensing, design-around, or litigation 
purposes, parties would look to the reference sources that the patentee 
himself selected.  The courts, including the Federal Circuit, would limit 
themselves to the same patentee-selected resources when adjudicating a 
claim construction dispute; they would do so in accordance with the 
general principle that a patentee is bound in subsequent litigation by the 
statements she made in the intrinsic patent record.195  The Patent Office 
                                                          
2085, 2143-48 (2002).  According to Rosenkranz, “Congress could provide:  ‘When Courts 
have recourse to a dictionary in interpreting any federal statute enacted after this one, it shall 
be the Oxford English Dictionary, second edition, and no other.’”  Others, it must be said, 
have criticized his proposals.  See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I?  
Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 
97 (2003). 
 192. See generally Rai, supra note 26. 
 193. Professor Wagner, in a recent article that wisely urges greater attention to the ex 
ante effects of patent law doctrines, suggests that “a rule assigning the default meaning of 
claim terms according to a standard dictionary would be beneficial,” at least “in the sense 
that [the rule] would induce patentees to be clear about the meanings of the words they 
choose for the claims.”  R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel:  Patent Administration 
and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 244 & n.312 (2002) (footnote omitted).  
He notes, in connection with recommending “a standard dictionary,” that “the PTO could 
promulgate an ‘official’ list of standard reference sources, related to technological field 
where appropriate.”  Id. at 244 n.311.  Under this approach, “[c]laim terms would . . . be 
presumed to take the meaning assigned in the standard source, unless the patentee clearly 
designated a different meaning.”  Id.  The interim half of the proposal we describe below 
resembles Professor Wagner’s approach, although we do not think it is advisable for the 
Patent Office to devote resources to developing a consensus about which reference sources 
merit inclusion on an official agency list.  See infra Part III.C.3.  We propose, instead, that 
each patent examiner have the flexibility to specify, in the context of each separate patent 
application, which reference sources will be consulted absent objection from the applicant.  
See infra Part III.C.2. 
 194. See infra Part III.C. 
 195. See, e.g., Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., L.P., 323 F.3d 989, 995, 65 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826, 1830 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The public notice function of a patent and 
its prosecution history requires that a patentee be held to what he declares during the 
prosecution of his patent.”); Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1384, 49 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The public is entitled to rely upon the 
public record of a patent in determining the scope of the patent’s claims.”); Key Pharms. v. 
Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716-17, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911, 1917 (Fed. Cir. 
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would thus, in effect, add another facet to the longstanding practice of 
allowing patentees to provide controlling express definitions for any claim 
terms in the body of the patent.196  Put another way, patentees, who are 
already empowered to be their own lexicographers, i.e., dictionary writers, 
would also be their own dictionary choosers.  Such an approach provides 
courts with a way to use dictionaries that is both highly predictable and 
tailored to each patent.  This rule’s properly cognizable cost to the 
applicant is small, and the benefit to those who must construe the patent in 
the future is large. 
Before elaborating on our proposed change to the Patent Office’s 
procedural rules, we address two questions that might arise about the Patent 
Office playing any role in dictionary selection:  whether compelling 
dictionary selection falls within the agency’s power over examination 
procedure; and whether appropriate dictionary selections can be made at 
the time the patent application is filed.  The short answer to both questions 
is, “Yes.” 
A. Patent Office Power Over Dictionary Choice 
The Patent Act grants the Patent Commissioner “broad powers” over 
PTO practice.197  It is equally clear, however, that “Congress has not vested 
the Commissioner with any general substantive rulemaking power.”198  
                                                          
1998) (“Competitors are entitled to rely on the public record of the patent, and if the 
meaning of the patent is plain, the public record is conclusive.”); Vitronics Corp. v. 
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(“[C]ompetitors are entitled to review the public record, apply the established rules of claim 
construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee’s claimed invention and, thus, design 
around the claimed invention.”); see also Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 
F.3d 1346, 1354, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“This court and its 
predecessor have held that a statement by an applicant during prosecution identifying certain 
matter not the work of the inventor as ‘prior art’ is an admission that the matter is prior 
art.”). 
 196. See 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1371, 
1374, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050, 1054-55, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 
1569, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1137, 1140-41 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441, 
164 U.S.P.Q. 619, 622 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397, 
155 U.S.P.Q. 697, 702 (Ct. Cl. 1967).  The leading claim drafting guide recommends the 
following technique:  “When one wishes to impart a special meaning to a word or phrase 
appearing in the claims, one should define that word or phrase in the specification; for 
example, ‘As used in this description and in the appended claims, the word “__” means 
“__.”’”  ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 19, at III-
15 (4th ed. 2001). 
 197. Gerritsen v. Shirai, 979 F.2d 1524, 1528, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1912, 1915 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992); see also id. at 1527 n.3, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915 n.3  (“Congress thus 
delegated plenary authority over PTO practice, including interference proceedings, to the 
Commissioner.”); Stevens v. Tamai, 366 F.3d 1325, 1333, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1765, 1771 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (same). 
 198. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347, 1351 
MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:27 PM 
2005] PROVEN KEY 885 
Specifically, the Patent Act gives the Commissioner the power to “establish 
regulations, not inconsistent with law, which . . . shall govern the conduct 
of proceedings in the Office,”199 i.e., to make procedural rules that bind 
patent applicants.  When the Patent Office promulgates a rule under this 
grant of power, it must use notice-and-comment rulemaking in accordance 
with the Administrative Procedure Act.200  The Federal Circuit, in turn, 
gives such a procedural rule controlling weight unless it is “‘arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”201  One might wonder, 
against this backdrop, whether the Patent Office has the power to require 
every patent applicant to state, on the face of her application, what publicly 
available general purpose and specialized dictionaries she wants the Office 
to use in the event it needs help from such sources to construe the scope of 
her proposed claims.  In short, is such a dictionary rule procedural?  If it is, 
the Patent Office has the power to promulgate it. 
It is important, when analyzing the divide between procedural and 
substantive rules in the patent law context, to keep in mind the Patent 
Office’s primary task—to assess the patentability of the inventions put 
before it by applicants.  The Patent Act broadly provides that, when it 
receives a patent application, the Patent Office “shall cause an examination 
to be made of the application and the alleged new invention” to assess its 
patentability under the Act.202  A patent issues to the applicant, upon 
                                                          
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (rejecting Patent Office’s contention that its gap-filling interpretation of 
two complex patent term provisions was a substantive agency regulation entitled, if 
reasonable, to controlling deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)); see also Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 
F.2d 920, 930, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1677, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (concluding that Patent 
Office policy regarding the substantive reach of the Patent Act’s “patentable subject matter” 
provision, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988), was merely an interpretive rule and thus not required to 
be established through “notice and comment” rulemaking). 
 199. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2001).  From 1952 to 1999, this grant of power was set 
forth in 35 U.S.C. § 6.  See Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act 
of 1999, 113 Stat. 1501A-521 to 603, § 4712 (pp. 572-73, amending 35 U.S.C. § 2).  The 
Patent Office has had this power over examination procedure since 1870.  See Act of July 8, 
1870, ch. 230, § 19, 16 Stat. 198, 200 (“[T]he Commissioner, subject to the approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior, may from time to time establish rules and regulations, not 
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the patent office.”). 
 200. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2001) (establishing “notice and comment” rulemaking); 35 
U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(B) (requiring that Patent Office procedural rules “shall be made in 
accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code”).  The current rules governing 
the conduct of Patent Office proceedings are codified in Title 37 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations.  For a concise description of notice-and-comment rulemaking in federal 
agencies, see 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.3 (4th ed. 2002).  
There is no question that the Patent Office is an “agency” for purposes of the Administrate 
Procedure Act.  See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999). 
 201. In re Sullivan, 362 F.3d 1324, 1328, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984)) (rejecting challenge to validity of Patent Office procedural rule); Tamai, 366 F.3d at 
1333-34, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771-72 (upholding reasonableness of Patent Office 
procedural rule). 
 202. 35 U.S.C. § 131.  As the Federal Circuit has succinctly stated, “It is the PTO’s duty 
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payment of the proper fees,203 “if on such examination it appears that the 
applicant is entitled to a patent under law.”204  To assess a claim’s 
compliance with each of the Patent Act’s substantive patentability 
requirements—utility,205 novelty,206 nonobviousness,207 and an adequately 
supporting written disclosure208—a patent examiner must establish the 
scope of the claim under review.209  The Patent Act alone, however, 
provides only sparsely phrased general requirements for what an applicant 
must do to present a proper patent application.210  To flesh out the details of 
this minimalist statutory framework, the Patent Office has promulgated 
detailed regulations governing the manner in which an applicant must 
present her materials.211 
Many of the Patent Office’s regulations governing patent applications 
appear designed to facilitate an examiner’s prompt and efficient 
comprehension of the scope of the applicant’s proposed claims.  For 
example, to implement the Patent Act’s broadly framed requirement of a 
                                                          
to assure that the statutory requirements for patentability are met.”  In re Morris, 127 F.3d 
1048, 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 203. 35 U.S.C. § 151. 
 204. Id. § 131. 
 205. Id. § 101; see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 155-59 (discussing utility 
requirement). 
 206. 35 U.S.C. § 102; see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 91, 93 (discussing novelty 
requirements). 
 207. 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 131-34 (discussing 
nonobviousness requirement). 
 208. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1; see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 65-67 (discussing best 
mode, enablement, and written description requirements). 
 209. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112 (referring throughout to “the invention”); see also 
Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1362, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027, 
1029 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The first step in any invalidity or infringement analysis is claim 
construction.”); In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 494, 496 
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (“All words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of 
that claim against the prior art.”).  It is thus no surprise that the Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure, the Patent Office’s official “set of instructions to the examining corps,” In re 
Kaghan, 387 F.2d 398, 401, 156 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 130, 132 (C.C.P.A. 1967), includes a 
lengthy discussion of important claim construction principles.  See U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE §§ 2111, 2173.05(a) (8th ed. 2001, rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter MPEP], available 
at http://www.uspto.gov/ web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html; see also Refac Int’l, Ltd. v. 
Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.2, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1665, 1671 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (“The MPEP does not have the force and effect of law; however, it is entitled to 
judicial notice as the agency’s official interpretation of statutes or regulations, provided that 
it is not in conflict with the statutes or regulations.”). 
 210. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2) (requiring that an application contain “a specification as 
prescribed by” 35 U.S.C. § 112, “a drawing as prescribed by” 35 U.S.C. § 113, and “an oath 
by the applicant as prescribed by” 35 U.S.C. § 115).  A special preliminary application, 
called a “provisional application,” can be filed without including any separately numbered 
claim paragraphs.  Id. § 111(b)(2); see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 378.  The existence 
of this sort of preliminary patent does not alter the points discussed here. 
 211. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.51-1.59 (2004) (application); §§ 1.63-1.69 (inventor’s oath); §§ 
1.71-1.79 (specification); §§ 1.81-1.85 (drawings); §§ 1.97-1.98 (information disclosure 
statement); §§ 1.801-1.825 (biotechnology invention disclosures). 
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specification that describes the invention and ends with numbered 
claims,212 the Patent Office details both the materials the specification must 
contain213 and the order in which those materials must be arranged.214  
Similarly, to implement the Patent Act’s broadly framed provision about 
illustrative drawings,215 the Patent Office maintains highly detailed 
regulations governing the form and content of patent drawings.216  All these 
regulations, which no doubt have some incidental effect on the substance of 
applicants’ resulting patent rights, are framed with the primary goal of 
structuring the patent examination process to facilitate accurate and 
efficient assessment of claim patentability.  These rules are thus procedural, 
in that they are designed not to shape the primary behavior of inventors 
(e.g., inventors’ decisions to invent new solutions to problems or, instead, 
use known solutions), but rather to improve the accuracy and efficiency of 
inventors’ engagement with government officials who assess their legal 
rights.217 
Most interestingly, for our purposes, the Patent Office has already 
promulgated a regulation directly targeted at helping an examiner readily 
understand the words in the claims.  Specifically, the Patent Office 
expressly requires that a patent application “[b]e in the English language or 
be accompanied by a translation of the application . . . into the English 
language together with a statement that the translation is accurate.”218  This 
procedural rule, by making the meaning of an applicant’s claim words 
more readily accessible to the patent examiner, helps the Office more 
accurately and efficiently determine the scope of the claim to which the 
applicant asserts an entitlement. 
                                                          
 212. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶ 1, 2. 
 213. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71-1.75. 
 214. § 1.77(b). 
 215. 35 U.S.C. § 113. 
 216. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.83-1.84. 
 217. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding 
that one can distinguish substantive and procedural rules “by inquiring if the choice of rule 
would substantially affect . . . primary decisions respecting human conduct”); S.A. Healy 
Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewarage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) 
(asserting that a state rule has a substantive goal if it is “designed to shape conduct outside 
the courtroom and not just improve the accuracy or lower the cost of the judicial process”).  
We owe this formulation to LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 19-21 & n.49 (U. 
San Diego, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-02, 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=508282.  See also Thomas W. Merrill, 
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 n.200 (1985) 
(“Substantive rules . . . guide the conduct of persons outside the courtroom, before they are 
drawn into litigation.  By negative implication, ‘procedural’ rules are those that would not 
affect behavior in . . . ‘everyday, prelitigation life.’”). 
 218. 37 C.F.R. § 1.52(b)(ii); see also § 1.52(d) (requiring English translations of non-
English applications).  There is also a similar provision requiring translation of any non-
English documents that parties submit in an interference proceeding at the Patent Office.  
See § 1.647. 
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Our proposed rule, by mandating that all applicants identify on the face 
of their applications their preferred general and specialized reference 
sources for defining claim terms, is akin to the “use English or translate” 
rule.  If promulgated, it would help the examiner better understand the 
scope of the claim that an applicant seeks to patent.  Specifically, if an 
examiner were in doubt about the meaning of a claim word, and thus about 
the scope of the proposed claim, she could consult the applicant-identified 
reference sources for assistance.  Indeed, such dictionary consultation is 
fully consistent with the established Patent Office practice of giving a claim 
term its broadest reasonable construction during examination.219  The 
Federal Circuit has, in at least three post-Markman cases on direct review 
from Patent Office rejections, used dictionaries to help establish the 
broadest reasonable construction of a claim term.220  The examiner could 
also use the reference sources to help explain to the applicant her 
evaluation of the claim’s patentability.  Of course, if none of the claim 
words raised doubts for the examiner that consulting an applicant-identified 
source would resolve, she might not consult the applicant-identified 
dictionaries at all.  In any event, the dictionaries would have been identified 
for later use in design-around, licensing, and litigation settings. 
We know anecdotally that examiners sometimes cite and quote 
dictionary definitions in their interactions with patent applicants.221  Our 
proposed rule would thus simply transform a sporadic practice into a 
regularized one.  The rule is procedural because it is aimed at regulating 
patent applicants’ engagement with the machinery of the patent system, not 
their innovation behavior outside the patent system.  Nor would our rule, if 
adopted, be the first time that the Patent Office has adjusted the application 
process to take account of the Federal Circuit’s post-Markman claim 
construction jurisprudence.  Specifically, in June 2003, the Patent Office 
                                                          
 219. See MPEP, supra note 209, § 2111, at 2100-46; see also In re Morris, 127 F.3d 
1048, 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A]s an initial matter, the 
PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the 
words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the 
art”).  The policy justification for this approach is that, if the broadest reasonable 
construction of a claim term creates a patentability problem for the applicant, the applicant 
has the opportunity to respond to the problem with an appropriate change in claim language.  
See In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1667 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
Indeed, this approach “promotes the development of the written record before the PTO that 
provides the requisite written notice to the public as to what the applicant claims as the 
invention.”  In re Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1027. 
 220. In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1364, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2002, 2006 (Fed. Cir. 
2002); Hyatt, 211 F.3d at 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666; In re Morris, 127 F.3d at 
1056, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029. 
 221. See, e.g., Cordis Corp. v. Medtronics AVE, Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1359, 67 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1876, 1879 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (during reexamination prosecution, the 
examiner used the definition of the claim word “slots” from Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary to help explain to the applicant how a prior art reference showed the claimed 
structure). 
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modified its regulation requiring an “Abstract” in every application,222 first 
promulgated in 1966,223 to conform the rule to the Federal Circuit’s claim 
construction case law.224  From 1966 to 2003, the rule requiring an abstract 
had ended with the statement that “[t]he abstract will not be used for 
interpreting the scope of the claims.”225  In Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic 
Concepts, Inc., however, the Federal Circuit concluded that, 
notwithstanding the text of the Office’s abstract rule, there was “no legal 
principle that would require [it] to disregard [a] potentially helpful source 
of intrinsic evidence as to the meaning of claims.”226  The Patent Office 
expressly relied on Hill-Rom to explain its deletion of the final sentence in 
its 2003 revision to the rule.227  Given the far greater number of times the 
Federal Circuit has cited a dictionary, compared to a patent abstract, a 
Patent Office rule regularizing dictionary selection by patent applicants 
would be even better grounded than this recent change to the abstract 
requirement. 
In sum, a rule mandating that all applicants specify their preferred 
general purpose and specialized reference sources on the face of their 
applications falls well within the ambit of the Patent Office’s plenary 
power over examination procedure. 
B. There’s No Time Like the Filing Date 
It might seem odd, at first blush, to suggest that one should improve a 
litigation technique by making a change to the start of an administrative 
process that begins several years earlier.228  Upon reflection, however, it is 
clear that the best time to regularize the selection of objective reference 
sources for claim construction is the time a patent application is first filed. 
                                                          
 222. 37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b). 
 223. 31 Fed. Reg. 12922, 12922 (Oct. 4, 1966) (adopting § 1.72(b)). 
 224. 68 Fed. Reg. 38611, 38614 (June 30, 2003) (describing new rule); id. at 38621 
(Comment 18); id. at 38628 (text of new version of 37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b)). 
 225. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b) (1967); 37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b) (1983); 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.72(b) (2003). 
 226. 209 F.3d 1337, 1341 n.*, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437, 1440 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 227. 68 Fed. Reg. at 38614, 38621.  Interestingly, this brings the abstract rule full circle:  
when it was first proposed in 1966, the rule did not include the statement that the Patent 
Office would not use the abstract for claim construction.  31 Fed. Reg. 4412, 4412 (Mar. 15, 
1966) (providing language of proposed Rule 1.75). 
 228. It takes an average of just over two years for a patent application to mature into an 
issued patent.  U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT:  FISCAL YEAR 2003 19 [hereinafter 
PERFORMANCE REPORT] (reporting average total pendency time of 26.7 months for fiscal 
year 2003), available at http://www.ustpo.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2003/ index.html.  In 
addition, patentees who sue on their patents typically do so within two to four years of a 
patent’s issue date.  See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 454 
(2004) (Figure 1).  Adding these two typical time periods together, the filing date of a patent 
application is likely to precede the filing date of a patent suit by about four to six years. 
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First, a dictionary selection policy implemented at the time of filing is 
comprehensive.  All patents result from the examination process.229  It is 
therefore certain that any patent that is in litigation today was the subject of 
an examination process at some point in the past.  In light of this basic fact 
about patent administration, the best way to ensure that an information-
forcing rule such as the one proposed here provides the greatest public 
benefit is to make it part of the patent examination process.230 
Second, an application’s filing date is one of the key touchstones of 
every patentability analysis.  As has already been noted, the Office cannot 
evaluate the patentability of a claim without construing the scope of that 
claim.231  The claim itself must therefore be sufficiently definite to make it 
amenable to construction, and the Patent Act expressly requires that claims 
be definite.232  Claim definiteness is assessed as of the application’s filing 
date.233  Similarly, all three doctrines that test a written disclosure’s 
adequacy to support the applicant’s claims—best mode, enablement, and 
written description—are assessed as of the application’s filing date.234  
Finally, the content of the prior art that is used to assess both novelty and 
nonobviousness is expressly tied, in part, to the application’s filing date.235  
                                                          
 229. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2001) (requiring an application); id. § 131 (requiring examination 
of the application). 
 230. See Wagner, supra note 193, at 198-209 (explaining the great importance of 
information-forcing rules that are put in place at the patent examination stage). 
 231. See id. at 204 (“Patent scope determinations occur during patent prosecution and 
during litigation (possibly years apart).”) (footnote omitted). 
 232. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention.”); see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 40-45 (discussing claim 
definiteness requirement).  As the Federal Circuit explained in its recent decision in 
Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 35 U.S.C. § 112 “requires ‘that the claims be 
amenable to construction, however difficult that task may be.’”  341 F.3d 1332, 1338, 68 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. 
United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 233. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1556-57, 220 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303, 316 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (overturning trial court’s conclusion that claims 
were invalid for indefiniteness, on the ground that “subsequently developed and therefore 
irrelevant formulae cannot be used to render non-enabling or indefinite that which was 
enabling and definite at the time the application was filed”). 
 234. Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 557, 32 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1077, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (best mode); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 
935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1111, 1116-17 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (written 
description); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (enablement); see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 
68 (“The patent application must comply with the disclosure requirements when it is 
filed.”). 
 235. The content of the prior art is determined according to 35 U.S.C. § 102, both for 
novelty and nonobviousness purposes.  See MUELLER, supra note 22, at 94, 139.  Subections 
(b) and (d) are expressly tied to the filing date of the application under review.  And 
subsections (a), (e), and (g), although tied to the invention date of the application under 
review, often rely on the filing date as a proxy for the invention date:  the Patent Office 
“presumptively treats the applicant’s filing date as her invention date (based on a 
constructive reduction to practice theory) for purposes of applying [subsections] (a), (e), and 
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It is plainly appropriate, in light of the filing date’s central role in all 
patentability analysis, to require that a patent applicant identify at that time 
her preferred objective reference sources for use in claim construction. 
Third, mandating that an applicant express his dictionary preferences on 
the filing date comports with two separate temporal restrictions on a 
patent’s written content.  The Patent Act expressly provides that, in the 
course of amending claims and correcting the supporting disclosure in 
response to points raised by the patent examiner, an applicant cannot make 
any substantive addition to the patent disclosure.  In the words of the Patent 
Act, “[n]o amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the 
invention.”236  The Patent Act similarly restricts changes to drawings 
included in a patent.  Specifically, section 113 of the Act provides that an 
applicant “shall furnish a drawing where necessary for the understanding of 
the subject matter sought to be patented.”237  The courts have long looked 
to drawings for whatever help they provide in construing disputed claim 
terms.238  Importantly, section 113 expressly precludes consulting a post-
filing drawing to help construe claim terms:  “Drawings submitted after the 
filing date of the application may not be used . . . to supplement the original 
disclosure thereof for the purpose of interpretation of the scope of any 
claim.”239  Augmenting these filing-date based restrictions on patent 
content with a dictionary selection requirement will help keep the focus of 
the claim construction process on the content of the originally filed patent 
document. 
Fourth, requiring an applicant to name her preferred dictionaries is not, 
in fact, all that dramatic a departure from current patent drafting or 
examination practice.  For example, experienced patent drafters already 
advise those who are learning the trade to consult dictionaries and similar 
sources to ensure a high-quality patent.240  Patentees sometimes expressly 
                                                          
(g), unless and until the applicant proves an earlier actual invention date.”  MUELLER, supra 
note 22, at 95 (footnote omitted). 
 236. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a).  According to Professor Mueller, “The fundamental principle 
underlying the new matter prohibition is that ‘the invention described in the original patent 
[or application] must not be changed.’”  MUELLER, supra note 22, at 68 n.14 (quoting In re 
Oda, 443 F.2d 1200, 1203, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 268, 270-71 (C.C.P.A. 1971)). 
 237. 35 U.S.C. § 113. 
 238. Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 398, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 703 
(Ct. Cl. 1967) (“In those instances where a visual representation can flesh out words, 
drawings may be used in the same manner and with the same limitations as the 
specification.”); Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 93 F. Supp. 2d 563, 570 (D.N.J. 
1998) (same), aff’d, 208 F.3d 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  Indeed, 
drawings may be sufficient, by themselves, to provide a written disclosure that supports 
claims.  Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1565, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(“[U]nder proper circumstances, drawings alone may provide a “written description” of an 
invention as required by § 112.”). 
 239. 35 U.S.C. § 113(ii). 
 240. See, e.g., FABER, supra note 196, § 19, at III-16 (“In most cases, the inventor or a 
mechanical dictionary can supply the precise name for a part in any specific embodiment.”); 
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rely on particular dictionaries in their patents to help explain the meaning 
of claim terms.241  In addition, we know that examiners sometimes cite 
dictionaries to applicants to help explain why a claim term should be 
construed in a particular manner.242  It is safe to conclude, on the basis of 
these informal, occasional practices, that patent practitioners will readily 
adapt to the dictionary selection requirement we propose. 
Fifth, and finally, one might still object that dictionary selection at the 
filing stage is unworkable because, at that time, the applicant lacks the 
context necessary to make a meaningful choice among competing reference 
sources—context that a live dispute with another party about claim scope 
would provide.  However, this objection simply denies the wisdom in the 
Federal Circuit’s view that it is better to enrich claim construction with 
reference sources that are “not colored by the motives of the parties” to a 
dispute, “and not inspired by litigation.”243  If reference sources are to be 
more than mere props in a post hoc justification game, patentee pleas for 
“more context” should be set aside. 
C. Changing Patent Office Rules to Regularize Dictionary Choice 
To make dictionary consultation more predictable, for design-around, 
licensing, and litigation purposes, the Patent Office should require all 
patent applicants to state their dictionary preferences (general purpose and 
specialized) on the face of their patent applications at the time they file 
them.  Such a rule is well within the Patent Office’s regulatory power over 
examination procedure,244 and the time of filing is an appropriate one at 
which to require applicants to state their preferences.245 
The new regime we propose would be more predictable than the 
effectively random approach to choosing dictionaries that the courts, 
including the Federal Circuit, use now.  There will, of course, be a cost to 
achieving this increased predictability.  Is this cost offset by at least as 
                                                          
JEFFREY G. SHELDON, HOW TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION § 6.3.5.1.3, at 6-32 (PLI 
Press, 2001) (“A thesaurus and a dictionary are indispensable tools for the practitioner and 
should be frequently referred to when preparing the claims.”). 
 241. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,972,909 (issued Nov. 27, 1990) at col. 1, ll. 50-60 
(citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (G&G Merriam 1967) to help 
define claim term “caulk,” spelled “caulk” in the dictionary), at http://www. uspto.gov (on 
file with the American University Law Review); U.S. Patent No. 6,708,400 (issued Mar. 23, 
2004) at col. 7, ll. 32-40, at http://www.uspto.gov (on file with the American University 
Law Review) (quoting Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary to help define claim term 
“particulate”), 
 242. See In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1667 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (discussing the examiner’s use of Webster’s New International Dictionary to give the 
term “sharing” its broadest common meaning). 
 243. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 244. See supra Part III.A. 
 245. See supra Part III.B. 
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large a savings in patent licensing and litigation costs, such that our 
proposed change yields a net social benefit?  We think it is.  Admittedly, as 
is usually the case in such patent reform discussions, we can offer only the 
roughest estimates of our proposal’s costs and benefits.246  These estimates, 
however, make quite a persuasive case. 
The primary cost of implementing our proposal, apart from the initial 
cost of promulgating the regulation itself, would be the increased cost of 
preparing a patent application for initial filing.  Specifically, the patent 
drafter would take some time to determine which reference sources are 
preferable for the application at hand and pass along the cost of this time to 
her client.247  In estimating this cost, one must keep in mind two important 
background facts. 
First, the drafter’s additional cost of choosing reference sources for a 
single application is likely to be very low.  Above an obvious minimum 
quality threshold, the precise identity of the reference sources named 
matters far less than the simple fact that some specific sources are named 
(thereby eliminating uncertainty about which sources the courts will 
consult if litigation occurs).  That this is so becomes plain when one 
considers the fact pattern that prompts one to turn to dictionaries in the first 
place:  namely, the inevitable occasion where one wants more guidance on 
the meaning of a claim term than the patent itself provides, because the 
drafter did not foresee the need to choose a more precise word or phrase to 
cover the point in question.  Of course, where the drafter did foresee the 
need for a precise word or phrase, she consulted the appropriate reference 
sources to ensure proper word choice or, alternatively, drafted express 
definitions for inclusion in the body of the patent.  The cost of thoroughly 
addressing foreseeable scenarios is already a cost of patent preparation 
today, and it would continue to be a cost of patent preparation were our 
proposal adopted.  Given that we turn to dictionaries to cope with the 
unforeseeable, it makes little sense for a patent applicant to invest more in 
choosing dictionaries than it takes to identify one or two sources with a 
good, solid reputation.  So, for example, a rational patent drafter will not 
                                                          
 246. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1495 (2001) (arguing that revising the patent review procedures to require a more 
thorough examination of all patent applications is unnecessary given that litigation occurs 
for only a minority of patents and that most patents are never licensed).  Only rough 
estimates are possible concerning our proposal because there are no reliable data on (a) how 
many patents are licensed, (b) how much it costs, on average, to negotiate a patent license, 
(c) how many patents, whether licensed or not, are the subject of formal infringement or 
validity analysis, or (d) how much it costs, on average, to conduct such a formal analysis.  
Id. at 1507-08. 
 247. In the context of in-house counsel, who do not bill the client in this manner, the cost 
is born in the form of a reduced number of applications the drafter can prepare in a given 
unit of time. 
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choose a dictionary by looking up every word in a draft claim in several 
dictionaries in an effort to see which one is “best.” 
Second, however high or low the drafter’s additional cost of reference 
source selection may be for a single application, the drafter spreads that 
cost over a large number of patent applications involving similar 
technology.  As a result, the average cost of dictionary selection will be far 
lower than the cost of dictionary selection for the first application a drafter 
prepares in a given technology. 
It is possible, against this backdrop, to give a rough estimate of the 
annual increased patent preparation cost that our proposal entails.  
According to the American Intellectual Property Law Association’s 
(“AIPLA”) most recent biennial survey of, among other things, patent 
prosecution and litigation costs, the national median costs of preparing and 
filing “relatively complex” applications in the three main technological 
areas are as follows:  (a) biotechnology/chemical, $10,001; (b) 
electrical/computer, $9,995; and (c) mechanical, $8,001.248  The average 
median cost across these technologies is $9,332.33.  Assume, for purposes 
of this analysis, that selecting reference sources increases the average 
preparation cost by 1%, or $93.32, per application.249  The Patent Office 
receives just over 330,000 utility patent applications a year,250 about 28% 
of which are continuation applications,251 i.e., applications that simply re-
initiate the examination process on an application that was filed at least 
once before.252  Of course, an application will entail the dictionary selection 
                                                          
 248. AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 88 tbl. 21 (2003) [hereinafter SURVEY]. 
 249. We think this estimate is actually far higher than would likely be the case, and thus 
overstates the cost of our proposal.  If, however, the benefits of the proposal outweigh even 
this overstated cost, we can be confident that the proposed change produces a net social 
benefit. 
 250. See PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 228, at 106 tbl. 1 (providing a summary of 
patent examining activities for the fiscal years 1999-2003).  In particular, from 2001-2003, 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office received over 330,000 patent applications per year.  
Id.  However, in 1999 and 2000, the Patent Office received under 330,000 patent 
applications.  Id. 
 251. The principal empirical study of these applications reports that, during fiscal years 
1993-1998, “28.4% of the utility, plant, and reissue (UPR) applications in those years were 
not new or original applications, but were continuing applications claiming the benefit of the 
filing dates of previously filed applications.”  Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, 
Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 
11 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 3 (2001); see also id. at 16 tbl.1.  The Quillen & Webster data group 
utility patent applications with plant and reissue applications.  Id. at 3.  Only the utility 
applications, however, are of interest in this study.  Their 28% figure remains a good 
estimate for continuing applications for utility patents alone because reissue and plant patent 
applications make up such a small portion of the total number of applications filed in a 
given year.  For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Patent Office received 331,729 utility 
applications, 785 plant applications, and 938 reissue applications.  PERFORMANCE REPORT, 
supra note 228, at 106 tbl. 1.  Similarly, in fiscal year 2002, the Patent Office received 
331,580 utility applications, 1,134 plant applications, and 974 reissue applications.  Id. 
 252. For a concise explanation of continuation applications in U.S. patent practice, see 
Quillen, Jr. & Webster, supra note 251, at 4-6. 
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cost only the first time it is filed.  Using the one percent increase 
assumption, then, we estimate the annual increase in preparation cost to be 
$22,172,832.253 
Would making dictionary selection part of the patent examination 
process save at least $22.2 million a year?  We think it would.  One source 
of savings would be court cases that are not filed at all because greater 
agreement on the likely construction of an arguable claim term makes 
litigation unnecessary.  According to the AIPLA’s most recent biennial 
survey, the national median cost of a full patent trial in which $1 to $25 
million is at risk is $2 million per side, i.e., $4 million.254  If six such trials 
are avoided every year, the new rule has both paid for itself and yielded a 
small social benefit; additional avoided trials are pure benefit.  Given that 
about 1,900 utility patent infringement cases are filed every year,255 and 
that about ninety-five of these cases are fully tried,256 avoiding six trials 
does not seem like that tall an order.  Alternatively, the national median 
cost of taking through discovery a patent infringement case in which $1 to 
$25 million is at risk is $1,001,000 per side, i.e., $2 million.257  If twelve 
such cases are avoided every year, the new rule has both paid for itself and 
yielded a small social benefit.  Again, this is not too high a hurdle, given 
the 1,600 cases filed annually.  Given that the Federal Circuit used 
dictionaries to help construe claim terms in twenty-six separate appeals in 
2003, and another twenty separate appeals in the first half of 2004, it seems 
safe to conclude that the annual litigation savings that our proposal would 
generate would more than cover the cost of requiring all applicants to state 
their dictionary preferences. 
Another source of savings would be less costly license negotiations.  The 
savings mechanism in licensing, as in avoided litigation, is greater 
agreement among the parties on the likely construction of an arguable 
claim term.  There are virtually no reliable data about how many of the 
roughly 180,000 patents that issue each year258 are licensed for revenue.259  
                                                          
 253. (330,000 applications per year) x (72% originally filed) x ($93.32 per application) = 
$22,172,832.00 per year. 
 254. SURVEY, supra note 248, at 93 tbl. 22. 
 255. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases:  Does Geographic 
Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 903 tbl. 1 (2001) (indicating that, from 
1995 to 1999, district courts resolved about 1,900 utility patent infringement cases per year). 
 256. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Piece 
Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 384 & tbl. 1 (2000) (reporting that from 1983 
to 1999, the annual number of full patent trials ranged from a low of seventy-three to a high 
of 112, with an average of ninety-five). 
 257. SURVEY, supra note 248, at 93 tbl. 22. 
 258. See PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 228, at 106 tbl. 1 (reporting the annual 
number of allowed patents for the fiscal years 1999-2003, however failing to note how 
many of those patents were licensed for revenue).  From 1999-2003, the number of allowed 
patent applications rose from year to year, averaging out to 186,607 applications per year.  
Id. 
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Professor Lemley, in his study of the costs and benefits of various patent 
law reform proposals, estimates that about 3.5% of issued patents are 
licensed for revenue, and that the cost to an industry of negotiating a 
license with the patentee is $100,000.260  Using these assumptions, along 
with an estimate that the identification of dictionaries on the face of the 
patent lowers the licensing cost by one percent, the annual savings is 
$6,300,000.261  This licensing savings alone covers twenty-eight percent of 
the increased patent preparation cost of our proposal.  Using a licensing 
cost discount of 5%, which we think is more likely, our proposed rule 
generates an annual licensing cost savings of $31,500,000,262 i.e., 142% of 
the estimated increase in annual patent preparation costs. 
Finally, a key source of savings would be avoided dead weight loss, 
achieved through more effective competition against patentees from those 
who have designed around their patents.  Dictionaries named on the face of 
all patents will reduce the uncertainty of a competitor’s analysis of the 
scope of the claim; the reduced uncertainty will, in turn, facilitate more 
rapidly achieved and more numerous design-arounds.  Competition from 
these design-arounds will help drive down the patentee’s price to marginal 
cost, thereby helping trim dead weight loss.  It is impossible to estimate the 
size of this effect, but it seems hard to imagine that it would fall below 
$22.2 million per year in an economy as vast as our own.  This savings 
from enhanced certainty, moreover, takes nothing from a patentee that she 
is entitled to keep.  One of the core policies underlying the public notice 
function that clear claim language serves is the desirability of facilitating 
design-arounds by the patentee’s competitors.263  As the Federal Circuit 
observed more than a decade ago, “[d]esigning around patents is, in fact, 
one of the ways in which the patent system works to the advantage of the 
public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its constitutional 
purpose.”264 
It appears, from these three savings sources alone, that moving 
                                                          
 259. See Lemley, supra note 246, at 1507 (noting the lack of accurate data regarding 
patents licensed for revenue).    
 260. Id. at 1507-08. 
 261. (180,000 patents per year) x (3.5% licensed) x ($100,000 per license) x (1% savings 
per license) = $6,300,000 savings per year. 
 262. (180,000 patents per year) x (3.5% licensed) x ($100,000 per license) x (5% savings 
per license) = $31,500,000 savings per year. 
 263. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 
84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 95 n.126 (2004) (explaining that design-arounds benefit the public by 
encouraging progress in the marketplace through the creation of new and innovative 
advances and variations of the patented product); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim 
Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 40-43 (2000) (noting that when a competitor plans 
to design around a patented product, he or she seeks to create a product that will not result in 
an infringement suit).    
 264. Slimfold Mfg. v. Kinkead Indus., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1842, 
1845-46 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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dictionary selection from the litigation stage (where it is effectively 
random) to the examination stage (where it greatly reduces uncertainty for 
every patent throughout its term) will generate important social benefits.  
The Patent Office should make this change to the patent examination rules 
without delay.  It can do so in two stages.  We discuss both in turn, 
beginning with the long-term solution at which the Patent Office should 
aim.265 
1. Changing the application content rule to require dictionary selection 
We think the ultimate goal at which the Patent Office should aim is a 
change to the existing rules governing what an applicant must include in 
her application on the day it is filed.  The existing rules, codified in Title 37 
of the Code of Federal Regulations,266 are the result of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.  The change we propose—a requirement that an applicant 
name her preferred reference sources, both general and specialized, on the 
face of the application—also requires notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
such that it will have the force of law and bind all applicants.267 
This new dictionary selection requirement need not limit applicants in 
their choice of sources, either in name or number.  If the applicant names a 
source that the Patent Office does not yet possess, it can acquire the title in 
keeping with its congressional mandate to maintain an effective library.268  
In short order, any existing gaps in the Office’s reference library will be 
filled.  If the applicant wants to commit in advance to using many 
dictionaries of a given type (e.g., by naming two or three general purpose 
English language sources), we can think of no reason to disallow the 
practice at the outset.  Of course, the same tension that today sharpens the 
choice between broad language (which covers more potential 
infringements, and is also more vulnerable to prior art-based invalidity 
                                                          
 265. The specific suggestions we make here are predicated on the current state of the 
law.  Depending on how the Federal Circuit resolves the Phillips case, see supra notes 17-
18 and accompanying text, some of the details of our proposal might require adjustment. 
 266. The most natural locus for our proposed change is 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71-1.79 (2005), a 
cluster of rules called “Specification.”  A patent specification requires, among other things, 
a written description of the invention or discovery (§ 1.71) setting forth what the applicant 
seeks to patent in a manner that distinguishes it from other inventions (§ 1.71); a title of the 
invention or discovery (§ 1.72); a summary of the nature and substance of the invention (§ 
1.73); and one or more claims that define the scope of the invention (§ 1.75).  One could 
also make our proposed change by modifying the rules governing the “information 
disclosure statement,” a form that applicants use to tell the Patent Office about prior art 
references of which she is aware.  See §§ 1.97-1.98 (providing the guidelines that qualify an 
applicant to issue an “information disclosure statement” and also explaining what the 
“information disclosure statement” must include). 
 267. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text (explaining the Patent Office’s 
power to promulgate binding procedural rules). 
 268. See 35 U.S.C. § 7 (2002) (“The Director shall maintain a library of scientific and 
other works and periodicals, both foreign and domestic, in the Patent and Trademark Office 
to aid the officers in the discharge of their duties.”). 
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attacks) and narrow language (which covers fewer potential infringements, 
and is also less vulnerable to prior art-based invalidity attacks) will also 
sharpen the choice between naming more and fewer dictionaries.  We think 
it likely that most applicants will name one or two general purpose and one 
or two specialized reference sources.  If, after monitoring the practice for a 
year or two, the Patent Office finds that applicants are overwhelming the 
system with too many reference source designations, it can revisit the 
question whether to cap the number of reference sources an applicant may 
name. 
2. Changing examiner practice to require dictionary identification 
In the interim, as the notice-and-comment process plays out, the Patent 
Office should immediately change the Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure to direct all examiners to state, in the first response from the 
Office that is sent to the applicant, the general purpose and specialized 
reference sources the examiner will use to construe claim words should any 
doubts about claim scope arise.  This rule, which would bind examiners but 
not applicants, can be implemented without notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.269  Should an applicant object to the use of the reference 
sources that the examiner chooses, the applicant can designate alternative 
reference sources.  In addition, the Patent Office should adapt the existing 
rules ensuring that any prior art that the examiner identifies during the 
examination process also appears on the face of the patent,270 so that the 
examiner-identified reference sources (or their applicant-identified 
substitutes) also appear on the face of any resulting patent. 
3. The undesirability of an official dictionary list 
It is worth pausing for a moment, in this discussion of integrating 
dictionary selection into the patent examination process, to consider why 
the Patent Office should not prescribe a closed list of reference sources 
after conducting a formal proceeding to determine which reference sources 
are most reliable for each main technological area.271  First, this top-down 
                                                          
 269. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2002) (providing that notice-and-comment rulemaking is 
not required for “interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency 
organization, procedure, or practice”).  The Patent Office regularly relies on this exception 
to the notice-and-comment rulemaking requirement when promulgating examination 
guidelines that are directed at the examiner corps.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001) (“Because 
these Guidelines only govern internal practices, they are exempt from notice and comment 
rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A).”). 
 270. See MPEP, supra note 209, § 707.05, at 700-12 (providing that the patent examiner 
should consider and cite prior art which is related to the claims asserted in the patent 
application); id. § 1302.12, at 1300-13 (encouraging the patent examiner to cite related art 
for allowed patent applications). 
 271. See Wagner, supra note 193.  As we noted earlier, Professor Wagner may have 
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approach cuts against the general grain of the patent process, which is quite 
applicant-driven.272  Second, a top-down approach is on the wrong side of a 
basic information asymmetry:  applicants, who know far more about the 
current state of the art in their fields than do patent examiners,273 are in the 
best position to choose the most up-to-date, high-quality dictionaries and 
similar sources.  Third, a centralized selection process would needlessly 
divert resources from other Patent Office needs.  Indeed, the more the 
selection process sought to overcome the information asymmetry just 
described, the more costly it would be.  And the expense would be incurred 
time and again as the Patent Office regularly updated its list of prescribed 
reference sources.  In short, this “official list” game would not be worth the 
candle. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit has put dictionary consultation at the heart of its 
claim construction jurisprudence.  This practice is not likely to change.  A 
dictionary-friendly approach to claim construction has neutrality and 
predictability goals that are both worthy and attainable.  These goals cannot 
be fully realized, however, until the choice of dictionary is made something 
more than a capricious, post hoc exercise at the courthouse.  The Patent 
Office thus has a vital regulatory role to play in making dictionary selection 
a routine applicant-driven, pre-dispute process.  The Patent Office should, 
in short, act quickly and decisively to make dictionary choice as central to 
patent examination as it has already become to patent litigation. 
                                                          
suggested something along these lines.  Id.  However, because his proposal occupies only 
two or three sentences, it is difficult to be certain.  Id. at 244 & n.311. 
 272. For example, it is the applicant, not the Patent Office, who prompts examination by 
drafting and filing an application.  See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (indicating that it is the inventor or 
someone authorized by the inventor who actually files the patent application).  And it is the 
applicant who, after receiving notice from the Patent Office of the problems with her 
application, submits new claims and other amendments to correct the problems.  35 U.S.C. 
§ 132(a). 
 273. See Wagner, supra note 193, at 206-09 (discussing the litigation process of patent 
cases).  During the “prosecution history phase,” the patentee provides information to the 
Patent Office.  Id. at 206-07.  Because the patentee is required to provide the most accurate 
information it has regarding the innovation, the prosecution history also tends to be an 
accurate source of information.  Id. at 207. 
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POSTSCRIPT:  THE DECISION IN PHILLIPS V. AWH CORP. 
Just before this Article went to press, the Federal Circuit issued its en 
banc decision on claim construction methodology in Phillips v. AWH 
Corp.,274 concluding a rehearing that was ordered while this Article was in 
draft.275  Phillips rejects the Telegenix decision’s use of dictionaries as a 
universal, necessary first step in claim construction.276  After a brief review 
of the court’s decision in Phillips, we consider the evidence that courts are 
likely to continue to rely on dictionaries to construe claims.  We also 
conclude, given Phillips’ continued commitment to de novo review in 
claim construction and utter silence about how courts should select from 
among multiple pertinent dictionaries, that there is as great a need as ever 
for the Patent Office to help make dictionary selection in claim 
construction more predictable with regulations of the type we propose.  
The Federal Circuit, capturing the essence of the several questions it had 
posed in its order directing en banc review,277 framed the “principal 
question in” Phillips as “the extent to which [courts] should resort to and 
rely on a patent’s specification in seeking to ascertain the proper scope of 
its claims.”278  Holding up its decade-old decisions in Markman279 and 
Vitronics,280 as well as a more recent decision in Innova/Pure Water,281 for 
special “reaffirm[ation],”282 the court emphasized that “the person of 
ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the 
context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in 
the context of the entire patent, including the specification.”283  The two 
overarching principles that frame the claim construction process, discussed 
above,284 remain the same:  “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their 
                                                          
 274. Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en banc). 
 275. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
 276. 2005 WL 1620331, at *11-*16.  For our analysis of the Telegenix discussion about 
using objective reference sources in claim construction, see supra notes 73-84 and 
accompanying text. 
 277. See 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (setting forth seven groups of questions 
for additional briefing). 
 278. 2005 WL 1620331, at *4. 
 279. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).  For our analysis of Markman’s discussion about using 
objective reference sources in claim construction, see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying 
text. 
 280. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  For our 
analysis of Vitronics’ discussion about using objective reference sources in claim 
construction, see supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text. 
 281. See Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 282. 2005 WL 1620331, at *4; see also id. at *16. 
 283. Id. at *5. 
 284. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
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ordinary and customary meaning,’”285 and “the ordinary and customary 
meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a 
person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, 
i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.”286  According 
to the court, a term’s ordinary and customary meaning “provides an 
objective baseline from which to begin claim construction.”287  The 
particularized context for the claim term that the patent specification and 
prosecution history provide remains central to the process throughout.288  
Indeed, the “specification’s virtue” is that it was “created at the time of 
patent prosecution for the purpose of explaining the patent’s scope and 
meaning.”289 
What of dictionaries and other objective reference sources, which are 
extrinsic to the particularized context of the specification and prosecution 
history?  Can courts continue to use such reference sources to help construe 
claims?  On this point, the court struck a more complex balance.  On the 
one hand, the court reaffirmed its basic approval of court use of objective 
reference sources extrinsic to the patent, such as dictionaries and technical 
treatises, for the background information they provide to generalist judges 
facing unfamiliar technology.  “Because dictionaries, and especially 
technical dictionaries, endeavor to collect the accepted meanings of terms 
used in various fields of science and technology,” the court opined, “those 
resources have been properly recognized as among the many tools that can 
assist the court in determining the meaning of particular terminology to 
those of skill in the art of the invention.”290  Moreover, even “general 
purpose dictionaries may be helpful” when, for example, “the ordinary 
meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may 
be readily apparent even to lay judges.”291  In short, so long as it “keep[s] in 
mind the flaws inherent in each type of evidence,” a district court is 
permitted “in its sound discretion to admit and use such [extrinsic] 
evidence.”292  The result in Phillips is, in this respect, as we predicted.293 
On the other hand, the Phillips court repudiated the more extrinsic-
                                                          
 285. 2005 WL 1620331, at *5 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at *6-*9. 
 289. Id. at *11. 
 290. Id. at *10; see also id. at *11 (“extrinsic evidence,” such as dictionaries, “can help 
educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what 
a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean”). 
 291. Id. at *6.  In such a case, claim construction “involves little more than the 
application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.”  Id. 
 292. Id. at *11; see also id. at *15 (“As we have noted above, however, we do not intend 
to preclude the appropriate use of dictionaries.”). 
 293. See supra notes 185-186 and accompanying text. 
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directed, always-consult-a-dictionary-first methodology that the Telegenix 
case had prescribed.294  After recounting the Telegenix methodology’s 
focus on dictionaries, according to which “the specification should be 
consulted only after a determination is made, whether based on a 
dictionary, treatise, or other source, as to the ordinary meaning or meanings 
of the claim term in dispute,”295 the court rejected the methodology as 
“improperly restrict[ing] the role of the specification in claim 
construction.”296  According to the court, “[t]he main problem with 
elevating the dictionary to such prominence is that it focuses the inquiry on 
the abstract meaning of words rather than on the meaning of claim terms 
within the context of the patent.”297  As a result, “too often [the Telegenix] 
line of cases has been improperly relied upon to condone the adoption of a 
dictionary definition entirely divorced from the context of the [patent’s] 
written description.”298  The compulsory methodology of Telegenix has 
thus been rejected.  The intrinsic patent materials, not extrinsic evidence 
that may help one understand them, are restored as claim construction’s 
touchstone.  Interestingly, neither the authoring judge in Telegenix, Judge 
Linn,299 nor any of the six heavy dictionary citers we identify in our 
study,300 wrote separately in Phillips to take issue with this repudiation of 
Telegenix.   
The court in Phillips effectively dials its claim construction 
jurisprudence back to October 15, 2002, just before Telegenix was decided.  
And Telegenix itself is rejected as a dead end detour.  In light of this result, 
will district courts and the Federal Circuit continue to rely on dictionaries 
to construe claims?  Existing evidence suggests that they will, and at a 
significant rate.  First, as our own data show, by 2002 the Federal Circuit 
was issuing, on average, more than two claim construction decisions a 
month that relied on dictionaries and similar sources to construe claim 
terms.301  The case law that preceded Telegenix was thus adequate to 
support a significant rate of reliance on dictionaries.  If litigation parties 
and the judges who hear their cases continue to find dictionaries useful, 
                                                          
 294. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 295. 2005 WL 1620331, at *13. 
 296. Id.  
 297. Id. at *14. 
 298. Id. 
 299. See Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
 300. See infra Tbl. 7, App. B.  Judge Lourie, who frequently cited dictionaries in his 
claim construction opinions for the court, did write separately in Phillips.  He did so, 
however, to dissent from the court’s construction of the particular claim term in question, 
not to take issue with the court’s general claim construction methodology.  See 2005 WL 
1620331, at *20-*22 (Lourie, J., dissenting in part).  With regard to methodology, Judge 
Lourie “fully join[ed]” Judge Bryson’s opinion for the court.  Id. at *20. 
 301. See supra Tbl. 4. 
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courts will continue to rely on them. 
Second, two other claim construction decisions bracket the Phillips 
decision—one just before, and one just after—and both make use of 
dictionaries to construe claim terms.  Thirteen days before Phillips, the 
Federal Circuit issued its decision in Seachange International, Inc. v. C-
Cor, Inc.302  In Seachange, written by Judge Linn (the author of Telegenix) 
for a panel that includes Judge Bryson (the author of Phillips), the court 
overturned a district court’s constructions of three disputed claim terms.303  
In explaining its rationale for each of the three terms, the Federal Circuit 
cited and quoted from The New IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical 
and Electronics Terms (5th ed. 1993).304  Two days after Phillips, the 
Federal Circuit issued its decision in North American Container, Inc. v. 
Plastipak Packaging, Inc.305  In Plastipak, written by Judge Lourie for a 
panel that includes Judge Bryson (the author of Phillips) and Judge Linn 
(the author of Telegenix), the court affirmed a district court’s construction 
of the claim term “generally convex.”306  The district court had relied on, 
among other things, a definition for “generally” provided by the Oxford 
English Dictionary Online.307  The Federal Circuit agreed, concluding that 
“the court articulated a common-sense understanding of the term 
[‘generally’] confirmed by a dictionary.”308  These cases show the truth in 
Phillips’ insistence that it “do[es] not intend to preclude the appropriate use 
of dictionaries.”309 
Third, Phillips, like Vitronics before it, praises dictionaries for their 
objectivity.  According to Phillips,  
Dictionaries or comparable sources are often useful to assist in 
understanding the commonly understood meaning of words and have 
been used both by our court and the Supreme Court in claim 
interpretation.  A dictionary definition has the value of being an unbiased 
source “accessible to the public in advance of litigation.”310 
                                                          
 302. Nos. 04-1375, 04-1498, 2005 WL 1523382 (Fed. Cir. June 29, 2005). 
 303. Id. at *1. 
 304. Id. at *4 (quoting defintion of “network”), *12 (quoting definition of “distributed 
system”), *13 (quoting definition of “CPU”).  According to our data, this is the third most 
frequently cited technical source on which the Federal Circuit relied.  See supra Tbl.6, App. 
B.  
 305. Nos. 04-1306, 04-1307, 2005 WL 1645620 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2005). 
 306. Id. at *1. 
 307. Id. at *5. 
 308. Id. at *10. 
 309. Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, at *15 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en 
banc). 
 310. Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 
1996)) (citation omitted).  As we discussed above, supra notes 69-72 and accompanying 
text, Vitronics emphasized the relative objectivity and reliability of dictionaries to help 
explain the court’s greater solicitude for dictionaries compared to expert testimony.  By 
reaffirming that premise in Phillips, the court once again invites greater reliance on 
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Phillips, like Vitronics, also highlights the risk of partisan slant that 
diminishes the value of expert testimony, observing that, because expert 
testimony “is generated at the time of and for the purpose of litigation,” it 
“can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence.”311  Given 
that ordinary and customary meaning must be determined, and that expert 
testimony continues to bear the taint of comparatively greater bias, one 
must expect some courts to prefer dictionaries as sources for ordinary 
meaning.312  Both parties and courts can thus draw strong support from 
Phillips itself to justify continued reliance on dictionaries in claim 
construction, so long as they avoid the dictionary-first method of Telegenix, 
now condemned for its perceived excess. 
One cannot help but wonder whether, assuming courts do continue to use 
dictionaries to help construe disputed claim terms at something like 2002 
levels, the courts’ selections from among available reference sources will 
become more predictable than the chaotic pattern that our study documents.  
We think not.  As we have explained, the pre-Phillips case law offers no 
guidance on how to select from among multiple pertinent reference 
sources, and offers conflicting signals on how to synthesize a single 
definition using the content from multiple sources.313  Phillips, for its part, 
offers no guidance on how courts or parties should select dictionaries or 
other reference sources, other than expressing a mild preference for 
technical over general purpose dictionaries314 and using the patent 
application’s effective filing date as the relevant anchoring date.315  Phillips 
also sidesteps the opportunity to reconsider whether the Federal Circuit 
should engage in de novo review of lower court claim construction 
rulings,316 a question on which it had ordered additional briefing.317  The 
                                                          
objective reference sources than expert witnesses. 
 311. 2005 WL 1620331, at *11; see also supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. 
 312. See MSM Invs. Co. v. Carolwood Corp., 259 F.3d 1335, 1339 n.* (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(“Standard dictionary definitions indicate ordinary meaning.”); Dow Chem. Co. v. 
Sumitomo Chem. Co. Ltd., 257 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Thus, in determining the 
ordinary meaning of a technical term, courts are free to consult scientific dictionaries and 
technical treatises at any time.”); Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 
1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Without evidence in the patent specification of an express intent 
to impart a novel meaning to a claim term, the term takes on its ordinary meaning.  For such 
ordinary meaning, we turn to the dictionary definition of the term.”) (citation omitted); 
Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[W]e see no error in 
the district court’s use of dictionary definitions to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the 
relevant claim limitation.”). 
 313. See supra notes 116-130 and accompanying text, and notes 160-179 and 
accompanying text. 
 314. 2005 WL 1620331, at *10. 
 315. Id. at *5. 
 316. Id. at *20. 
 317. See 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc order) (questioning “is it 
appropriate for this court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim 
construction rulings?”). 
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unpredictability of trial court use of dictionaries is thus compounded by 
further unpredictability in Federal Circuit use of dictionaries on de novo 
review.  Judge Mayer’s dissent in Phillips decries this very 
unpredictability.318  Indeed, as Professor Wagner has observed,319 the rule 
of Phillips is that, in claim construction, there are no rules.  Phillips states 
that “there is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim 
construction.  Nor is the court barred from considering any particular 
sources or required to analyze sources in any specific sequence, as long as 
those sources are not used to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous 
in light of the intrinsic evidence.”320  This approach maximizes the Federal 
Circuit’s flexibility in choosing and using objective reference sources in 
light of all the other circumstances in a case.  This flexibility, however, 
comes at the price of the costly uncertainties now imposed all the more 
clearly on other patent system actors—patentees, potential licensees, 
accused infringers, and the Patent Office. 
After Phillips, as before, dictionaries are bound to be used routinely for 
claim construction.  After Phillips, as before, the Federal Circuit provides 
no rules or principles, other than “sound discretion,” for how a judge 
should choose or use a dictionary in this context.  After Phillips, as before, 
the Patent Office has the power to make dictionary selection more 
predictable, as we have explained at length.321  Nothing in Phillips stands in 
the way of the regulatory solution we propose.  Given the benefits that 
would accrue from the truly objective and predictable use of objective 
                                                          
 318. See 2005 WL 1620331, at *26 (Mayer, J., dissenting) ( 
If we persist in deciding the subsidiary factual components of claim construction 
without deference, there is no reason why litigants should be required to parade 
their evidence before the district courts or for district courts to waste time and 
resources evaluating such evidence. . . . If the proceedings before the district court 
are merely a tryout on the road, as they are under our current regimen, it is wasteful 
to require such proceedings at all.  Instead, all patent cases could be filed in this 
court; we would determine whether claim construction is necessary, and, if so, the 
meaning of the claims. 
) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 319. See R. Polk Wagner, Phillips Analysis, Part 1:  The New Rule Is There Are No 
Rules, (July 15, 2005), at http://www.polkwagner.com (on file with the American 
University Law Review).  Judge Mayer, in his dissent in Phillips, makes a similar point:   
[A]fter proposing no fewer than seven questions, receiving more than thirty amici 
curiae briefs, and whipping the bar into a frenzy of expectation, we say nothing 
new, but merely restate what has become the practice over the last ten years—that 
we will decide cases according to whatever mode or method results in the outcome 
we desire, or at least allows us a seemingly plausible way out of the case.   
2005 WL 1620331, at *22. 
 320. 2005 WL 1620331, at *16; see also id. (“In Vitronics, we did not attempt to provide 
a rigid algorithm for claim construction, but simply attempted to explain why, in general, 
certain types of evidence are more valuable than others.  Today, we adhere to that approach 
and reaffirm the approach to claim construction outlined in that case, in Markman, and in 
Innova.”). 
 321. See supra at notes 180-273 and accompanying text. 
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reference sources in claim construction, the Patent Office should act to 
make reference source selection a necessary step in obtaining a patent. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From HERBERT C. MORTON, THE STORY OF WEBSTER’S THIRD:  PHILIP 
GOVE’S CONTROVERSIAL DICTIONARY AND ITS CRITICS 215 (1994) 
(facing page). 
Reprinted by permission of the publisher, Merriam-Webster, 
Incorporated (www.Merriam-Webster.com). 
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APPENDIX B 
This Appendix contains all the tables and figures for this manuscript that 
do not fit neatly in the manuscript’s main body. 
TABLE 5 
This table shows all the general purpose English language sources the 
Federal Circuit used as resources in claim construction cases from April 5, 
1995, to June 30, 2004. 
 
SOURCE CIT’N FREQUENCY (%)322 
American College Dictionary  (Random House) 1  (0.4%) 
American Heritage Dictionaries  (Houghton Mifflin) 24 (9.0%) 
    American Heritage College Dictionary (3d ed.) 5  (1.9%) 
    American Heritage Dictionary 12 (4.5%) 
    American Heritage Dictionary Second College Edition 7  (2.6%) 
    Chambers Concise Dictionary  (Chambers) 1  (0.4%) 
Merriam-Webster Dictionaries  (Merriam-Webster) 103  (38.4%) 
    Merriam-Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.) 3  (1.1%) 
    Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (6th ed.) 7  (2.6%) 
    Webster’s New International Dictionary 1  (0.4%) 
    Webster’s New International Dictionary Second Edition 2  (0.7%) 
    Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 18 (6.7%) 
    Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 4  (1.5%) 
    Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 68 (25.4%) 
Oxford Dictionaries  (Oxford University Press) 18 (6.7%) 
    Oxford English Dictionary 14 (5.2%) 
    Oxford Reference Dictionary 1  (0.4%) 
    Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 3  (1.1%) 
Random House Dictionaries  (Random House) 11 (4.1%) 
    Random House College Dictionary 1  (0.4%) 
    Random House Unabridged Dictionary 4  (1.5%) 
    Random House Webster’s College Dictionary 1  (0.4%) 
    Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 5  (1.9%) 
Strunk & White, The Elements of Style (4th ed. 2000) 1  (0.4%) 
                                                          
 322. Percentages based on the total number of all dictionaries, encyclopedias, treatises, 
and similar sources cited, i.e., 268. 
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“the dictionary”323 1  (0.4%) 
Webster’s II New College Dictionary324  (Houghton Mifflin) 1  (0.4%) 
Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary  
(Riverside325) 
10 (3.7%) 
Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary  (Gramercy 
Books) 
1  (0.4%) 
Webster’s New 20th Century Dictionary  (Simon & Schuster) 2  (0.7%) 
Webster’s New World Dictionary  (various publishers) 15 (5.6%) 
TOTAL 189  (70.5%) 
 
Note:  This table groups together all citations to differently dated 
printings of the same title (e.g., the 1966, 1968, 1971, 1986, 1993, and 
2002 printings of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary). 
                                                          
 323. Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1564, 39 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492, 1497 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Although the dictionary broadly defines 
‘conductor’ as any substance that conducts an electrical charge, the patent itself belies such 
a broad construction.”).  Judge Lourie, who authored Tex. Instruments, most often cites to 
WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY (Riverside Publ’g Co. 1988) and 
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (3d ed., Simon & Schuster 1988). 
 324. This is the current edition of, and the successor title to, WEBSTER’S II NEW 
RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY (Riverside Publ’g Co. 1994). 
 325. Riverside Publishing Co. has been a subsidiary of Houghton Mifflin since 1979, 
prior to the first publication of Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary in 1984.  
RIVERSIDE PUBLISHING:  A DISTINGUISHED HISTORY, at http://www.riverpub.com 
/about/history.html (last visited July 19, 2004) (on file with American University Law 
Review).  Sidney Landau surmises that Houghton Mifflin may have established this 
dictionary, which does not include taboo sexual or scatological words, to distinguish it from 
the American Heritage Dictionary series, which does.  LANDAU, supra note 2, 228-30, 443 
n.15 (2d ed. 2001). 
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TABLE 6 
This table shows all the technical or specialized sources the Federal 
Circuit used as resources in claim construction cases from April 5, 1995, to 
June 30, 2004. 
 
SOURCE CIT’N FREQ’Y  (%)326 
Annual Book of ASTM Standards (1996) 1 
Maribeth Cuccinelli, The Art & Science of Footwear Manufacturing 
(1974) 
1 
Barron’s Dictionary of Insurance Terms (4th ed. 2000) 1 
Chambers Dictionary of Science & Technology (1999) 1 
Serway & Faughn, College Physics (4th ed. 1995)  1 
Michael Busby, Demystifying ATM/ADSL (Wordware 1998) 1 
Cyril M. Harris, Dictionary of Architecture & Construction (2d ed. 
1993) 
1 
Dictionary of Computing (4th ed. 1996) 3  (1.1%) 
Dictionary of Electronics 1 
Dictionary of Mechanical Engineering 2 
Dictionary of Microbiology & Molecular Biology (2d ed. 1987) 1 
Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 4  (1.5%) 
Encyclopedia of Computer Science (1976) 1 
Encyclopedia of Polymer Science (1965) 1 
Skoog et al., Fundamentals of Analytical Chemistry (7th ed. 1996)  1 
Benjamin Lewin, Genes IV (1990)  1 
Handbook of Chemistry & Physics (63d ed. 1982-83) 1 
Michael & Irene Ash, Handbook of Pharmaceutical Additives 
(1995) 
1 
Hawley’s Condensed Chemical Dictionary 3  (1.1%) 
Henderson’s Dictionary of Biological Terms (11th ed. 1995) 1 
IBM Dictionary of Computing (10th ed. 1994) 2 
Illustrated Dictionary of Electronics (3rd ed. 1985) 2 
G.B. Stringfellow & H.T. Hall, 43 Journal of Crystal Growth 47 
(1978)  
1 
Knight’s American Mechanical Dictionary (1876) 1 
Robert C. Faber, Landis on Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting 
(4th ed. 2000)  
1 
                                                          
 326. Percentages based on the total number of all dictionaries, encyclopedias, treatises, 
and similar sources cited, i.e., 268.  Percentage values less than one percent are omitted. 
MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:27 PM 
2005] PROVEN KEY 911 
Kenneth L. Williamson, Macroscale & Microscale Organic 
Experiments (2d ed., Heath 1994)  
1 
Marks’ Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers (9th ed. 
1987) 
1 
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific & Technical Terms 9  (3.4%) 
McGraw-Hill Electronics Dictionary (5th ed. 1994) 1 
McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science & Technology (7th ed. 1992) 1 
A. Parish, Mechanical Engineer’s Reference Book (11th ed. 1973) 1 
Melloni’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary (1979) 1 
Microsoft Computer Dictionary  7  (2.6%) 
Modern Dictionary of Electronics 5  (1.9%) 
New IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical & Electronics Terms 
(5th ed. 1993) 
6  (2.2%) 
Louis F. Feisner, Organic Experiments (Heath 1964)  1 
Photonics Dictionary (2000) 1 
Copper Development Association, Standards Handbook:  Wrought 
& Cast Copper and Copper Alloy Products (6th ed. 1994)  
1 
Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 3  (1.1%) 
E. Bryan Carne, Telecommunications Primer (2d ed., Prentice Hall 
1999)  
1 
Karl Drlica, Understanding DNA & Gene Cloning:  A Guide for the 
Curious (2d ed. 1992) 
1 
Van Nostrand Reinhold Dictionary of Information Technology (3d 
ed. 1989) 
1 
Hala et al., Vapour Liquid Equilibrium (2d English ed. 1967)  1 
Wordsworth Dictionary of Science & Technology 1 
TOTAL 79(29.5%) 
 
Note:  This table groups together all citations to differently dated 
versions with the same title (e.g., the 12th and 13th editions of Hawley’s 
Condensed Chemical Dictionary). 
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TABLE 7 
Number of claim terms construed by reliance on a dictionary or similar 
source, by Judge, by Year 
 
Judge327 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total   
Archer328 
(100%) 0 0 3 1 0 2 3 0 1 1 11 (5.3%) 
Bryson  
(100%) 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 
7  
(3.3%) 
Clevenger 
(100%) 0 4 4 1 1 1 5 3 3 2 
24 
(11.5%) 
Dyk329 
(45%) - - - - - 0 4 9 6 3 
22 
(10.5%) 
Gajarsa330  
(75%)  - - 0 0 1 1 2 0 13 4 
21 
(10.0%) 
Linn331  
(49%) - - - - - 0 5 7 4 11 
27 
(12.9%) 
Lourie  
(100%) 0 2 0 0 1 9 3 4 0 4 
23 
(11.0%) 
Mayer  
(100%) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1   
(0.5%) 
Michel  
(100%) 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 
6  
(2.9%) 
Newman  
(100%) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2   
(1.0%) 
Nies332  
(15%) 0 1 - - - - - - - - 
1   
(0.5%) 
                                                          
 327. The percentage measure beneath each judge’s name states the percentage of the 110 
months between April 1995 (the date of the in banc Markman decision, supra note 190) and 
June 2004 (the end of the study) that a judge was a member of the Federal Circuit. 
 328. Judge Archer took senior status on December 25, 1997.  U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHIES, at http://www.fedcir.gov/judg bios.html 
(last modified Jan. 25, 2005) (on file with American University Law Review). 
 329. Judge Dyk entered service on June 9, 2000. 
 330. Judge Gajarsa entered service on Sept. 12, 1997. 
 331. Judge Linn entered service on  Jan. 1, 2000. 
 332. Judge Nies served on the Federal Circuit from its inception in 1982 until 1996.  On 
November 1, 1995, Judge Nies took senior status, and died while serving on August 7, 1996.  
Briefly, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 9, 1996, at A5. 
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Plager333  
(100%) 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3   
(1.4%) 
Prost  
(30%)334 - - - - - - - 0 1 0 3 (4%) 
Rader  
(100%) 0 2 2 0 0 3 6 5 7 1 
26 
(12.4%) 
Rich335  
(45%) 0 1 1 1 3 - - - - - 
6   
(2.9%) 
Schall  
(100%) 0 2 1 3 3 2 0 1 2 4 18 (8.6%) 
Per  
Curiam 
0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 4 0 7   
(3.3%) 
 
Note:  Biographical information on the judges can be found at 
www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html.  In any year in which a given judge did not 
serve at all on the Federal Circuit, the year is marked “-” for that judge.  
This table does not include data for Senior Judges Friedman or Cowen, 
who were on senior status when the Federal Circuit issued its en bank 
Markman decision and who were not the authoring judge for any of the 
decisions we studied. 
                                                          
 333. Judge Plager took senior status on November 30, 2000.  U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHIES, at http://www.fedcir.gov/judg bios.html 
(last modified Jan. 25, 2005) (on file with American University Law Review). 
 334. Judge Prost entered service on Oct. 2001. 
 335. See Victoria Slind-Flor, Giles S. Rich Dies at 95, NAT’L L.J., June 21, 1999, at A6; 
Judge Giles S. Rich Succumbs to Illness (Boston Patent Law Ass’n), June 30, 1999, at 1.  
Judge Rich served on the Federal Circuit from its inception in 1982 until the last days of his 
life in 1999;  he died on June 9, 1999. 
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APPENDIX C 
This Appendix contains the basic data from the detailed review of the 
Federal Circuit’s claim construction cases from April 1995 to June 2004.  It 
contains data for all the opinions in which the court used one or more 
dictionary definitions of a word in a patent claim to construe an element of 
that patent claim.  Cases are listed first in year order, then alphabetically by 
first party name.  The italicized portion of an entry in the “Claim Term” 
column is the text for which the court used one or more dictionary 
definitions.  When the court relied on a dictionary definition for a cognate 
of the word that appeared in the patent claim, rather than or in addition to 
the claim word itself, the cognate is indicated in brackets. 
 
CASE YEAR CLAIM 
TERM 
SOURCE(S) USED JUDGE 
National Presto Indus. v. 
Black & Decker (U.S.) 
Inc., Nos. 92-1388, 92-
1476, 1995 WL 367072, at 
*4 n.2 (Fed. Cir. June 20, 
1995). 
1995 means on 
said 
housing 
Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1981) 
Newman 
Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, 
PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1581, 
36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1162, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
1995 at least 600 
tpi 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986) 
Plager 
Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, 
PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1581 
n.3, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1162, 1166 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
1995 at least 
approximat
ely 600 tpi 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986) 
Plager 
Athletic Alternatives, Inc. 
v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 
F.3d 1573, 1579, 37 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365, 
1370 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
1996 varies 
between 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1976) 
Michel 
Cole v. Kimberly-Clark 
Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531, 
41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
1996 perforation 
means 
Webster’s Encyclopedic 
Unabridged Dictionary 
(1989) 
Rich 
Dana Innovations v. 
Speakercraft, Inc., No. 95-
1472, 1996 WL 748250, at 
*2 (Fed. Cir. Dec 2, 1996). 
1996 elongate 
bar 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986) 
Schall 
Dana Innovations v. 
Speakercraft, Inc., No. 95-
1472, 1996 WL 748250, at 
*2 (Fed. Cir. Dec 2, 1996). 
1996 elongate 
bar 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986) 
Schall 
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CASE YEAR CLAIM 
TERM 
SOURCE(S) USED JUDGE 
Great N. Corp. v. Henry 
Molded Prods., Inc., 94 
F.3d 1569, 1574, 39 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1997, 
2001 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
1996 greater 
flexural 
cushioning 
/ [ flexure ] 
Webster’s New International 
Dictionary (1932) 
Clevenger 
Greenberg v. Ethicon 
Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 
F.3d 1580, 1583, 39 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783, 
1786 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
1996 detent 
mechanism 
Random House Unabridged 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1993); 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968); 
Dictionary of Mechanical 
Engineering (4th ed. 1996) 
Bryson 
Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 
86 F.3d 1098, 1105, 39 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 
1005 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
1996 shoe upper Maribeth Cuccinelli, The Art 
& Science of Footwear 
Manufacturing (Norman V. 
Germany ed., 1974) 
Lourie 
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. 
Cypress Semiconductor 
Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1564, 
39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1492, 1497 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
1996 a conductor “the dictionary” Lourie 
Yamaha Corp. v. ESS 
Tech., Inc., No. 95-1362, 
1996 WL 146499, at *6 
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1996). 
1996 a stored 
waveshape 
table 
New IEEE Standard 
Dictionary of Electrical and 
Electronics Terms (5th ed. 
1993) 
Clevenger 
Yamaha Corp. v. ESS 
Tech., Inc., No. 95-1362, 
1996 WL 146499, at *6 
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1996). 
1996 a stored 
waveshape 
table 
New IEEE Standard 
Dictionary of Electrical and 
Electronics Terms (5th ed. 
1993) 
Clevenger 
Yamaha Corp. v. ESS 
Tech., Inc., No. 95-1362, 
1996 WL 146499, at *6 
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1996). 
1996 a stored 
waveshape 
table  
New IEEE Standard 
Dictionary of Electrical and 
Electronics Terms (5th ed. 
1993) 
Clevenger 
York Prods., Inc. v. 
Central Tractor Farm & 
Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 
1572-73, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1619, 1622 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996). 
1996 a 
substantial 
part of / 
[ substantia
lly ] 
American Heritage 
Dictionary Second College 
Edition (1982); 
Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1983) 
Rader 
York Prods., Inc. v. 
Central Tractor Farm & 
Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 
1575, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1619, 1625 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996). 
1996 a plurality 
of . . . 
American Heritage 
Dictionary Second College 
Edition (1982) 
Rader 
Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 
79 F.3d 1563, 1565 n.1, 38 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 
1282 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
1996 coherence 
length of 
the beam 
Handbook of Chemistry & 
Physics (63d ed. 1982-83) 
Nies 
American Permahedge, 
Inc. v. Barcana, Inc., 105 
F.3d 1441, 1444, 41 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 
1616 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
1997 extending 
laterally of 
American Heritage 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1976) 
Clevenger 
MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:27 PM 
916 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:829 
CASE YEAR CLAIM 
TERM 
SOURCE(S) USED JUDGE 
Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 
Inc., No. 96-1399, 1997 
WL 419391, at *8 (Fed. 
Cir. July 14, 1997). 
1997 are secured 
to 
Webster’s II New Riverside 
University Dictionary (2d 
ed. 1988) 
Rader 
Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron 
Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501, 
42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1608, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
1997 joined in 
proper 
reading 
frame 
Karl Drlica, Understanding 
DNA and Gene Cloning:  A 
Guide for the Curious (2d 
ed. 1992) 
Rich 
Hazani v. United States 
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 126 
F.3d 1473, 1480, 44 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1358, 
1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
1997 integrally 
formed in 
Webster’s New International 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1939) 
Bryson 
Hazani v. U.S. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 126 F.3d 1473, 
1480, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1358, 1363-64 
(Fed. Cir. 1997). 
1997 integrally 
formed in 
Webster’s New International 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1939) 
Bryson 
In re Morris, 127 F.3d 
1048, 1056, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1023, 1029 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997). 
1997 integrally 
formed as a 
portion of  
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986) 
Plager 
Johansson v. Rose 
Displays Ltd., No. 96-
1410, 1997 WL 437016, at 
*3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 5, 
1997).  
1997 absent 
deformatio
n or 
destruction 
of 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1966) 
Clevenger 
Johansson v. Rose 
Displays Ltd., No. 96-
1410, 1997 WL 437016, at 
*3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 5, 
1997). 
1997 absent 
deformatio
n or 
destruction 
of 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1966) 
Clevenger 
Johnstown Am. Corp. v. 
Trinity Indus., Inc., Nos. 
97-1070, 97-1071, 1997 
WL 291956, at *2 (Fed. 
Cir. May 28, 1997). 
1997 longitudina
l axis 
Cyril M. Harris, Dictionary 
of Architecture & 
Construction (2d ed. 1993) 
Archer 
Kegel Co., Inc. v. AMF 
Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 
1420, 1427, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1123, 1127 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997). 
1997 maintenanc
e assembly 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986) 
Schall 
MHB Indus. Corp. v. 
Garberg & Assocs., Inc., 
No. 96-1539, 1997 WL 
423021, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 
July 29, 1997). 
1997 across said 
common 
header 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1971) 
Archer 
MHB Indus. Corp. v. 
Garberg & Assocs., Inc., 
No. 96-1539, 1997 WL 
423021, at *4 (Fed. Cir. 
July 29, 1997). 
1997 bag Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1971) 
Archer 
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Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon 
Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 
1420, 1430-31, 44 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103, 
1112 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
1997 first 
opening 
through 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1981) 
Rader 
Young Dental Mfg. Co., 
Inc. v. Q3 Special Prods., 
Inc., 112 F.3d 1137, 1142, 
42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1589, 1593 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
1997 axial bore Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968) 
Clevenger 
Action Techs., Inc. v. 
Novell Sys., Inc., Nos. 97-
1460, 97-1481, 1998 WL 
279359, at *5 (Fed. Cir. 
May 27, 1998). 
1998 type of 
conversatio
n 
Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3d college ed. 
1994) 
Schall 
Action Techns., Inc. v. 
Novell Sys., Inc., Nos. 97-
1460, 97-1481, 1998 WL 
279359, at *6 (Fed. Cir. 
May 27, 1998). 
1998 state of the 
conversatio
n 
Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3d college ed. 
1994) 
Schall 
Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 
1448, 1459, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1169, 1177 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998).  
1998 through [X] 
to [Y] 
Webster’s II New Riverside 
University Dictionary (1984) 
Archer 
Lee’s Aquarium & Pet 
Prods., Inc. v. Python 
Prods., Inc., Nos. 97-1278, 
97-1328, 1998 WL 
129903, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 
Mar. 24, 1998). 
1998 gravel Annual Book of ASTM 
Standards, American Society 
of Testing Materials (1996); 
Random House Webster’s 
College Dictionary (1991); 
Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3d college ed. 
1994); 
American Heritage College 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1997); 
Webster’s New World 
Dictionary  
Per Curiam 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Huntsman Polymers 
Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 874-
75, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
1998 block 
copolymer 
Encyclopedia of Polymer 
Science (1965) 
Per Curiam 
Renishaw PLC v. Marposs 
Societa’ per Azioni, 158 
F.3d 1243, 1251, 1251 n.4, 
48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1117, 1123, 1123 n.4 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
1998 generating 
a trigger 
signal when 
Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary 
(1985); 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993); 
Chambers Concise 
Dictionary (1992) 
Clevenger 
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Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. 
United States, 147 F.3d 
1358, 1363, 1363 n.7, 47 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027, 
1030, 1030 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
1998 open cold-
wall reactor 
[cold-wall 
added 
during 
prosecution 
history] 
G.B. Stringfellow & H.T. 
Hall, 43 J. CRYSTAL 
GROWTH 47 (1978) 
Michel 
Technology Chems. & 
Prods., Inc. v. Home 
Diagnostics, Inc., Nos. 97-
1068, 97-1075, 1998 WL 
163650, at *6 (Fed. Cir. 
Apr. 9, 1998). 
1998 porosity 
gradient 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986) 
Schall 
Trimedyne, Inc. v. Surgical 
Laser Techs., Inc., No. 96-
1538, 1998 WL 393864, at 
*12 (Fed. Cir. July 10, 
1998). 
1998 a hollow, 
bulbous 
element 
Random House Unabridged 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1993); 
Webster’s II New Riverside 
University Dictionary (1984) 
Rich 
Antonious v. Spalding & 
Evenflo Co., Inc., No. 98-
1478, 1999 WL 777450, at 
*3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 
1999). 
1999 attached 
solely to 
said rear 
wall 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1971) 
Schall 
Antonious v. Spalding & 
Evenflo Co., Inc., No. 98-
1478, 1999 WL 777450, at 
*3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 
1999). 
1999 attached 
solely to 
said rear 
wall 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1971) 
Schall 
Bickerstaff v. Dr. Shrink, 
Inc., No. 99-1091, 1999 
WL 693884, at *6 (Fed. 
Cir. Sept. 3, 1999). 
1999 cowl Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986) 
Schall 
Karlin Tech., Inc. v. 
Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 
177 F.3d 968, 971, 50 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 
1468 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
1999 series of 
threads 
Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1986) 
Rich 
Karlin Tech., Inc. v. 
Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 
177 F.3d 968, 971, 50 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 
1468 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
1999 series of 
threads 
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of 
Scientific and Technical 
Terms (5th ed. 1994); 
A. Parish, Mechanical 
Engineer’s Reference Book 
(11th ed. 1973) 
Rich 
Middleton, Inc. v. 
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. 
Co., No. 99-1201, 1999 
WL 1072246, at *4 (Fed. 
Cir. Nov. 16, 1999). 
1999 material for 
finishing 
Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1984) 
Clevenger 
National Recovery Techs., 
Inc. v. Magnetic 
Separation Sys., Inc., 166 
F.3d 1190, 1195, 49 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671, 
1675 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
1999 selecting 
for 
processing 
Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3d college ed.) 
Gajarsa 
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Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 
F.3d 1342, 1346, 51 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377, 
1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
1999 flashlight American Heritage 
Dictionary (2d college ed. 
1982) 
Mayer 
Rival Co. v. Sunbeam 
Corp., Nos. 98-1198, 98-
1199, 1999 WL 96416, at 
*5 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23, 
1999). 
1999 defined by 
the base 
Webster’s II New Riverside 
University Dictionary (1988) 
Lourie 
Ultrak, Inc. v. Radio 
Eng’g Indus., Inc., Nos. 
97-1523, 97-1543, 1999 
WL 197173, at *4, 52 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526, 
1529 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 8, 
1999). 
1999 lens 
window 
means 
American Heritage 
Dictionary  (1969) 
Rich 
Brita Wasser-Filter-
Systeme v. Recovery 
Eng’g, Inc., No. 99-1322, 
2000 WL 1375170, at *4 
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 21, 2000). 
2000 sleeve Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989) 
Gajarsa 
Cortland Line Co., Inc. v. 
Orvis Co., Inc., 203 F.3d 
1351, 1356, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1734, 1737 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). 
2000 end plate Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1990) 
Rader 
Doyle v. Crain Indus., 
Inc., No. 00-1103, 2000 
WL 1608826, at *4 (Fed. 
Cir. Oct. 25, 2000). 
2000 at ambient 
temperatur
es 
Hawley’s Condensed 
Chemical Dictionary (12th 
ed. 1993) 
Lourie 
Doyle v. Crain Indus., 
Inc., No. 00-1103, 2000 
WL 1608826, at *5 (Fed. 
Cir. Oct 25, 2000). 
2000 ejecting 
said 
mixture 
Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988) 
Lourie 
Eisenberg v. Alimed, Inc., 
No. 98-1317, 2000 WL 
1119743, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 
Aug. 8, 2000). 
2000 trough Webster’s New Collegiate 
Dictionary (1979) 
Archer 
Eisenberg v. Alimed, Inc., 
No. 98-1317, 2000 WL 
1119743, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 
Aug. 8, 2000). 
2000 hollow 
section  
Webster’s New Collegiate 
Dictionary (1979) 
Archer 
Elekta Instrument S.A. v. 
O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, 
Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1307, 
54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1910, 1913 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
2000 only within 
a zone 
extending 
between 
latitudes 
Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988) 
Lourie 
Elekta Instrument S.A. v. 
O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, 
Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1307, 
54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1910, 1913 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
2000 only within 
a zone 
extending 
between 
latitudes 
Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988) 
Lourie 
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Elekta Instrument S.A. v. 
O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, 
Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1307, 
54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1910, 1913 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
2000 only within 
a zone 
extending 
between 
latitudes 
Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988) 
Lourie 
Envirco Corp. v. Clestra 
Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d 
1360, 1365, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1449, 1452 (Fed. 
Cir 2000).   
2000 Second 
baffle 
means 
Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1990) 
Rader 
Hill-Rom Co., Inc. v. 
Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209 
F.3d 1337, 1340-41, 54 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437, 
1440 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
2000 cushion Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1976) 
Bryson 
In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 
1367, 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1664, 1667 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). 
2000 shar[e]ing Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968) 
Bryson 
Mitek Surgical Prods., Inc. 
v. Arthrex, Inc., Nos. 99-
1004, 99-1034, 2000 WL 
217637, at *2 (Fed. Cir. 
Feb. 22, 2000). 
2000 for boring Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1971) 
Per Curiam 
Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Standard Register Co., 
229 F.3d 1091, 1114, 56 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 
1241 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
2000 extending 
along said 
end edges 
Webster’s II New Riverside 
University Dictionary (1984) 
Michel 
NFA Corp. v. Asheboro 
Elastics Corp., No. 98-
1579, 2000 WL 6217, at 
*2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 5, 2000). 
2000 intermeshin
g with / 
[ inter- ] 
American Heritage 
Dictionary (1st ed. 1981) 
Clevenger 
Optical Disc Corp. v. Del 
Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 
1324, 1335, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1289, 1295 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). 
2000 ramped 
trailing 
edges /  
[ ramp ] 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986); 
Modern Dictionary of 
Electronics (6th ed. 1997) 
Schall 
Optical Disc Corp. v. Del 
Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 
1324, 1338, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1289, 1298 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). 
2000 decreasing 
the time 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986) 
Schall 
Space Sys./Loral, Inc. v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., 
Nos. 99-1255, 99-1289, 
2000 WL 1205154, at *5 
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 23, 2000). 
2000 automatical
ly 
Webster’s II New Riverside 
University Dictionary (1988) 
Lourie 
Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. 
Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 
F.3d 958, 965, 55 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513, 
1517 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
2000 an inner 
body 
portion 
Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988) 
Lourie 
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Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. 
Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 
F.3d 958, 967, 55 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513, 
1518 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
2000 to expose Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988) 
Lourie 
Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. 
Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 
F.3d 958, 967, 55 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513, 
1518 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
2000 integral 
contrasting 
border 
Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988) 
Lourie 
Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. 
Clinical Innovations 
Assocs., No. 00-1140, 
2000 WL 1838586, at *2 
n.2 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 
2000). 
2000 a liquid 
column/[ U
-tube 
manometer 
] 
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of 
Scientific and Technical 
Terms (5th ed. 1994) 
Michel 
UV Coatings, Ltd. v. Sico, 
Inc., No. 99-1336, 2000 
WL 986965, at *3 (Fed. 
Cir. July 18, 2000). 
2000 sprayable Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986)   
Rader 
Acromed Corp. v. Sofamor 
Danek Group, Inc., 253 
F.3d 1371, 1381, 59 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130, 
1137 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
2001 engag[e]ing Webster’s II New Riverside 
University Dictionary (1988) 
Rader 
Bell Atl. Network Servs., 
Inc. v. Covad 
Communications Group, 
Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1276, 
59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1865, 1877 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
2001 channel E. Bryan Carne, 
Telecommunications Primer 
(2d ed., Prentice Hall 1999); 
Michael Busby, 
Demystifying ATM/ADSL 
(Wordware 1998) 
Gajarsa 
Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King 
Indus., Inc., 21 Fed. Appx. 
894, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
2001 substantiall
y flat 
American Heritage 
Dictionary Second College 
Edition (1982); 
Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1983) 
Dyk 
Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total 
Containment, Inc., 258 
F.3d 1317, 1328, 1328 n.5, 
59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1489, 1497, 1497 n.5 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001). 
2001 a plurality 
of 
American Heritage 
Dictionary Second College 
Edition (1982); 
Random House Webster’s 
Unabridged Dictionary (2d 
ed. 1988) 
Dyk 
Doorking, Inc. v. Sentex 
Sys., Inc., 19 Fed. Appx. 
872, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  
2001 disabl[e]ing 
said [X] 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968) 
Dyk 
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Dow Chem. Co. v. 
Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 
F.3d 1364, 1373, 1373 n.8, 
1374, 1374 n.9, 1375-76, 
59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1609, 1615, 1615 n.8-9, 
1616 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
2001 codistills . .
 . at a 
boiling 
point / 
[ distillatio
n ] 
Hawley’s Condensed 
Chemical Dictionary (13th 
ed. 1997); 
Louis F. Feisner, Organic 
Experiments (Heath 1964); 
Kenneth L. Williamson, 
Macroscale and Microscale 
Organic Experiments (2d 
ed., Heath 1994); 
Hala et al., Vapour Liquid 
Equilibrium (2d English ed. 
1967) 
Gajarsa 
Durel Corp. v. Osram 
Sylvania Inc., 256 F.3d 
1298, 1304, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1238, 1242 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001). 
2001 metal oxide 
coating 
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of 
Scientific and Technical 
Terms (5th ed. 1994); 
Hawley’s Condensed 
Chemical Dictionary (12th 
ed. 1993) 
Lourie 
Ecolab, Inc. v. 
Envirochem, Inc., 264 
F.3d 1358, 1366, 60 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173, 
1179 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
2001 substantiall
y uniform 
alkaline 
detergent 
American Heritage College 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1997) 
Linn 
Ecolab, Inc. v. 
Envirochem, Inc., 264 
F.3d 1358, 1366, 60 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173, 
1179 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
2001 substantiall
y uniform 
alkaline 
detergent 
American Heritage 
Dictionary Second College 
Edition (1982); 
Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (9th 
ed. 1983) 
Linn 
Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. 
v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 
1311, 1318, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1203, 1208 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001). 
2001 lateral Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968) 
Clevenger 
Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 
F.3d 1334, 1343, 59 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1290, 
1296 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
2001 an angular 
medial 
surface 
Webster’s New Collegiate 
Dictionary (1975) 
Linn 
Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 
F.3d 1334, 1343, 59 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1290, 
1296 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
2001 an angular 
medial 
surface 
Webster’s New Collegiate 
Dictionary (1975) 
Linn 
Generation II Orthotics 
Inc. v. Medical Tech. Inc., 
263 F.3d 1356, 1367, 59 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1919, 
1928 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
2001 controlled 
medial and 
lateral 
inclination 
Stedman’s Medical 
Dictionary (27th ed. 2000) 
Linn 
Glaxo Group Ltd. v. 
Ranbaxy Pharm., Inc., 262 
F.3d 1333, 1336, 59 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1950, 
1952 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
2001 essentially 
free from 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986) 
Rader 
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Hemphill v. McNeil-PPC, 
Inc., 25 Fed. Appx. 915, 
918 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
2001 vaginal 
swab 
American Heritage 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1992); 
Dorland’s Illustrated 
Medical Dictionary (28th ed. 
1994) 
Dyk 
Kudlacek v. DBC, Inc., 25 
Fed. Appx. 837, 844 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001). 
2001 extending 
into each 
Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1985) 
Clevenger 
LNP Eng’g Plastics, Inc. 
v. Miller Waste Mills, Inc., 
275 F.3d 1347, 1354, 61 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1193, 
1198 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
2001 substantiall
y 
completely 
wetted 
Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1983) 
Rader 
MSM Invs. Co. v. 
Carolwood Corp., 259 
F.3d 1335, 1339, 59 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1856, 
1859 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
2001 method of 
feeding 
Webster’s II New Riverside 
University Dictionary (1988) 
Lourie 
Oak Tech., Inc. v. 
International Trade 
Comm’n, 248 F.3d 1316, 
1329-30, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1748, 1758  (Fed. 
Cir. 2001). 
2001 cyclic 
redundancy 
checker 
Encyclopedia of Computer 
Science (1976) 
Clevenger 
Pandrol USA v. Airboss 
Ry. Prods., Inc., 10 Fed. 
Appx. 837, 842, 842 n. 1 
(Fed. Cir. 2001). 
2001 adher[e]ing 
material 
Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1985) 
Clevenger 
Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram 
Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 
1344, 60 U.S.P.Q. 2d 
(BNA) 1851, 1855 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) 
2001 portion Random House Unabridged 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1993) 
Clevenger 
Schaefer Fan Co., Inc. v. J 
& D Mfg., 265 F.3d 1282 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) 
2001 rings Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary 
(1998); 
American Heritage College 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1997) 
Rader 
Tapco Int’l Corp. v. Van 
Mark Prods., 18 Fed. 
Appx. 865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) 
2001 portions 
projecting 
outwardly 
from  
Webster’s New Collegiate 
Dictionary (1979) 
Archer 
Tapco Int’l Corp. v. Van 
Mark Prods., 18 Fed. 
Appx. 865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) 
2001 portions 
projecting 
outwardly 
from 
Webster’s New Collegiate 
Dictionary (1979) 
Archer 
Tapco Int’l Corp. v. Van 
Mark Prods., 18 Fed. 
Appx. 865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) 
2001 portions 
projecting 
outwardly 
from 
Webster’s New Collegiate 
Dictionary (1979) 
Archer 
Union Pac. Res. Co. v. 
Chesapeake Energy Corp., 
236 F.3d 684, 692, 57 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293, 
1298  (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
2001 comparing 
[X] to [Y] 
American Heritage College 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1997) 
Rader 
MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:27 PM 
924 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:829 
CASE YEAR CLAIM 
TERM 
SOURCE(S) USED JUDGE 
Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. 
Coating Mach. Sys., Inc., 
239 F.3d 1225, 1232-33, 
57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1679, 1684-85 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) 
2001 air 
circulat[e]i
ng means/[ 
re- ] 
Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988) 
Lourie 
Winbond Elecs. Corp. v. 
International Trade 
Comm’n, 4 Fed. Appx. 
832, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
2001 adjacent 
said [X] 
Webster’s II New Riverside 
University Dictionary (1988) 
Rader 
Banyan Licensing, L.C. v. 
Orthosupport Int’l, Inc., 
34 Fed. Appx. 696, 698 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) 
2002 defines a 
length 
Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989) 
Linn 
Beckson Marine, Inc. v. 
NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 
723-24, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1031, 1034 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) 
2002 sloping 
drain 
groove 
American Heritage 
Dictionary  (4th ed. 2000); 
Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989) 
Rader 
Belden Wire & Cable Co. 
v. Cable Design Techs. 
Corp., 35 Fed. Appx. 905, 
907 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
2002 bronze Copper Development 
Association, Standards 
Handbook:  Wrought & Cast 
Copper and Copper Alloy 
Products (6th ed. 1994) 
Lourie 
Benetton Sportsystem 
USA, Inc. v. First Team 
Sports, Inc., 38 Fed. Appx. 
599, 605 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
2002 toe region Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993) 
Clevenger 
CCS Fitness, Inc. v. 
Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 
1359, 1367, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1658, 1663 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) 
2002 reciprocatin
g member 
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of 
Scientific and Technical 
Terms (5th ed. 1994); 
American Heritage 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1996) 
Michel 
Display Techs., Inc. v. 
Paul Flum Ideas, Inc., 60 
Fed. Appx. 787, 792 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) 
2002 aperture  Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3rd college ed. 
(1994) 
Schall 
Electro Scientific Indus., 
Inc. v. Dynamic Details, 
Inc., 307 F.3d 1343, 1349, 
64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1781, 1784 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) 
2002 workpiece Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989); 
Robert C. Faber, Landis on 
Mechanics of Patent Claim 
Drafting (4th ed. 2000) 
Rader 
Frank’s Casing Crew & 
Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR 
Techs., Ltd., 292 F.3d 
1363, 1374 & n.8, 63 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 
1073 & n. 8 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) 
2002 monitoring 
the torque 
Random House Webster’s 
Unabridged Dictionary (2d 
ed. 1998); 
Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (9th 
ed. 1983) 
Dyk 
Honeywell Inc. v. Victor 
Co. of Japan, Ltd., 298 
F.3d 1317, 1324-25, 63 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1904, 
1907-09  (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
2002 placed 
contiguous 
the [X] 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1966) 
Bryson 
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In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 
1357, 1364, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 2002, 2006  (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) 
2002 speech user 
agent / 
[ speech 
recognition 
] , [ speech 
recognizer 
] 
IBM Dictionary of 
Computing (10th ed. 1994); 
Van Nostrand Reinhold 
Dictionary of Information 
Technology (3d ed. 1989) 
Dyk 
Inverness Med. Switz. 
GmbH v. Princeton 
Biomeditech Corp., 309 
F.3d 1365, 1370 & n. 2-3, 
64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1926, 1930 & n. 2-3  (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) 
2002 mobility of 
said [X] is 
facilitated 
by / 
[ mobile ] 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968); 
Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1947) 
Dyk 
Inverness Med. Switz. 
GmbH v. Princeton 
Biomeditech Corp., 309 
F.3d 1365, 1370 & n. 4, 64 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926, 
1930 & n. 4  (Fed. Cir. 
2002) 
2002 mobility of 
said [X] is 
facilitated 
by 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968) 
Dyk 
Inverness Med. Switz. 
GmbH v. Warner Lambert 
Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1378, 
64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1933, 1936 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) 
2002 onto a 
portion 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968); 
Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1947) 
Dyk 
Inverness Med. Switz. 
GmbH v. Warner Lambert 
Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1378-
79, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1933, 1936-37 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) 
2002 on said [X] Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968); 
Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1947) 
Dyk 
M-3 & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Cargo Sys., Inc., 33 Fed. 
Appx. 513, 515 (Fed. Cir.  
2002) 
2002 restrain the 
door 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968) 
Dyk 
Manning v. Paradis, 296 
F.3d 1098, 1103 & n.1, 63 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681, 
1685 n. 1 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
2002 a method of 
treating 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1966) 
Dyk 
Masco Corp. v. United 
States, 303 F.3d 1316, 
1323-24, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1182, 1186 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) 
2002 to drive the 
lever 
American Heritage 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1996); 
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of 
Scientific and Technical 
Terms (5th ed. 1994) 
Linn 
Masco Corp. v. United 
States, 303 F.3d 1316, 
1327-28, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1182, 1189 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) 
2002 transmittin
g a force/ 
[ transmissi
on ] 
Dictionary of Mechanical 
Engineering (3d ed. 1985); 
Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989) 
Linn 
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Masco Corp. v. United 
States, 303 F.3d 1316, 
1328, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1182, 1189 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) 
2002 the dial American College 
Dictionary (1970) 
Linn 
Middleton, Inc. v. 
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. 
Co., 311 F.3d 1384, 1387, 
65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1138, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) 
2002 uniform 
flexible 
film 
Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1985) 
Rader 
NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident 
Microsystems, Inc., 287 
F.3d 1062, 1070-71, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1482, 
1487-88  (Fed Cir. 2002) 
2002 having a 
coupling 
New IEEE Standard 
Dictionary of Electrical and 
Electronic Terms (5th ed. 
1993); 
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of 
Scientific and Technical 
Terms (5th ed. 1994); 
Modern Dictionary of 
Electronics (7th ed. 1999) 
Clevenger 
Nikken USA, Inc. v. 
Robinsons-May, Inc., 51 
Fed. Appx. 874, 881-81 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) 
2002 magnetic 
polarity 
Serway & Faughn, College 
Physics (4th ed. 1995) 
Lourie 
Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. 
Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 31 
Fed. Appx. 727, 731 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) 
2002 a 
continuous 
slice 
 Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1990) 
Rader 
Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. 
Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 31 
Fed. Appx. 727, 730 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) 
2002 folding Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1990) 
Rader 
Schumer v. Laboratory 
Computer Sys., Inc., 308 
F.3d 1304, 1311, 64 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832, 
1838  (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
2002 or Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1967) 
Dyk 
Semitool, Inc. v. Novellus 
Sys., Inc., 44 Fed. Appx. 
949, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
2002 wafer 
support 
Knight’s American 
Mechanical Dictionary 
(1876) 
Lourie 
Smith Eng’g Co., Inc. v. 
Eisenmann Corp., 28 Fed. 
Appx. 958, 963 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) 
2002 inlet duct American Heritage 
Dictionary (1981) 
Clevenger 
Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. 
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 
1193, 1206, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1813, 1821  (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) 
2002 repeatedly 
substantiall
y 
simultaneo
usly 
activating/[ 
activate ] 
Modern Dictionary of 
Electronics (6th ed. 1984) 
Linn 
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Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. 
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 
1193, 1209, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1813, 1823 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) 
2002 display 
areas 
Illustrated Dictionary of 
Electronics (3d ed. 1985) 
Linn 
Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. 
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 
1193, 1209, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1813, 1823-24  
(Fed. Cir. 2002) 
2002 background 
area 
Illustrated Dictionary of 
Electronics (3d ed. 1985) 
Linn 
Transclean Corp. v. 
Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 
290 F.3d 1364, 1374-75, 
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1865, 1872  (Fed. Cir. 
2002) 
2002 exhibiting 
resilient 
characterist
ics / 
[ resilience] 
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of 
Scientific and Technical 
Terms (5th ed. 1994); 
American Heritage 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1992) 
Lourie 
Union Carbide Chems. & 
Plastics Tech. Corp. v. 
Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d 
1167, 1177, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1545, 1552  (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) 
2002 characteriz
able by an 
efficiency 
equation/[ c
haracterize 
] 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993) 
Prost 
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron 
Bioresearch, Inc., 334 
F.3d 1343, 1350, 67 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337, 
1342  (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 non-
diffusively 
bound 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968) 
Dyk 
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron 
Bioresearch, Inc., 334 
F.3d 1343, 1350, 67 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337, 
1342  (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 non-
diffusively 
immobilize
d 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968) 
Dyk 
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron 
Bioresearch, Inc., 334 
F.3d 1343, 1350, 67 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337, 
1342  (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 non-
diffusively/[
 diffusion ] 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968) 
Dyk 
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron 
Bioresearch, Inc., 334 
F.3d 1343, 1354, 67 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337, 
1345  (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 analyte Skoog et al., Fundamentals 
of Analytical Chemistry (7th 
ed. 1996) 
Dyk 
Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec 
Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 
1373, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865, 1872 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 boot 
selection 
flag 
Microsoft Press Computer 
Dictionary (3d ed.) 
Michel 
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. 
Rockwood Retaining 
Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 
1307-08, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865, 1871  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 back 
surface 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993) 
Gajarsa 
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Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. 
Rockwood Retaining 
Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 
1307-08, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865, 1871  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 back 
surface 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993) 
Gajarsa 
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. 
Rockwood Retaining 
Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 
1308, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865, 1872  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 a 
protrusion 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993) 
Gajarsa 
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. 
Rockwood Retaining 
Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 
1309, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865, 1872  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 to mate Merriam-Webster’s New 
Collegiate Dictionary (10th 
ed. 1998) 
Gajarsa 
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. 
Rockwood Retaining 
Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 
1311, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865, 1872  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 generally 
parallel 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993) 
Gajarsa 
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. 
Rockwood Retaining 
Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 
1311, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865, 1874  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 generally 
parallel 
Merriam-Webster’s New 
Collegiate Dictionary (10th 
ed. 1998) 
Gajarsa 
Apex Inc. v. Raritan 
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 
1364, 1373, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1444, 1451  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 circuit Dictionary of Computing 
(4th ed. 1996) 
Gajarsa 
Apex Inc. v. Raritan 
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 
1364, 1374, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1444, 1452  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 interface 
circuit/[ int
erface ] 
Dictionary of Computing 
(4th ed. 1996); 
Modern Dictionary of 
Electronics (7th ed. 1999) 
Gajarsa 
Apex Inc. v. Raritan 
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 
1364, 1375, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1444, 1453  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 serial data 
packet 
Microsoft Computer 
Dictionary (4th ed. 1999) 
Gajarsa 
Apex Inc. v. Raritan 
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 
1364, 1376, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1444, 1453  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 overlay Microsoft Computer 
Dictionary (4th ed. 1999) 
Gajarsa 
Apex Inc. v. Raritan 
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 
1364, 1376, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1444, 1453  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 overlaid 
signals/[ ov
erlay ] 
Microsoft Computer 
Dictionary (4th ed. 1999) 
Gajarsa 
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Apex Inc. v. Raritan 
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 
1364, 1376-77, 66 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444, 
1454  (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 switch Microsoft Computer 
Dictionary (4th ed. 1999) 
Gajarsa 
Arlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 
345 F.3d 1318, 1326, 68 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1439, 
1444  (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 capable of 
flexing 
Random House Unabridged 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1993) 
Linn 
Bell Communications 
Research, Inc. v. Fore 
Sys., Inc., 62 Fed. Appx. 
951, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 derived 
from 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993) 
Clevenger 
Boehringer Ingelheim 
Vetmedica, Inc. v. 
Schering-Plough Corp., 
320 F.3d 1339, 1346-47, 
65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1961, 1965-66 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) 
2003 isolat[e]ing Dictionary of Microbiology 
and Molecular Biology (2d 
ed. 1987); 
Random House College 
Dictionary (1980) 
Clevenger 
Bowers v. Baystate Techs., 
Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1332  
(Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 plurality Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989) 
Rader 
Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. 
Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 
326 F.3d 1215, 1221, 66 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1517, 
1521  (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 remote 
location 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993) 
Linn 
Deere & Co. v. Toro Co., 
57 Fed. Appx. 442, 447 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 pivotably 
attached 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986) 
Schall 
Deering Precision 
Instruments, LLC. v. 
Vector Distribution Sys., 
Inc. 347 F.3d 1314, 1323, 
68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1716, 1722  (Fed. Cir. 
2003) 
2003 substantiall
y in [X] 
Webster’s New 20th Century 
Dictionary (1983) 
Gajarsa 
E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 
3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 
1364, 1367, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1947, 1949  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 electronic 
multi-
function 
card 
Merriam-Webster’s New 
Collegiate Dictionary (10th 
ed. 1999); 
Random House Webster’s 
Unabridged Dictionary (2d 
ed. 1998); 
Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989) 
Dyk 
Ferguson 
Beauregard/Logic 
Controls, Inc. v. Mega Sys. 
LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1339, 
69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1001, 1009  (Fed. Cir. 
2003) 
2003 normal 
plunger 
performanc
e 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1966) 
Linn 
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Ferguson 
Beauregard/Logic 
Controls, Inc. v. Mega Sys. 
LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1340, 
69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1001, 1010  (Fed. Cir. 
2003) 
2003 predetermi
ned plunger 
performanc
e 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1966) 
Linn 
Genzyme Corp. v. 
Transkaryotic Therapies, 
Inc., 346 F.3d 1094, 1098, 
68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1596, 1599  (Fed. Cir. 
2003) 
2003 chromosom
ally 
integrated/[
 integration 
] 
Benjamin Lewin, Genes IV 
(1990) 
Rader 
Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. 
Andrx Pharms., Inc., 344 
F.3d 1226, 1229, 68 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1302, 
1304  (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 hydroxypro
pyl 
methylcellu
lose 
Michael Ash & Irene Ash, 
Handbook of 
Pharmaceutical Additives 
(1995) 
Newman 
Intellectual Prop. Dev., 
Inc. v. UA-Columbia 
Cablevision, Inc., 336 F.3d 
1308, 1315-16, 1316 n. 7, 
67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1385, 1390 & n. 7 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 high 
frequency 
carrier 
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of 
Scientific and Technical 
Terms (1974); 
Webster’s Seventh New 
Collegiate Dictionary 
(1967); 
Oxford English Dictionary; 
Dictionary of Electronics 
Schall 
Libman Co. v. Quickie 
Mfg. Co., 74 Fed. Appx. 
900, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 surround 
the [X] 
Webster’s II New College 
Dictionary (1995) 
Rader 
Moba, B.V. v. Diamond 
Automation Inc., 325 F.3d 
1306, 1315, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1429, 1435  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 holding 
stations / 
[ to hold ] 
Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989) 
Per  
Curiam 
Moba, B.V. v. Diamond 
Automation Inc., 325 F.3d 
1306, 1316-17, 66 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 
1436  (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 to urge the 
[X] 
Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989) 
Per  
Curiam 
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Nautilus Group, Inc. v. 
Icon Health & Fitness, 
Inc., 82 Fed. Appx. 691, 
692-93 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 in 
cantilevere
d fashion 
American Heritage 
Dictionary Second College 
Edition (1986); 
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of 
Scientific and Technical 
Terms (3d ed. 1984); 
Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary 
(1986); 
Wordsworth Dictionary of 
Science and Technology 
(1995); 
Marks’ Standard Handbook 
for Mechanical Engineers 
(9th ed. 1987); 
McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia 
of Science and Technology 
(7th ed. 1992) 
Rader 
Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. 
Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 
1314, 1322, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1321, 1326  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 the 
periphery 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993) 
Clevenger 
Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp., 
76 Fed. Appx. 293, 296-
97, 297 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) 
2003 oligonucleo
tide 
Melloni’s Illustrated 
Medical Dictionary (1979); 
Dorland’s Illustrated 
Medical Dictionary (26th ed. 
1981); 
Stedman’s Medical 
Dictionary (24th ed. 1982); 
Stedman’s Medical 
Dictionary (26th ed. 1995) 
Rader 
Pinnacle Pigging Sys., Inc. 
v. Eliminator Pigging Sys. 
USA, Inc., 55 Fed. Appx. 
943, 944-45 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) 
2003 after 
inflat[e]ion 
of 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968) 
Per Curiam 
Rambus Inc. v. Infineon 
Techs. Ag, 318 F.3d 1081, 
1091, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1705, 1711  (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) 
2003 integrated 
circuit 
device 
New IEEE Standard 
Dictionary of Electrical and 
Electronic Terms (5th ed. 
1993); 
IBM Dictionary of 
Computing (10th ed. 1994) 
Rader 
Rambus Inc. v. Infineon 
Techs. Ag, 318 F.3d 1081, 
1094, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1705, 1713-14  
(Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 bus New IEEE Standard 
Dictionary of Electrical and 
Electronic Terms (5th ed. 
1993) 
Rader 
Simmons, Inc. v. 
Bombardier, Inc., 73 Fed. 
Appx. 421, 423 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) 
2003 a bottom 
for [X] 
American Heritage College 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1993) 
Per Curiam 
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System Div., Inc. v. Teknek 
LLC, 59 Fed. Appx. 333, 
339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 permitting 
ready 
removal 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1968); 
Random House Webster’s 
Unabridged Dictionary (2d 
ed. 1998) 
Dyk 
Waner v. Ford Motor Co., 
331 F.3d 851, 854, 66 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943, 
1946  (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
2003 inboard 
side flange 
Webster’s New 20th Century 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1962) 
Archer 
Animatics Corp. v. 
Quicksilver Controls, Inc., 
102 Fed. Appx. 659, 665 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 modular 
motor body 
Webster’s Seventh New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1976) 
Schall 
Animatics Corp. v. 
Quicksilver Controls, Inc., 
102 Fed. Appx. 659, 662, 
664-65 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 modular 
control unit 
Webster’s Seventh New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1976) 
Schall 
Animatics Corp. v. 
Quicksilver Controls, Inc., 
102 Fed. Appx. 659, 665-
67 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 connected 
to 
Webster’s Seventh New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1976) 
Schall 
Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. 
Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 
F.3d 1367, 1372, 69 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1996, 
1999  (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 surrender 
value 
protected 
investment 
credits 
Barron’s Dictionary of 
Insurance Terms (4th ed. 
2000) 
Bryson 
Edwards Sys. Tech., Inc. v. 
Digital Control Sys., Inc., 
99 Fed. Appx. 911, 912-13 
(Fed. Cir. May 18, 2004) 
2004 specularly-
reflective 
surface /[ 
specular 
reflection ] 
, [ specular 
reflector ] 
Photonics Dictionary (2000) Archer 
Globetrotter Software, Inc. 
v. Elan Computer Group, 
Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1380, 
70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1161, 1171  (Fed. Cir. 
2004)  
2004 a message 
preventing 
said copy 
Random House Webster’s 
Unabridged Dictionary (2d 
ed. 1998); 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(2002) 
Dyk 
Goldenberg v. Cytogen, 
Inc., 373 F.3d 1158, 1165, 
71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) 
2004 beta-
subunit 
Dorland’s Illustrated 
Medical Dictionary (29th ed. 
2000) 
Gajarsa 
Goldenberg v. Cytogen, 
Inc., 373 F.3d 1158, 1165-
66, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) 
2004 intracellula
r marker 
substance 
Dorland’s Illustrated 
Medical Dictionary (29th ed. 
2000) 
Gajarsa 
Housey Pharms., Inc. v. 
AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 366 
F.3d 1348, 1353, 70 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 
1645  (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 an inhibitor 
or activator 
of a protein 
Chambers Dictionary of 
Science and Technology 
(1999) 
Clevenger 
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Housey Pharms., Inc. v. 
AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 366 
F.3d 1348, 1353, 70 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 
1645  (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 an inhibitor 
or activator 
of a protein 
Henderson’s Dictionary of 
Biological Terms (11th ed. 
1995) 
Clevenger 
In re Morgan, 87 Fed. 
Appx. 746, 750 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) 
2004 a recess Webster’s II New Riverside 
University Dictionary (1984) 
Gajarsa 
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel 
Corp., 89 Fed. Appx. 218, 
229 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 in a [Z] Webster’s New World 
Dictionary (3d college ed. 
1988) 
Lourie 
International Rectifier 
Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 
F.3d 1363, 1370-71, 70 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209, 
1215  (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 polygonal 
region 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1966); 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993) 
Linn 
International Rectifier 
Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 
F.3d 1363. 1372, 70 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209, 
1216  (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 annular 
ring 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1966) 
Linn 
International Rectifier 
Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 
F.3d 1363, 1374, 70 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209, 
1217 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 adjoining Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1966) 
Linn 
Leoutsakos v. Coll’s Hosp. 
Pharmacy, Inc., 98 Fed. 
Appx. 835, 838-39 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) 
2004 planar 
plate 
member 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993) 
Rader 
Linear Tech. Corp. v. 
Impala Linear Corp., 71 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 
1165-66 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 circuit Dictionary of Computing 
(4th ed. 1996); 
Modern Dictionary of 
Electronics (7th ed. 1999) 
Linn 
Linear Tech. Corp. v. 
Impala Linear Corp., 71 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 
1168-69 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 simultaneo
usly 
off/[ simult
aneous ] 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993) 
Linn 
Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-
Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 
1340, 1347 n. 3, 69 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1815, 
1821 n.3  (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 full duplex Microsoft Press Computer 
Dictionary (1991) 
Lourie 
Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-
Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 
1340, 1352, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1815, 1825  (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) 
2004 headers Microsoft Computer 
Dictionary (4th ed. 1999) 
Lourie 
Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. 
Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 363 
F.3d 1306, 1308-09, 70 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 
1440 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 hydrosol Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(2002) 
Dyk 
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Nystrom v. TREX Co., 
Inc., 374 F.3d 1105, 1111-
12, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1241, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) 
2004 board Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(2002); 
American Heritage 
Dictionary (4th ed. 2000) 
Linn 
Nystrom v. TREX Co., 
Inc., 374 F.3d 1105, 1115, 
71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1241, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) 
2004 convex top 
surface 
American Heritage 
Dictionary (4th ed. 2000) 
Linn 
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
363 F.3d 1207, 1212, 70 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 
1420  (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 internal 
steel baffles 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993) 
Lourie 
SuperGuide Corp. v. 
DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 
F.3d 870, 850, 69 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 
1872  (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 regularly 
received 
American Heritage 
Dictionary (6th ed. 1976) 
Prost 
SuperGuide Corp. v. 
DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 
F.3d 870, 882, 69 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 
1874  (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 a search on Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1993) 
Prost 
SuperGuide Corp. v. 
DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 
F.3d 870, 886, 69 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 
1877  (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 at least one 
of [W], [X], 
[Y], and 
[Z] 
Strunk & White, The 
Elements of Style (4th ed. 
2000) 
Prost 
TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. 
Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., 
L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 
1134, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1328, 1334  (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) 
2004 fuel 
reservoir 
Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989); 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986) 
Linn 
TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. 
Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., 
L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 
1135-36, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1328, 1335-36 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 within Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989); 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986) 
Linn 
TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. 
Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., 
L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 
1138, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1328, 1337  (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) 
2004 opening for 
connecting 
Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989) 
Linn 
TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. 
Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., 
L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 
1138, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1328, 1337  (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) 
2004 opening for 
connecting 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(1986) 
Linn 
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Ultratech Stepper, Inc. v. 
ASM Lithography, Inc., 97 
Fed. Appx. 914, 919-20 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 microcircui
t device 
Oxford Reference 
Dictionary (1989); 
McGraw-Hill Electronics 
Dictionary (5th ed. 1994) 
Schall 
W.E. Hall Co., Inc. v. 
Atlanta Corrugating, LLC, 
370 F.3d 1343, 1350, 71 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1135, 
1140  (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 open 
channels 
Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989) 
Gajarsa 
Zimmer, Inc. v. 
Howmedica Osteonics 
Corp., 111 Fed. Appx. 
593, 599 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
2004 modular 
prosthesis 
system 
Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 
(2002) 
Dyk 
 
 
 
